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Africa Organised Crime Index 2023

Increasing criminality,
growing vulnerabilities



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ENACT is implemented by



Contents

1 Introduction	4
1.1 Preface	6
1.2 Vulnerabilities in an evolving criminal landscape	7
1.3 Crime and conflict nexus	9
1.4 How resilience and democracy are connected	12
2 About the Index	14
2.1 Methodology	18
2.2 Index scoring process and limitations	19
2.3 How to read the pyramid representations	21
3 Criminality	22
3.1 Continental overview and analysis	24
3.2 Criminal markets	26
3.3 Criminal actors	32
3.4 Regional analysis	33
East Africa	34
West Africa	39
North Africa	45
Central Africa	51
Southern Africa	57
4 Resilience	64
4.1 Continental overview	66
4.2 Indicator trends	68
4.3 Regional breakdown	70
West Africa	71
Southern Africa	75
North Africa	79
East Africa	83
Central Africa	87

5 The crime–resilience nexus	92
6 Conclusion	98
Appendix 1	
Interpreting the results	103
A1.1 Diversity in the Index components.....	103
A1.2 Limitations.....	104
A1.3 Broader scope: additional Index indicators.....	105
Appendix 2	
Definitions	106
A2.1 Defining organised crime.....	106
A2.2 Criminal market definitions.....	107
A2.3 Criminal actor definitions.....	110
A2.4 Resilience indicator definitions.....	110
Appendix 3	
Ranking tables	115
A3.1 Criminality scores.....	115
A3.2 Criminal market scores.....	116
A3.3 Criminal actor scores.....	120
A3.4 Resilience scores.....	122
Notes	127
Acknowledgements	131

SECTION 1

Introduction





1 Introduction

1.1 Preface

Since 2019, the ENACT¹ Organised Crime Index for Africa (Index) has been published as a biennial snapshot of criminality and resilience on the continent. The 2023 Index is the third iteration of this tool, offering an insight into the criminal markets, criminal actors and the state of resilience in Africa in 2022, as well as a longitudinal analysis spanning 2018 to 2022.

Over the past five years, criminality across Africa has steadily increased and shows no sign of slowing down. Human trafficking remains a serious challenge; the cocaine markets have spiked in East, West and Southern Africa; and financial crimes are endemic in many regions, especially in North Africa. State-embedded actors continue to be involved in criminal markets and, following the removal of COVID-19-related travel restrictions, foreign actors are again driving criminality due to porous borders and the transnational nature of organised crime. At the same time, despite slowly returning to pre-pandemic levels, resilience in Africa has failed to keep up with increasing criminality.

While nuances exist from country to country, conflict and levels of democracy are key contextual factors when assessing criminality and resilience levels in Africa. Higher levels of criminality tend to be found in areas experiencing conflicts, which range from armed ethnic wars to political instability. Conflict leads both to the financing of illicit markets, such as arms trafficking and the illicit trade in non-renewable resources, and to increased vulnerability and the rise in other illicit practices, such as human trafficking and human smuggling. Conflict also inhibits resilience, as it shifts the focus from fighting criminal threats to addressing other issues such as extremism and political fragility. The Index has found resilience to be generally higher in democracies than in authoritarian states. This is because countries tend to be better equipped for combating organised crime if they have an effective rule of law, adequate accountability mechanisms, and a free and open civil society. In other words, good governance and a high degree of state transparency are essential for enhancing resilience.

EVOLUTION OF THE ENACT ORGANISED CRIME INDEX FOR AFRICA

- The first iteration of the Index was published in 2019, with the intention to ‘catalyse a dialogue, and offer a common nomenclature and framework for understanding the challenge’ of organised crime by evaluating levels of criminality and resilience on the continent.²
- In 2021, the second iteration was released, capturing the evolution of criminality and resilience within a world significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. It was published alongside the Global Organized Crime Index, the first ever assessment of criminality and resilience on a global scale. The introduction of global benchmarks in 2021 enabled the Index to compare criminality and resilience in Africa to the rest of the world, as well as across African countries and regions.
- The 2023 Index offers insight into the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on organised crime in Africa. It covers the period before, during and after the pandemic, including the post-pandemic mitigation measures adopted to stop the spread and limit the effect of COVID-19. In response to the ever-changing organised crime climate, the Index has expanded its scope, adding indicators with the aim of capturing real-world dynamics and criminality in countries that are not traditionally affected by the original criminal indicators (see Section 2).

Across its three editions, the ENACT Organised Crime Index for Africa has monitored criminality and resilience patterns on the continent, as they evolved alongside political crises, civil wars and declining governance structures. The longitudinal analysis over five years has further highlighted

the nexus between crime and conflict, and the interconnectedness of resilience and democracy. In brief, where there is conflict and instability, criminality increases, and where democratic institutions are strong, countries are better able to build resilience against organised crime.

1.2 Vulnerabilities in an evolving criminal landscape

Although Africa has experienced major geopolitical, economic and social changes since the publication of the first edition of the ENACT Organised Crime Index Africa in 2019, organised crime has endured as a constant, often thriving in times of crisis. Since the first Index, our expert assessments of criminality have found that illicit economies have expanded across Africa’s regions, and criminal actors have gained a foothold in a continually changing environment, largely characterised by new conflicts, political

instability and growing economic inequality. In addition to these persistent, chronic challenges, other sporadic issues have contributed to undermining the security landscape of the continent, such as recurring health crises, the impacts of climate change and cyber vulnerabilities. All these dynamics have shown how adaptive organised crime in Africa has become, proving how criminal interests are able to seize new opportunities to solidify their presence and heighten fragility.

Organised crime has found opportunities to expand in Africa, putting institutional stability and governance at risk. Violence and coups in some regions have continued to threaten peace and development, highlighting how conflict creates increased vulnerability to organised crime, as criminal actors take advantage of instability and divert attention to pursue illicit activities unabated. Moreover, state capture and the compromising of key institutions across the continent, such as law enforcement agencies and judicial systems, have raised fears of the declining effectiveness of resilience mechanisms against criminality in certain areas. This has proven to be especially true with regard to civil society, such as the media and non-governmental organisations engaged in exposing or tackling organised crime, or mitigating its impact in vulnerable communities. For many civil society actors, the erosion of their ability to operate freely has meant an increasingly restricted civic space in which they can work.

Nevertheless, positive developments have also been detected in some African countries, showing the endurance of certain governance frameworks. Many elections held on the continent in recent years and those that are planned for next year can be seen as a response to the worrying derailments of some democratic processes, highlighting the need to support legal pathways. Despite such encouraging signals, however, Africa's overall reservoir of resilience remains deficient. As organised crime continues to grow, it is clear that responses have been inadequate and that there is a need for a more integrated approach to tackle the problem.

Monitoring the evolution of organised crime and resilience in Africa alongside contextual factors, such as the emergence of conflicts and the status of democracy, helps us better understand how these issues are interrelated and where vulnerabilities lie. For example, analysis shows that regions experiencing conflicts tend to exhibit higher levels of criminality. Conflict contributes to the financing of illicit markets and intensifies susceptibility to activities such as human smuggling or arms trafficking. Armed groups, in particular, play a significant role in perpetuating instability, lawlessness and violence in order to protect vested interests. Conflict also impedes resilience efforts by diverting attention and resources away from

organised crime threats. At the same time, the Index has identified that democratic states enjoy greater levels of resilience, emphasising the crucial role of effective rule of law, accountability mechanisms and a transparent civil society in combating organised crime.

Over its three editions, this tool has provided not only a holistic overview of the main macro trends in Africa, but also an analysis of the regional and local contexts. The longitudinal assessment has offered insights into the evolution of criminal threats and the tenure of resilience mechanisms, with proxy indicators, such as conflict and democracy, enhancing the level of the analysis. The result is an attempt at identifying key vulnerabilities on the African continent over time, with the purpose of building up predictive functions of the Index in the future. The Index results collected, assessed and analysed by experts over a five-year time frame have led to the following main findings:

- **Criminality across Africa has risen.** Criminal markets, for which there are three rounds of data over the five years, like human trafficking and arms trafficking, have all experienced growth across the continent. In some cases this has been significant; for example, the cocaine trade has recorded the biggest increase since 2019. In contrast, newly introduced markets incorporated in the 2023 edition, such as cyber-dependent crimes, have been identified as less widespread, though exceptions exist. The relatively lower pervasiveness of these newly included markets does not negate the potential for them to become more prevalent in the future, serving as a noteworthy alert for policymakers.
- **Resilience efforts are failing to adequately address the organised crime threat.** Despite the enduring upswing in criminality across the continent, resilience in Africa has struggled to match the escalation of criminal activities, thereby resulting in a widening gap between criminality and resilience. Although there was a modest increase in resilience levels from 2021 to 2023, Africa remains the continent with the lowest resilience levels globally and these developments have proven insufficient in countering organised crime in Africa, which has been increasing substantially compared to the sluggish pace of resilience.

- **Conflict creates opportunities for criminality to thrive.** Widespread insecurity, ranging from political violence to open conflict, enables illicit markets to flourish and criminal groups to exploit insecurities and act with general impunity. At the same time, organised crime is also considered a key factor in sustaining conflict, violence and generally fractious societies, highlighting the significance of the crime–conflict nexus.
- **Democratic values can contribute to building effective, sustainable responses.** Just as conflict is linked to criminality, democracy shows a strong correlation with resilience, indicating that governance standards can influence state capacity to effectively respond to criminal threats. Democracies, which are generally characterised by rule of law, well-established checks and balances on state accountability, strong social protection mechanisms and an open civic space, are considered to be more equipped than authoritarian states to address the root causes as well as the different manifestations of organised crime.
- **The space for civil society is shrinking.** A major challenge identified since the inception of the Index is the shrinking environment for civil society, including independent media, as crucial actors supporting the fight against organised crime. The already limited civic space has been observed to be progressively diminishing since 2019 across the three iterations of the Index.
- **Africa faces unique challenges and opportunities.** While some macro continental trends have been identified, it is important to delve into local contexts in order to fully understand how organised crime and resilience dynamics evolve and unfold. In particular, since 2019, East Africa has been assessed as the region with the highest levels of criminality, driven largely by armed and ethnic conflicts, and the presence of non-state armed groups and militias. Southern Africa, despite showing the lowest regional levels of crime on the continent, has seen levels of criminality progressively increase since 2019. With regards to resilience, West Africa has shown some relatively positive developments in 2023 despite facing multiple challenges. Central Africa, on the other hand, continues to exhibit the lowest resilience levels in Africa, with limited signs of improvement since 2019.

These findings and assessments are unpacked in detail in this report.

1.3 Crime and conflict nexus


States that are characterised by conflict and instability are often prone to providing the conditions for organised criminality to thrive. The opposite is also arguably true, as a wide spectrum of illicit economies, ranging from illegal mining to arms and drug trafficking, are known to lead to fragility and conflict once a certain threshold is reached. The African continent continues to be a prime example of this two-way situation. Available data illustrates how conflict and criminality have become intertwined, with either conflict becoming a booster for criminality, or criminality enabling political and economic

tensions, which could in turn potentially feed conflict and fragility.³

In 2022, although the war in Ukraine focused global attention on conflict in Europe, insecurity and instability continued to have a major impact in Africa, where nearly 1 000 more conflict events occurred compared to the previous year.⁴ Civilians bore the brunt of these crises, with the surge in conflicts accompanied by an increase in the number of civilian casualties.

FIGURE 1.1

Conflict hotspots



The Index's results show that widespread insecurity has influenced and sustained criminality patterns on the continent (and vice versa). Political violence increased in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where state forces were engaged in ongoing conflict with violent extremist groups.⁵ Armed conflict spilled over in West Africa, reportedly fuelling criminal groups and armed bandits, who sought to expand their areas of influence.⁶ At the same time, illicit economies, such as cattle rustling and kidnapping for ransom, continued to undermine stability in the region, illustrating the growing 'geographic overlap between crime and conflict zones'.⁷ In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the M23, an armed militia group, took control of territory in the mineral-rich eastern region,⁸ which contributed to the country's high levels of non-renewable resource crimes. The Wagner Group,⁹ the notorious Russian private military company, maintained its foothold in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Mali, where it was involved in illicit markets, such as arms trafficking and illicit gold mining, and was accused of human rights violations.¹⁰ The involvement of Wagner

at the time worsened the volatile situation in Sudan, where the group reportedly profited from the mining and smuggling of gold.¹¹

Since the first iteration of the Index, political instability and conflict-ridden areas have evolved across regions, with the enduring fragility of certain states emboldening organised crime. For example, after years of instability and the civil war, Libya continues to be embroiled in conflict,¹² which has created conditions for the country to become a hotbed of crime for illicit markets, ranging from human smuggling to non-renewable resource crimes and arms trafficking. Similarly, since 2017, the Cabo Delgado conflict in northern Mozambique, which is driven by both ideological and socio-economic issues,¹³ has created fertile ground for the expansion of many illicit economies, such as the drug trade. On the other hand, organised crime is considered a key factor in sustaining conflict, violence and generally fractious societies, but there is a correlation, rather than a causal relationship between conflict and criminality.

CORRELATIONS AND HOW TO READ THEM


To better understand organised crime dynamics on the African continent, this report explores the association (or correlation) of different components/ indicators of the Index among themselves and with external variables. Importantly, the correlations discussed here do not by default indicate causation. In other words, an observed relationship between two variables does not necessarily mean that a change in one indicator would directly cause a change in the other.

The strength and direction of a correlation is measured on a scale of -1.0 to +1.0. The closer the correlation coefficient (the

numeric value) to -1 or +1, the stronger the relationship between two variables; the midpoint of the scale (0) indicates that the variables are not related at all to one another. For the purpose of the current analysis, 0 to ± 0.20 is considered weak; ± 0.21 to ± 0.60 is considered moderate; and ± 0.61 to ± 1.0 is considered strong.

Negative values show that both variables move in opposite directions, so when one variable increases, the other decreases; while positive values demonstrate that both variables move in the same direction, so when one variable increases (or decreases), the other increases (or decreases).

FIGURE 1.2
Criminality and 2022 Fragile States Index




Source: Fund for Peace, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>

An analysis of the 2023 Index results and the 2022 Fragile States Index¹⁴ found the correlation between criminality and fragility to be moderate (+0.51), indicating that criminality is higher in countries that were characterised by increased fragility. During the reporting period, the African countries that had the highest scores for criminality – the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.35), Nigeria (7.28), Kenya (7.02) and Libya (6.93) – all experienced fragility and conflict in one form or the other.

Furthermore, the findings show that conflict and fragility pose a major obstacle to a country’s resilience, or ability to respond to organised crime. The correlation between resilience and fragility was -0.67, meaning that security, social, political or economic pressures will affect a country’s ability to respond to organised crime. This is logical because, in such a situation, the primary concern would be the threat of violence or the underlying fragility, not organised crime, which would be left to develop unchecked.

1.4 How resilience and democracy are connected

FIGURE 1.3
Resilience and the 2022 Democracy Index



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022, <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/>

According to the 2023 Index results and the 2022 Democracy Index,¹⁵ the correlation between resilience and democracy was strong (+0.75) in Africa, indicating that governance standards have an undeniable influence on criminality and resilience levels. This confirms the 2021 Index's findings, that democratic countries have higher levels of resilience than authoritarian states.

While democratic countries still face their own challenges, experiencing varying levels of criminality and resilience, the relationship between democracy and resilience is fairly easy to establish. Democracies, such as Cabo Verde, South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana,¹⁶ which are assessed to have higher resilience scores, have relatively well-established checks and balances for state accountability, and strong non-state actors and social protection mechanisms, such as an active civil society that participates in the fight against organised crime. Democracies with an established rule of law also tend to have stronger institutions and (to some extent) lower levels of corruption, as well as a generally independent judiciary and relatively effective law enforcement, which are key elements in combating organised crime.

A state's resilience to organised crime depends on not only the regime type but also the levels of governance, i.e., how effectively governments have implemented policies and services in areas such as security and democratic participation. According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance¹⁷ (IIAG), over the past decade, governance standards across Africa have declined significantly, resulting in a 'less safe, secure and democratic' continent.¹⁸ Reasons for the decline in governance include the growing unpopularity of elected leaders and dwindling economic prospects, as well as external factors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been an immense economic stressor. Other factors include the crackdown on independent media and rising living costs (in part due to the war in Ukraine).

In this respect, a clear link has been observed between deteriorating governance and overall levels of resilience, as the relationship between resilience and governance (as measured by the IIAG) was strong (+0.84). Furthermore, corruption is a proxy indicator for good governance, as it erodes and undermines existing resilience measures. This was supported by the strong relationship (of +0.79) between corruption (measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index¹⁹) and resilience levels. The implication is that countries with extensive and pervasive corruption would have lower levels of governance and, by extension, lower resilience to organised crime.

The above analysis has highlighted the broad findings of the 2023 Index, linking them to the changing trends and contextual dynamics that affect African countries. In particular, it has explored the role played by external variables, such as conflict and democracy, and how they have contributed to criminality and resilience patterns in Africa in recent years. The following sections will delve into the structure of the tool and its new geographic and thematic findings, offering an overview of the main changes in criminality and resilience, at continental, regional and country levels, since the Index's first iteration.



SECTION 2

About the Index





2 About the Index

Modelling an index is no easy feat, especially one that is intended to assess a phenomenon as clandestine as organised crime. Therefore, the Index model proposes an alternative, commodity-driven assessment framework to measure illicit markets through combining scope and scale, as well as value and impact. In this way, the Index aims to reconcile the information gaps apparent in other frameworks.

The 2023 ENACT Organised Crime Index is based on three key components:

- The scope, scale and impact of 15 criminal markets
- The structure and influence of five criminal actor types
- The existence and capacity of countries to be resilient to organised crime, measured across 12 resilience building blocks

In 2023, the second Global Organized Crime Index was published, presenting a comprehensive evaluation of criminality and resilience in 193 countries, alongside this, the third edition of the Africa Index. The Global Index presents a broad overview of organised crime, while the Africa Index provides a detailed assessment of the continent, offering insights into the current state and emerging trends in criminality and resilience. Having both a global and continent specific index for Africa is valuable, as together they allow for a more profound understanding of Africa's position in the global criminal landscape, facilitate comparisons with global trends, and offer a comprehensive view of the African continent. Therefore, these two indices should be viewed as complementary, as they provide different

perspectives when assessing Africa's situation. Moreover, Africa is the only continent to have longitudinal data on criminality and resilience (collected over three periods, starting from the inception of the Index in 2019), including two datasets that are globally calibrated (in 2021 and 2023). This wealth of data enables stakeholders to identify continental and regional trends and needs for addressing organised crime.


As mentioned above, while the first two editions of the Index analysed 10 criminal markets and four criminal actors, this third edition looks at 15 criminal markets and five criminal actors (Figure 2.1; bold text indicates new markets and actors).

THE INDEX'S DEFINITION OF 'ORGANISED CRIME'

Illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

FIGURE 2.1

Criminality indicators



Criminal actors

- ▲ CA1. Mafia-style groups
- ▲ CA2. Criminal networks
- ▲ CA3. State-embedded actors
- ▲ CA4. Foreign actors
- ▲ CA5. Private sector actors

Criminal markets

- ◆ CM1. Human trafficking
- ◆ CM2. Human smuggling
- ◆ CM3. Extortion and protection racketeering
- ◆ CM4. Arms trafficking
- ◆ CM5. Trade in counterfeit goods
- ◆ CM6. Illicit trade in excisable goods
- ◆ CM7. Flora crimes
- ◆ CM8. Fauna crimes
- ◆ CM9. Non-renewable resource crimes
- ◆ CM10. Heroin trade
- ◆ CM11. Cocaine trade
- ◆ CM12. Cannabis trade
- ◆ CM13. Synthetic drug trade
- ◆ CM14. Cyber-dependent crimes
- ◆ CM15. Financial crimes

The feasibility of including new criminality indicators into the framework of the Index was assessed through the commissioning of expert studies on a range of criminal markets and on the outcomes of several technical reference group meetings. Thematic experts assessed the proposed definitions, research criteria and methodological considerations for the inclusion of the new criminality indicators. In the end, the existing 14 criminality indicators were increased to 20. The full

definitions of all indicators are available in Appendix 2 and can be downloaded from africa.ocindex.net.

Criminality evaluations allow stakeholders to identify threats and their potency, whereas resilience assessments look at the presence and effectiveness of measures that countries have in place to combat organised crime threats. Resilience takes on different forms in various contexts because the nature of organised crime and its varied dynamics across


the world mean that what works in one region may have little impact in another. To account for the different problems posed by organised crime across a wide range of contexts, resilience measures, as defined under the Index, are far-reaching and multi-sectoral. Taken as a whole, the 12 resilience indicators form the building blocks to provide holistic and sustainable responses to organised crime (Figure 2.2).

THE INDEX'S DEFINITION OF 'RESILIENCE'

The ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

FIGURE 2.2

Resilience indicators



- R1. Political leadership and governance
- R2. Government transparency and accountability
- R3. International cooperation
- R4. National policies and laws
- R5. Judicial system and detention
- R6. Law enforcement
- R7. Territorial integrity
- R8. Anti-money laundering
- R9. Economic regulatory capacity
- R10. Victim and witness support
- R11. Prevention
- R12. Non-state actors

2.1 Methodology

This is an abridged version of the methodology applied in the research to compile the Index. The full methodology is available at africa.ocindex.net, alongside the guiding questions that were used to assign and justify criminality and resilience scores.

All countries are assigned a criminality score, which comprises two subcomponents: criminal markets and criminal actors. The assessment of the criminal markets subcomponent entails determining the monetary and non-monetary impact of a market

(considering different factors, such as the geographic concentration of the market, number of people affected by or involved in the market, the presence of violence and the scarcity of the commodity illicitly traded). The criminal actors evaluation measures the organisational capacity, level of sophistication and overall influence of criminal groups on the state and society more broadly.

Countries are also assigned a resilience score, to assess the level at which states have established

the appropriate legal, political and strategic frameworks to address organised crime. The assessment of the 12 resilience indicators are centred around the presence (or lack) of resilience measures or frameworks, and how effective they are in counteracting criminality in compliance with international human rights standards.


Under these components, each standalone indicator is assigned scores on a scale of 1 to 10. For the criminality indicators (criminal markets and criminal actors), a score of 1 means a market

or actor type that is absent or has little influence, while a score of 10 represents a market or actor type that is pervasive and highly influential. For the resilience indicators, the same numeric scale is used, but the scoring thresholds are inverted, with a score of 1 representing low resilience and a score of 10 representing high resilience.

Disclaimer: Small discrepancies of 0.01 in calculations of differences between 2019, 2021 and 2023 scores might occur due to binary round-off errors.

2.2 Index scoring process and limitations

FIGURE 2.3
Index development process





To maintain consistency, every Index iteration undergoes the same multi-stage development process. For all the countries, preliminary country profiles outlining the context behind each criminality and resilience indicator were constructed through open-source research. The country profiles then underwent two rounds of independent country and thematic scoring and evaluation by different experts. An additional round of verifications by geographic experts was carried out to ensure regional score calibration and serve as a check for country profile narratives, before country profiles were again assessed in a final round for continental and global calibration purposes.

Following up on previously identified limitations, necessary steps were taken to build a more accurate representation of organised crime globally, adding cross-cutting illicit activities, such as financial and cyber-dependent crimes to the Index framework. However, due to the new indicator additions, general comparisons with the 2021 and 2019 results should be approached with caution. Nevertheless, individual indicator and general resilience comparisons between the 2019, 2021 and 2023 Index iterations remain valid. Similarly, since 2021, the results for Africa reflect the continent's scores when calibrated globally. Although this variation means that users should approach comparisons between African scores for 2019 and subsequent iterations with caution, particularly at an individual country level, the first iteration still allows policymakers to assess changes in regional and country relationships, and identify key continental trends.



Although not included in the Index as a standalone criminal market, corruption is captured as an aggravating factor when determining the scores for each of the 15 criminal markets. Furthermore, corruption is a cross-cutting theme in the criminal actors and resilience components of the Index.

Finally, as an expert-led assessment, the Index may be subject to implicit and confirmation biases in both its development and the interpretation of its results. In response, the Index methodology was designed to limit these risks to the best extent possible through multiple independent and anonymised reviews, and standardised development guidelines.

2.3 How to read the pyramid representations

Pyramid width and height

The **criminal markets** score is represented by the Pyramid base size and the **criminal actors** score is represented by the Pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.




Panel height

The **resilience score** is represented by the Panel height which can be identified by the side of the Panel.

Africa average score

The Pyramid shape represents the criminality score, the average between criminal actors and criminal markets.

The overall **criminality** score for Africa is 5.25. This score is composed by a 5.05 score for **criminal markets**, and 5.45 for **criminal actors**. The **resilience** score is 3.85.



SECTION 3

Criminality





3 Criminality


3.1 Continental overview and analysis

Africa has long grappled with high levels of organised crime that manifests in a range of illicit activities and criminal actors operating across the continent. Individual countries take on a variety of roles within the illicit economy and, over time, have become entwined with transnational illicit flows. The pervasiveness of criminality and transnational organised crime in Africa has been discussed in boardrooms and international forums in the context of state security, but these discussions rarely consider the detrimental impacts of criminality on communities and their livelihoods.

During the reporting period, Africa faced numerous challenges, including armed conflicts, the long-term effects of the pandemic, the global ramifications of the Russia–Ukraine war, extreme climate events (including droughts and flooding), and heightened political instabilities. These conditions created an ideal environment for criminal markets and actors to flourish and extend their influence on the continent.

Between 2019 and 2023, overall criminality in Africa rose from 4.97 to 5.25, increasing by 0.20 points between 2019 and 2021 and by 0.08 points since 2021. However, if only the original indicators are included (i.e. 10 criminal markets and four criminal actor types), overall criminality rose by 0.23 since 2021. This notable difference in the overall criminality average highlights that while certain new criminal markets exhibit lower pervasiveness on the continent, many of the original criminality indicators are gaining a stronger foothold in Africa. However, that is not to say that their presence is negligible. It is still worthy of attention as some of the newly added indicators may expand in the following years and their impact is already notable in some contexts. Nonetheless, the escalation of criminal activities across the continent emphasises the undeniable effects of organised crime on the stability of African states and the security of their citizens.

FIGURE 3.1
Criminality in Africa, 2023




Across the different regions in Africa, overall criminality scores varied considerably, from 4.83 for Southern Africa (the lowest) to 5.88 for East Africa (the highest). And yet Southern Africa contains countries with some of the highest overall criminality scores on the continent, such

as South Africa (7.18) and Mozambique (6.20). Therefore, to have a comprehensive understanding of the continent's criminal landscape, it is important to explore the subcomponents of criminality, i.e. criminal markets and criminal actors at both continental and regional levels.

3.2 Criminal markets

FIGURE 3.2
Criminal market trends (2019–2023)



In 2023, at the continental level, all the original criminal markets increased in prevalence. The most pervasive criminal market in Africa was human trafficking, which scored 6.06, an increase of 0.70 points since the first iteration of the Index in 2019, when it was initially measured at a continental average of 5.36. The incremental growth of this illicit market, with an average score of 5.93 in 2021, coincided with heightened levels of conflict across the continent. The consequences of conflict, including forced displacement, modern forms of slavery, forced recruitment (such as child soldiers) and disruptions in social and familial structures led to an increased vulnerability to human trafficking.

The second fastest growing criminal market in Africa was human smuggling, with a continental average of

5.26 in 2023. This marks a substantial growth of 0.79 points from its 2019 score of 4.47 (and an increase of 0.41 from its score of 4.85 in 2021). Although human trafficking and human smuggling are two distinct illicit markets, the actors involved and the routes used often overlap. This overlap was particularly pronounced in East Africa, which was assessed to have the highest scores for human trafficking (7.78) and human smuggling (7.39) in both the continental and global contexts. While East Africa boasted the highest average for the human smuggling market, a significant upsurge in human smuggling activities has been observed in North Africa, contributing to the notable uptick in the continental human smuggling average. The region experienced the most substantial surge, with its human smuggling scores climbing by 1.58 points, from 5.75 in 2019 to 7.33 in 2023.


HUMAN SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN NORTH AFRICA

Following the lifting of the COVID-19 travel restrictions, irregular migrant movements across the central Sahel region (encompassing Mali, Niger and Chad) resumed. There was an uptick in migrant arrivals at key entry points, including Timbuktu and Gao in Mali; and Tahoua, Kouri Kantana and Agadez in Niger. Smuggling networks diversified the

routes used to cross from the Sahel to North Africa and towards Europe. In addition to the well-established routes, such as between Niger and Libya, and Sudan and Libya, smugglers used routes from Niger and Mali through Algeria, connecting Morocco and Mauritania to Spain's Canary Islands.

FIGURE 3.3

Human smuggling and human trafficking routes in North Africa



Source: GI-TOC

Libya serves both as a destination for irregular migration in the region and (increasingly) as a transit hub for migrants attempting to reach Europe. In 2022 alone, 80 600 attempts of sea crossings from Libya were recorded.²⁰ In recent years, an increasing number of migrants originating from Egypt, Bangladesh and (to a lesser extent) Syria have chosen Libya as a transit point for their journey to Europe, facilitated by smugglers. The expansion of artisanal gold

mining in the Sahel region has also contributed to the rise in human smuggling in North Africa. These dynamics have, in some cases, heightened the dangers faced by irregular migrants during their journeys, exposing them to trafficking risks, especially around the gold mining regions. They are also at risk of violent assaults by bandit groups and experiencing vehicle breakdowns along remote desert tracks.²¹

Financial crimes, one of the new criminal markets included under the Index, was the second most pervasive criminal market in Africa, with a score of 5.95. The most common financial crimes were embezzlement and misuse of public funds by state-embedded actors, tax evasion and financial fraud. North Africa boasted the highest score (7.83) for financial crimes both within the continent and globally, significantly contributing to the continental average. Most countries in the region scored between 8.0 and 9.50 for financial crimes, with the exceptions of Morocco (7.50) and Mauritania (6.0). While financial crimes, including cyber-enabled financial fraud, were identified as the second most prevalent criminal market in Africa, cyber-dependent crimes were the least pervasive criminal market in Africa, scoring 3.59. This is probably because of the low internet penetration rate on the continent, often due to high internet access costs and underdeveloped technological infrastructures in most countries.

Compared with the other drug markets, the cocaine trade on the continent has experienced the most substantial increase since 2019 (+1.12).

The third most pervasive criminal market was arms trafficking, which has demonstrated a steady growth since 2019, increasing from 5.24 to 5.56 in 2021 and further to 5.77 in 2023. This is likely due to the increased flow of illegal arms from regions afflicted by long-term conflict and instability, in particular East Africa and Central Africa. Long plagued by high levels of armed and ethnic conflicts and the presence of non-state armed groups and militias, East Africa scored 7.78 for arms trafficking (the highest in the world), followed by Central Africa (6.32). The arms trafficked tend to be predominantly small arms and light weapons from conflict-ridden areas in East Africa but also include explosive substances in Central Africa. These substances are used in manufacturing explosives for use in illicit activities such as illegal mining and blast fishing as well as armed conflict.²²

Of particular concern was the upward trajectory of environmental crimes. Africa's natural resources and biodiversity are vulnerable and face further strain from the effects of climate change. Between 2021 and 2023, fauna crimes increased by 0.24 (to 5.63) and non-renewable resource crimes by 0.27 (to 5.71). This is not surprising, given that Africa is home to some of the highest scoring countries for non-renewable resource crimes: Libya (9.50), a country known for its extensive oil smuggling industry; the DRC (9.50), a nation grappling with widespread gold and coltan smuggling that is exacerbated by ongoing armed conflict; and the CAR (10.0), a country with high levels of illicit production and trafficking of diamonds and gold.

By contrast, flora crimes remain below the continental average for criminal markets, despite showing a similar trend of steady growth since 2019 (4.66), with an increase of 0.17 points between 2021 (4.73) and 2023 (4.90). This upward trajectory observed across all environmental crimes is particularly concerning for Africa, considering the existing environmental strain resulting from increased droughts, erratic rainfall and drier conditions experienced across the continent due to climate change.

In line with general criminality trends, the continental cannabis trade increased steadily, from 5.17 in 2019 to 5.26 in 2021 and further to 5.52 in 2023. The UN has identified North Africa as a hub for interregional trafficking of cannabis resin to Western Europe.²³ Therefore, it is unsurprising that in 2023 North Africa was the highest scoring region (7.42) for the cannabis trade in Africa and in the

world, with Algeria (7.0) and Morocco (9.0) being international distribution centres, catering to both African and European consumer markets.

The synthetic drug trade has also grown, from 4.02 in 2019 to 4.34 in 2021 and further to 4.58 in 2023. One of the most notable examples of synthetic drug consumption on the continent is the non-medical use of tramadol.²⁴ In addition to tramadol consumption, the methamphetamine trade is also a key synthetic drugs market in Africa. Although North Africa was identified as the highest scoring region on the continent for this illicit market, with a score of 6.17, Southern Africa (4.65) had some of the highest (or growing) numbers of methamphetamine users on the continent.²⁵ Research suggests that the supply and flow of methamphetamine continues to expand in the region. In fact, methamphetamine is favoured over crack cocaine because its effects last longer, which means that purchases are less frequent and therefore less money is needed to maintain a practice of regular use.²⁶

Compared with the other drug markets, the cocaine trade on the continent has experienced the most substantial increase since 2019 (+1.12). This illicit market, initially scored at 3.40, experienced a notable growth of 0.70 points to reach 4.10 in 2021, with a further increase of 0.42 to reach 4.52 in 2023. It was the highest continental average increase of all criminal markets in both 2021 and 2023, reflecting the changes in global production and distribution of cocaine. Regionally, West Africa continued to play a leading role on the continent, with a score of 6.47 in 2023, up from 5.20 in 2019 and 6.0 in 2021. Further research indicates that cocaine trafficking through West Africa, following the well-established route from Latin America to the European consumer market, experienced a phase of significant growth.²⁷ Overall, cocaine use appears to be rising across the continent, not only in West Africa but also in East Africa and Southern Africa.²⁸

COCAINE MARKET AND TRADE IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Field research in East African and Southern African countries suggests that a large volume of cocaine is moving to and through these regions. Between 2019 and 2021, the cocaine trade increased by 0.70 points, reflecting the expansion in coca cultivation, cocaine production and its movement during the pandemic.

There has been a shift away from the US as the destination market of choice towards supplying domestic cocaine markets in Europe. This has been enabled by maritime and air supply chains that move commodities efficiently to European ports and cities, and a resurgence of traffic through indirect transit supply routes in African countries along the Atlantic coastline. These countries are vulnerable to exploitation and well located for transit from other regions.

West Africa, and more specifically Guinea-Bissau (8.50), had the highest score for cocaine trade on the continent and has maintained its position as a prominent transit hub for cocaine from the Andean region of South America to Africa. However, based on the volumes of cocaine that have been seized, East Africa and Southern Africa are becoming popular transit routes, with coastal ports in South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya serving as primary nodes for domestic, regional and transnational distribution of cocaine. They offer capable but poorly monitored container port facilities, weak marine enforcement, political environments that favour illicit traders, and established maritime and air links to the destination markets of Europe, Western Asia, Eastern Asia and Australia. Nigerian networks are also believed to be bringing heroin into Botswana using the same overland routes and transport modalities, with most shipments originating in South Africa. The drugs move through Botswana to neighbouring Zambia and Zimbabwe. As countries in East Africa and Southern Africa become more popular transit points for cocaine, the use of the drug in their local markets also increases.²⁹



The heroin trade showed a different trajectory to the other drug markets, shrinking by 0.13 between 2019 and 2021, likely due to the COVID-19 restrictions that disrupted heroin flows, and then rebounding to pre-pandemic levels – the continental average for heroin trade rose to 3.97 in 2023 (+0.16 since 2021). Heroin from Southern Asia is trafficked through all of Africa's regions, often using East Africa as an entry point, and then distributed to other markets in Africa and consumer markets in Western and Central Europe.³⁰ East Africa is known as the 'heroin coast' of Africa, reflecting its importance in the transnational heroin trade. Several East African countries serve as key transit points in the global heroin trade, including Kenya (7.50) and Tanzania (8.0). Tanzania, in particular, plays a central role in this illicit market by serving as a major landing point for heroin from Southern Asia, which is then distributed across the continent.

Two new additions to the Index, trade in counterfeit goods (5.42) and illicit trade in excisable goods (4.86), had a moderate to significant influence in Africa. Although these markets are not as frequently reported as other criminal markets, they not only cause financial losses to national economies but also pose significant threats to public health.

Although extortion and protection racketeering had a relatively limited influence across the continent, with an average score of 3.99, the picture is different at a country level, particularly in countries such as Somalia (9.50) and Libya (9.0). These countries have the highest scores in Africa and the world, with extortion and protection racketeering being a significant source of revenue source for non-state armed groups and militias, which wield substantial control in certain regions within these countries. These groups are notorious for using extortion schemes that target supply chains, businesses and even humanitarian aid efforts.

AFRICA AND THE WORLD

The Global Index and the ENACT Index are complementary tools that provide valuable insights into Africa's place within the global criminal landscape and enable the comparison of African and global criminality and resilience trends. In this way, stakeholders will be better equipped to understand the transnational nature of organised crime, including how global dynamics impact criminality at the local level and how illicit flows in different jurisdictions affect one another.

The Global Index revealed that overall, between 2021 and 2023, criminality rates grew by 0.16 to 5.03, while resilience levels stagnated at 4.81, further widening the global gap between criminality and resilience. A similar but less pronounced pattern was observed in Africa, where criminality rose by 0.08 points to 5.25, and resilience levels improved marginally, by 0.05 points to 3.85 during this period.

When examining specific criminal markets, certain global trends can be identified that also manifest themselves in Africa. For instance, in 2023, financial crimes were the most pervasive criminal market globally (5.98) and the second most pervasive in Africa (5.95). Globally, North Africa had the highest score for financial crimes (7.83), closely trailed by Western Asia (7.82) and South-eastern Asia (7.18).


Another noteworthy observation from the Africa Index, in line with global trends, is the significant growth in certain criminal markets since 2021. Human smuggling and the cocaine trade are the criminal markets that have expanded the most both globally and in Africa. Between 2021 and 2023, human smuggling was the fastest growing market globally (rising by 0.39 points to 5.16) and the second fastest growing market in Africa (rising by 0.41 points to 5.26). This global and continental growth can be attributed to heightened levels of instability and conflict, coupled with the relaxation of travel restrictions following the easing of COVID-19 lockdowns. The cocaine trade was the fastest growing market in Africa (rising by 0.42 points to 4.52) and third fastest growing market globally (rising by 0.30 points to 4.82), behind the synthetic drug trade, which increased by 0.33 points.

Africa did not follow the global trend for the criminal markets that grew the least between 2021 and 2023. Globally, the global heroin trade grew by just 0.10 points (4.08), whereas human trafficking was the slowest growing market in Africa, rising just 0.13 points, but continued to be the most pervasive criminal market in Africa (6.06).

With the exception of cyber-dependent crimes, environmental crimes were identified as the lowest scoring criminal market grouping globally, falling significantly below the global market average of 4.88. However, in Africa, non-renewable resources crimes and fauna crimes ranked as the fourth and fifth most pervasive criminal markets, with respective scores of 5.71 and 5.63. The heightened prevalence of these markets in Africa compared to their global impact is predictable given the continent's abundant natural resources and biodiversity.

3.3 Criminal actors

FIGURE 3.4
Criminal actors, continental trends (2019–2023)



Despite their influence increasing by only 0.05 points since 2021, criminal actors continued to drive overall criminality in Africa, scoring 5.45, compared to 5.05 for criminal markets in 2023 (Figure 3.2). Indeed, criminal actors had higher scores than criminal markets in 37 out of 54 (68.5%) countries, indicating that overall criminality continues to be driven by this subcomponent.

State-embedded actors continued to be the most prevalent criminal actors in Africa, consistent with the findings of the last two iterations of the Index, increasing their influence by 0.52 points since 2019 to reach 7.12 in 2023. Their influence grew steadily, increasing by 0.29 between 2019 and 2021 to reach 6.89, and by another 0.23 points since 2021. This influence reflects their role in facilitating and/or enabling illicit activities from within the state's apparatus. The highest scoring region for state-embedded actors was Central Africa (7.68), followed

closely by North Africa (7.67), East Africa (7.44), West Africa (6.93) and then Southern Africa (6.38). Corrupt political elites collude with criminal groups and use their captured state agencies to enable and fuel criminality across the continent. For example, the cocaine markets of East Africa and Southern Africa are driven by the collusion of state agencies, corruption and law enforcement incapacity (or indifference).³¹ In forest-rich countries, such as the CAR, state authorities facilitate the illegal logging market by issuing fraudulent forestland concessions to foreign companies.³²

Criminal networks in Africa take the form of criminal gangs, sometimes loosely structured, who are primarily involved in the drug trade or work with human smuggling and human trafficking syndicates. Criminal networks also exhibited gradual growth since 2019, when they were initially measured at 5.72, and grew to 5.96 in 2021, finally reaching 6.11 in 2023.

While criminal networks are prevalent across all regions of the continent, their impact was found by experts to be most pronounced in East Africa (6.78) and West Africa (6.63), where their activities have also extended to extortion and kidnapping for ransom.


Foreign actors were also found to exert significant influence in Africa, with a continental average of 5.91. Their impact has been steadily growing since 2019, but a more notable increase was observed in 2023, with a 0.28 point rise since 2021. Foreign actors were present in countries that are well integrated into international trade and the global economy, such as South Africa (7.50) and Nigeria (7.50). But they had a stronger presence in conflict-affected countries, such as Libya (9.50), the CAR (9.0), and Sudan (8.0). This can be largely attributed to the arrival of the Wagner Group, which is known to have provided military services during the reporting period, including mercenary troops and training programmes. Alongside its legal activities, this group has reportedly taken advantage

of political instabilities and widespread corruption to gain access to natural resources, such as gold and timber.³³ The group's involvement in criminal markets, such as flora crimes and non-renewable resource crimes, contributed to the upward trajectory of environmental crimes in Africa.

Private sector actors were involved in illicit activities across the continent, especially in East Africa, whose score of 6.0 was well above the continental average of 4.80. These actors are primarily linked to financial crimes and money laundering, which are enabled by their legal status and capabilities. However, they are less influential than other criminal groups, except for mafia-style groups, which scored 3.31 in 2023, an increase of 0.20 points since 2021. Mafia-style groups are highly organised gangs, armed groups and militias that are deeply entrenched in criminal markets in certain regions, such as Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama'a/Al-Shabaab in Mozambique and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

3.4 Regional analysis


FIGURE 3.5
Criminality averages by region, 2023



Between 2021 and 2023, criminality increased in East Africa, North Africa and Southern Africa but slightly decreased in West Africa and Central Africa. However, despite small improvements in the criminality averages of certain regions, especially compared to the 2019 Index, the original 10 criminal markets all

grew. To better understand the criminal landscape and trends in Africa, a more detailed analysis of the individual regions follows, with an emphasis on the changes and developments observed since the last two iterations of the Index.

East Africa



* 2023 score includes new criminality indicators. The criminality average of the original 10 criminal markets and 4 criminal actor types is 5.93.

OVERVIEW

- Since 2019, East Africa has had the highest levels of criminality on the continent.
- Criminality in the region is driven by high levels of armed and ethnic conflicts and the presence of non-state armed groups and militias.
- East Africa scored highest, driving the continental averages, for human smuggling, extortion and protection racketeering, arms trafficking and human trafficking.
- The activities of Al-Shabaab in parts of Somalia and the border regions between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia contributed to the region's high extortion and protection racketeering scores.
- In line with continental trends, criminal actors were the biggest contributor to the region's high criminality scores, with state-embedded actors being the most influential actor type.

Since 2019, East Africa's levels of criminality have surpassed all other regions. Initially, between 2019 and 2021, East Africa's criminality average rose from 5.51 to 5.66, reflecting an initial increase of 0.15 points. Subsequently, between 2021 and 2023, it surged once more, this time by 0.22 points, resulting in a new average of 5.88 in 2023 and underscoring the growing threat of organised crime. East Africa has long grappled with high levels of armed and ethnic conflicts and the presence of non-state armed groups and militias, which are significant drivers of criminality.

East Africa includes countries that have well-established criminal markets and actors, whose influence has been steadily growing due to prolonged political instabilities and conflicts. Seven out of its nine countries scored higher than the continental average of 5.25 for criminality: Kenya (7.02), Uganda (6.55), Sudan (6.37), South Sudan (6.32), Tanzania (6.20), Somalia (6.13) and Ethiopia (5.68). Only Djibouti (4.65) and Eritrea (3.97) scored lower than the average.


Criminal markets

East Africa drives the continental averages for human smuggling, extortion and protection racketeering, arms trafficking and human trafficking. The two most pervasive criminal markets in the region are human trafficking and arms trafficking, which both scored 7.78 in 2023.

All nine countries in the region scored above the continental average of 6.06 for human trafficking exhibiting prominent levels of this criminal market: Eritrea (9.0), South Sudan (8.50), Ethiopia (8.0), Kenya (8.0), Somalia (8.0), Sudan (8.0), Uganda (7.50), Djibouti (6.50), and Tanzania (6.50). Forced labour and sex trafficking perpetrated by criminal groups are widespread across the region, while in some countries, state actors are directly involved in trafficking activities. For instance, in South Sudan, the recruitment of child soldiers by state and non-state actors remains pervasive, rendering children in the country extremely vulnerable to trafficking.³⁴

In line with the escalating levels of conflict and instability in the region, arms trafficking has also steadily grown since 2019. Initially identified as the most prominent criminal market in the region with a score of 6.78, it rose to 7.11 in 2021 and ultimately reached a score of 7.78 in 2023. This score made East


FIGURE 3.6
Criminality trends by country, East Africa (2019–2023)



Africa the highest scoring region in Africa and globally for arms trafficking. This reflects the levels of armed and ethnic conflicts and instability in the region, and the presence of non-state armed groups and militias in certain countries. For instance, between 2021 and 2023, Ethiopia's score for arms trafficking increased by 1.50 points, to 8.50, as a result of the ongoing civil war in Tigray. Similarly, Sudan's score increased by 0.50 points to 9.0 due to the redirection of small arms and light weapons from conflict-afflicted areas. Other high-scoring countries in the region included Somalia (9.0) and South Sudan (8.0), which are also plagued by high levels of violence and conflict.

As mentioned earlier, armed conflicts and civil wars exacerbate human smuggling activities, as people turned to illegal means in the hope of escaping from the insecure and unstable environments that jeopardised their livelihoods and their lives. In 2023, East Africa scored 7.39 for human smuggling, an increase of 1.17 points since 2019. With the exception of South Sudan (5.50), all countries in the region were identified as having significantly high levels of human smuggling, especially Eritrea (9.50) and Sudan (8.0), both countries deeply affected by armed conflicts.

FIGURE 3.7
Criminal markets in East Africa, 2023



Extortion and protection racketeering was another notable criminal market in the region during the reporting period. While the average score for this criminal market is considerably lower than the criminal markets average of the region (5.52), with a score of 5.06, some countries are heavily affected by these illicit activities. Somalia, in particular, stands out with the highest score for extortion and protection

racketeering in the region at 9.50. The country's score is driven by the presence of Al-Shabaab, which operates its own governance system in Somalia's hinterland. Other countries with high extortion and protection racketeering scores include Kenya (7.0), where Al-Shabaab also exerts influence in the border regions with Somalia, and Ethiopia (6.0).

AL-SHABAAB'S SOURCE OF INCOME: EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING

Despite being expelled from the capital city of Mogadishu by the African Union's military mission in 2011, Al-Shabaab continues to command much of Somalia's hinterland, including parts of the Juba River Valley and other isolated pockets, with its power extending beyond the areas it physically controls. The group runs a structured and well-organised, sophisticated extortion racket through its established and efficient 'taxation' apparatus, which generates a budget surplus estimated to be greater than that of the Federal Government of Somalia. Drivers seem to prefer being taxed for using the road when they pass through Al-Shabaab-manned checkpoints, because they pay a set amount as opposed to the government's haphazard and inconsistent pricing system. Checkpoint taxation generates tens of millions of dollars for the militant group annually, but Al-Shabaab also raises revenue from other sources, including forced charitable contributions (*zakat*), direct extortion of business, taxation of imports into Mogadishu port, and kidnappings for ransom.³⁵

Environmental crimes were prevalent in East Africa, which scored highest on the continent for fauna crimes (5.94 in 2023, up from 5.56 in 2021 and 5.17 in 2019). Tanzania (8.0) and Kenya (7.0), were identified by experts as both source and transit points for illegal wildlife trade, including the trafficking of cheetahs, elephant tusks, hippo teeth and rhino products as well as live animals, including reptiles and amphibians, destined for Asian consumer markets. Non-renewable resource crimes (5.83) were also widespread (six of the nine countries scored above 5.50 in 2023), with the most common being illicit gold trade and oil smuggling, which are facilitated by widespread corruption and the involvement of state-embedded actors.

Drug markets were less pervasive than the other criminal markets in East Africa. The cannabis trade scored the highest with an average of 5.22, driven by Sudan (7.50), Kenya (6.50) and Ethiopia (6.0), where cannabis is produced for both domestic and regional markets. East Africa's expanding role as a key transit point in the global heroin trade was reflected in its score of 4.17 (up from 3.83 in 2021). Tanzania (8.0) is a major landing point for heroin from Southern Asia, which is then distributed across the continent. Compared with the other drug markets, the cocaine trade (3.33) and synthetic drug trade (3.28) were assessed to have a negligible influence in East Africa, making them the least pervasive criminal markets in the region compared to all other criminal markets.

Criminal actors


Criminal actors drive criminality in East Africa, which scored the highest (6.23) on the continent, significantly above the criminal markets average of 5.52.

In 2023, state-embedded actors were the dominant criminal actors (7.44) in the region and have consistently remained so since 2019. Their influence increased by 0.22 points to an average of 7.22 between 2019 and 2021 and another 0.22 points since 2021, with the final score reaching 7.44. They exploit instabilities, declining state control and the lack of rule of law, and are involved in criminal markets ranging from human trafficking and human smuggling to the drug trade and

smuggling of goods. State-embedded actors not only engage directly in criminal activities but also provide protection to other criminal actors who are conducting illicit activities. The influence of state-embedded actors was significant in most countries in the region, but especially in Eritrea (9.50) and South Sudan (9.0).

In 2023, criminal networks were the second most prevalent criminal actor type, scoring 6.78, a slight decline (-0.05) since 2021. The reach and influence of criminal networks are amplified by connections with networks in neighbouring countries that are also involved in criminal markets, such as human smuggling and wildlife trafficking.

FIGURE 3.8
Criminal actors in East Africa, 2023




Foreign actors (6.33) were also active in East Africa and included networks originating from other African regions, such as West African networks involved in environmental crimes and the drug trade in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia. Other foreign actors included transnational criminal actors, such as Chinese organisations involved in the drug trade, fauna crimes and money laundering; and groups linked to Iran, Yemen, Turkey and the UAE, that engage mainly in arms trafficking activities within the region.

Despite scoring a notable 6.0, private sector actors were ranked fourth in the region. These actors

engage in financial crimes and assist in concealing and converting the proceeds of criminal activities. The least influential criminal actors in East Africa were mafia-style groups, which increased by 0.11 points between 2019 and 2021 and then by 0.17 points between 2021 and 2023, finally reaching 4.61 in 2023. In some countries in the region, such as Tanzania (3.50), Ethiopia (2.0), Djibouti (1.50) and Eritrea (1.0), their presence is negligible to non-existent. On the other end of the spectrum, they dominate as one of the most prominent criminal actor types in certain countries, including Somalia (9.50), where Al-Shabaab is involved in a wide range of illicit activities, exerting control throughout the country.


West Africa



OVERVIEW

- Since 2019, West Africa has had the second highest levels of criminality on the continent.
- Between 2021 and 2023, criminality in West Africa decreased marginally due to inclusion of the new criminality indicators, which had a less severe impact than the original indicators. However, criminality has increased since 2019 when measured by the original criminality indicators.
- Criminality in the region is driven by political instability, armed conflict and heightened insecurity.
- West Africa was one of the three highest scoring regions for all criminal markets on the continent. It was one of the main continental hubs for the cocaine trade, being a well-established trans-shipment point for cocaine trafficked from Latin America to European consumer markets.
- In West Africa, state-embedded actors, criminal networks and foreign actors were all very influential, while mafia-style groups and private sector actors were present but had little influence.

FIGURE 3.9
Criminality trends by country, West Africa (2019–2023)



West Africa is a vast region containing more countries than any other region on the continent. In many of these countries, frequent political instability and violence have contributed to exacerbating the organised crime landscape in the region. West Africa has consistently ranked second on the continent in terms of levels of criminality since the first iteration of the Index. From an initial score of 5.29 in 2019, the region's average criminality score increased by 0.18 points to an average of 5.47 in 2021, but has since improved slightly, decreasing by 0.03 points to an average of 5.44 in 2023. This was due to the inclusion of the new indicators, as the decline in the overall criminality average for West Africa is only observed when considering the expanded scope of the Index. Based only on the original 10 criminal markets, the region's criminality has increased by 0.17 points. This nuance underscores that the new criminality indicators are less prevalent in West Africa than in other parts of the continent.

In 2023, Nigeria (7.28, up from 7.15 in 2021) had the highest levels of criminality in West Africa, and the second highest in Africa, after the DRC in Central Africa (7.35). The country is an outlier in the region, as other countries all scored below 6.0: from Mali (5.93) to Sierra Leone (4.95), Guinea (4.58), Gambia (4.53) and Cabo Verde (4.28). In recent years, the rise in violent extremism and presence of armed groups have added to the broad spectrum of criminal markets and extensive influence of criminal actors in Nigeria.

Criminal markets


In 2023, West Africa ranked among the top three in all criminal markets, with the most pervasive market being the cocaine trade. The cocaine trade, which had already rise by 0.80 between 2019 and 2021, saw a further uptick of 0.47 between 2021 and 2023, culminating in a regional average score of 6.47. The region is a well-established trans-shipment point for cocaine from Latin America destined for European consumer markets, and is growing in significance, as demonstrated, among other things, by the escalating number of seizures reported in 2021 and 2022.³⁶ During this period, notable cocaine seizures were carried out by the competent authorities in Cabo Verde (7.50), Nigeria (7.0), Gambia (7.0) and Côte d'Ivoire (5.50). Furthermore, seizure data from Brazilian authorities identified Benin (7.0), Nigeria (7.0), Guinea (7.0) and Cabo Verde (7.50) as the most

common destinations for cocaine trafficking. The escalating levels of seizures emphasise West Africa's growing significance in the transnational cocaine trade, building on its already established status as a trans-shipment point.³⁷

The other drug markets that have also grown since 2019 include the cannabis trade (6.17 in 2023, +0.47 points since the first iteration of the Index) and the synthetic drug trade (5.30 in 2023, +0.50 points). The

notable increase in the synthetic drug trade was mainly due to the non-medical use of tramadol in the region, particularly in Nigeria (8.50), Niger (7.50), Ghana (7.0) and Mali (7.0), which serve as both transit and destination countries and have expanding domestic markets. In 2023, the heroin trade scored 3.97 (+0.07 points), having declined by 0.33 points between 2019 and 2021.

FIGURE 3.10
Criminal markets in West Africa, 2023



Highest-scoring criminal markets across the continent:

- Cocaine trade
- Cyber-dependent crimes

Highest-scoring criminal market in the region:

- Cocaine trade

Most increased criminal market since 2021:

- Cocaine trade

West Africa led the continent in cyber-dependent crimes, scoring 4.20 in 2023.

Following the cocaine trade, human trafficking (6.33) was the second most pervasive criminal market in West Africa, with an increase of 0.16 points since 2021. After East Africa, the region scored the highest for this

criminal market on the continent. Political instability, heightened violence and financial insecurity have intensified the levels of human trafficking and made men, women and children more vulnerable.³⁸ Forced labour in street vending, agriculture and artisanal mining, and forced begging and sexual exploitation are widespread across the region. Non-state armed groups also recruit child soldiers in conflict-afflicted countries, such as Mali (7.50), Nigeria (7.50) and Burkina Faso (7.0). The human trafficking market has further expanded due to the increase in migrants who are particularly vulnerable to such illicit practices. This situation was also reflected in the increase in human smuggling, which rose by 0.20 points between 2019 and 2021 and then by another 0.27 points, reaching a score of 4.70 in 2023.

West Africa led the continent in cyber-dependent crimes, scoring 4.20 in 2023, despite this being the second least pervasive criminal market in the region. Criminal activities classed as cyber-dependent include malicious software, ransomware and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which target both government infrastructures and individuals. The regional score was driven by Nigeria (8.0), which is recognised as an epicentre for cybercrimes in Africa and globally. Actors operating within the country have been involved in large-scale cyber criminality, including the spread of malware through malicious links, which in one instance was disguised as information about COVID-19 vaccination appointments.³⁹ In 2022, servers in Nigeria were responsible for distributing malicious software targeting 56 financial institutions in Europe⁴⁰ and for attacking the Oil India system, an Indian national oil company, using Russian malware.⁴¹

The second-least pervasive criminal market in West Africa was extortion and protection racketeering (4.17), a newly added indicator. After remaining steady (at 50–100 incidents), kidnapping incidents across the region escalated between 2012 and 2016,

about 1 193 incidents were recorded between 2017 and 2021 (an increase of 829%) and the trend shows no signs of slowing down.⁴² Kidnapping for ransom is used by criminal networks to generate alternative income and by armed groups to intimidate, punish and recruit in the context of warfare.⁴³ The highest levels were in Mali (8.0), Nigeria (8.0) and Burkina Faso (6.50),⁴⁴ with Nigeria responsible for almost half of all incidents in 2022. These illicit activities have been observed spreading to other parts of the region, such as Côte d'Ivoire (5.50) and Benin (4.0), as violent extremism and conflict from countries in the Sahel region spill over into the rest of West Africa. Monitoring such activities is important due to the strong connection between conflict and kidnappings for ransom, as increases in kidnapping incidents can provide 'insights into shifting tensions, the operations of armed groups and conflict dynamics'.⁴⁵

Conversely, the remaining newly added criminal markets were found to be more prevalent than extortion and protection racketeering and cyber-dependent crimes, with illicit trade in excisable goods scoring 4.90, financial crimes scoring 5.73 and trade in counterfeit goods scoring the highest with 6.0. The regional score for trade in counterfeit goods is driven by widespread counterfeit pharmaceutical products in West Africa, which has become a major hub for these products,⁴⁶ especially anti-malaria medications, anti-inflammatories and antibiotics, which pose a great threat to public health in the region. This illicit economy affects 10 out of 15 West African countries, with the most affected being Nigeria (8.0), Senegal (7.50), Niger (7.0), Benin (7.0), Côte d'Ivoire (7.0) and Togo (7.0).

Environmental crimes were prevalent in West Africa and exacerbated by conflict, violent extremism and instability. Flora crimes (5.63), fauna crimes (5.83) and non-renewable resource crimes (5.93) have increased since 2021 (by 0.13, 0.16 and 0.13 points respectively). Non-renewable resource crimes include armed groups seizing control over several mining sites or (where they do not have direct control) illicitly taxing gold mining and gold flows. Since 2021, arms trafficking has also increased, by 0.20 points, to 5.70.

WEST AFRICAN MEDICAL MARKET

An estimated 20%–60% of the West African medical market consists of counterfeit and substandard medical products.⁴⁷ This illicit market is valued at around US\$1 billion, as reported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).⁴⁸ In recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the global trade in counterfeit medical products has expanded but has been more pronounced in West Africa. This is largely due to the region's high prevalence of communicable diseases, including malaria and HIV/AIDS, and the limited availability of and access to medical products. Compounding the problem is the lack of effective legal frameworks, weak law enforcement, widespread corruption and resource shortages.

Counterfeit and substandard medications are produced in local and foreign (and sometimes illegal) laboratories using less-active pharmaceutical ingredients. While shifting demands influence the dynamics of this criminal market, anti-malaria medication is one of the most common counterfeit medical products in West Africa, which has higher malaria rates than other parts of the continent.⁴⁹ Counterfeit antibiotics and antiretrovirals (for HIV/AIDS treatment) are also prevalent in West African countries, but the specific types of counterfeit medicines produced vary according to demand. For example, cough syrups are produced in winter and chloroquine was manufactured during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The market for counterfeit medications is especially attractive to criminal organisations because it combines high profitability and relatively low risk compared to other illicit markets, such as the cocaine trade. Indeed, some West African countries, such as Burkina Faso, do not even criminalise counterfeit medical products,⁵⁰ while other countries, such as Guinea, may have specific regulations related to counterfeit medical products but tend to impose less severe penalties than for other forms of organised crime.⁵¹



Criminal actors

With the exception of mafia-style groups and private sector actors, all criminal actors wield substantial influence in West Africa, with their scores ranging from 6.40 to 6.93. Among them, state-embedded actors (6.93) dominated, having increased by 0.20 points since 2019. In West African countries, corruption permeates all levels of the state, with state actors complicit in criminal markets, particularly drug trafficking and environmental crimes.⁵² This situation was most apparent in Guinea-Bissau (8.50) and Niger (8.50), which drive up the regional average.

Between 2021 and 2023, criminal networks, which are loosely structured criminal groups, extended their influence across the region, scoring 6.63 (+0.20 points). Nigeria (8.50) is grappling with banditry groups and various criminal factions involved in kidnap for ransom, arms trafficking and cattle rustling. It is estimated that over 30 000 bandits are active in north-west Nigeria, which is particularly vulnerable because of its porous borders, illegal gold mines and the insufficient law enforcement capacity.⁵³


In West Africa, foreign actors (6.40) had the most influence in Benin (8.0), Nigeria (7.50), Côte d'Ivoire (7.50) and Sierra Leone (7.50). They are closely intertwined with criminal networks and collaborate

in various criminal markets, particularly the drug trade. For example, there is substantial evidence suggesting that the Calabrian-based 'Ndrangheta and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, a criminal network from Brazil, use West Africa as a route for smuggling cocaine. Côte d'Ivoire (7.50) appears to be a 'Ndrangheta stronghold and a transit point for cocaine trafficking that extends to other countries, including Cabo Verde (7.0), Senegal (6.50), Ghana (6.50) and Niger (5.50).⁵⁴ Compared to the rest of the region, foreign actors had less influence in Gambia (4.0) and Mali (4.0).


Private sector actors (4.70) did not have significant influence over the region as a whole but were influential in Nigeria (7.0) and Senegal (7.0), where they are involved in environmental crimes and financial crimes, with the collusion of state-embedded actors.⁵⁵

Lastly, mafia-style groups (2.77) were the least influential criminal actor type in West Africa, despite an increase of 0.34 points since 2019. Nigeria's high score of 5.50 was primarily due to the far-reaching influence of Black Axe, a mafia-style group that engages in human trafficking, cyber-dependent crimes and financial crimes, and commits extreme acts of violence.⁵⁶

FIGURE 3.11
Criminal actors in West Africa, 2023



North Africa




* 2023 score includes new criminality indicators. The criminality average of the original 10 criminal markets and 4 criminal actor types is 5.17.



OVERVIEW

- In 2023, North Africa had the third highest criminality levels on the continent, up from fourth highest in 2019 and 2021.
- North Africa stands out as the highest scoring region for financial crimes in Africa and the world.
- Within Africa, North Africa occupied the top spot in the cannabis trade and the synthetic drug trade.
- Human trafficking decreased in the region, but human smuggling increased considerably due to the surge in migration from Libya and Tunisia towards Europe.
- Since 2021, all types of criminal actor have increased their influence, especially state-embedded actors, although mafia-style groups remain the least influential.

FIGURE 3.12
Criminality trends by country, North Africa (2019–2023)



Although below the continental average, criminality in North Africa has risen steadily since 2019 (4.73) and especially between 2021 (4.86) and 2023 when it increased by 0.22 points to 5.08. This resulted in the region moving from fourth to third place for criminality in Africa and demonstrates that organised crime is a substantial threat that continues to undermine safety and security in North Africa.

Criminality has increased but is distributed unevenly across the region’s six countries, with hotbeds of organised crime concentrated in certain countries. Of the six countries in North Africa, Libya was identified as having the highest score in terms of overall criminality. At 6.93 (+0.38 since 2021), the country is also the fifth highest scoring on the African continent as a whole. Within the region, Libya is followed by Egypt, which exhibits comparatively lower levels of organised crime, scoring 5.05 in 2023, down 0.11 points from its 2021 score. At the other end of the spectrum, albeit with slightly more moderate crime scores, Tunisia and Algeria have both experienced a continuous upsurge in criminality over the years, reaching respective average scores of 4.45 (+0.66 since 2021) and 4.88 (+0.37 since 2021) in the latest reporting period. Morocco and Mauritania were identified as experiencing mixed trends over the years, with criminality averages of 4.80 and 4.38 respectively in 2023 remaining largely the same as in 2021 (4.79 for Morocco and 4.38 for Mauritania), but notable decreases since 2019 where the following averages were recorded: 4.88 for Morocco and 4.60 for Mauritania.

Criminal markets

In 2023, North Africa led the continent in the cannabis trade (7.42) and synthetic drug trade (6.17). The cannabis trade is driven by Morocco with a score of 9.0, which has remained unchanged since 2019. Morocco is one of the largest producers of cannabis resin in the world, with most of its output destined for Europe and other African markets. Elsewhere in the region, smaller amounts of cannabis are grown but mostly for domestic consumption. Although cultivation and production are concentrated in Morocco, cannabis trafficking is prevalent in Algeria (7.0), which has long-standing connections to Morocco. Algeria is a major destination and transit market, with hashish smuggled through the country’s

southern borders. Between 2021 and 2023, Tunisia experienced a sharp increase in the cannabis trade, from 5.0 in 2019 and 2021 to 7.0 in 2023. Cannabis is now the most widely consumed drug in the country, and its affordability and accessibility have led to increased consumption among middle- and high-school students, a worrying trend with significant negative impact on society.⁵⁷ In 2022, the Tunisian authorities, which take a zero-tolerance approach, thwarted many attempts to smuggle cannabis and seized large quantities of the drug.


Tunisia also saw a significant jump in the synthetic drug trade, from a score of 4.0 between 2019 and 2021 to 6.0 in 2023. Synthetic drugs, including pregabalin, are smuggled from Europe and neighbouring countries into Tunisia, Algeria (6.50) and Libya (7.50). However, Egypt (8.0 in 2023, up from 7.0 in 2021 and 2019) remained the main hub for the synthetic drug trade in North Africa, mainly due to the consumption and trafficking of tramadol (from Libya or using maritime routes) and Captagon (from Lebanon and Syria en route to other Arab countries).⁵⁸ There is also growing concern about the possible spillover effects of increasing methamphetamine production in Afghanistan on the Egyptian market.

In 2023, the region's heroin trade (3.25) and cocaine trade (4.42) were relatively limited but both have risen steadily since 2019. The increase in the cocaine trade was in part due to the drop in cocaine prices and driven by higher consumption in countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, which are trans-shipment points for cocaine destined for European markets. Similarly, heroin has been expanding in North African countries, albeit to a lesser extent.

North Africa (7.83) had the highest score for financial crimes in Africa and the world. Financial crimes have infiltrated the legitimate economy, aided by connections between powerful families, businesspeople and ruling elites. The region's vulnerability to fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion is further fuelled by the financial sector's lack of operational transparency and thriving informality. The situation in Libya (9.50) is chronic, where a weakened state since the uprising in 2011 has compounded the problems caused by the embezzlement of funds, public sector fraud, grand corruption and tax evasion over the years. In 2022, investigations discovered that Libyan officials and businesspeople had embezzled tens of millions of dollars intended for infrastructure projects commissioned during the Gaddafi era.⁵⁹ Other countries in the region, including Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia (all at 8.0), Morocco (7.50) and Mauritania (6.0), were also assessed as having pervasive levels of financial crime.

The illicit trade in counterfeit goods (6.08) was widespread in the region, led by Morocco (6.50), followed closely by the other five countries that all scored 6.0. Weak law enforcement, low taxes and light customs controls in free zones make the trade in counterfeit goods a thriving market in Morocco, which, according to experts, mainly serves as a source country for products destined for Europe.⁶⁰ North Africa also had the highest levels of illicit trade in excisable goods (5.75) on the continent, led by Libya (7.0) and Algeria (6.50). Various products (especially cigarettes) are smuggled along the 'Maghreb route', from sub-Saharan countries to Libyan and Algerian ports. These illegal products mostly end up in Europe but also feed the domestic markets of North African countries. For example, most of the cigarettes smoked in Libya are illicit.⁶¹ Egypt (3.50) had the lowest levels of illicit trade in excisable goods among the North African countries.

FIGURE 3.13
Criminal markets in North Africa, 2023



Highest-scoring criminal markets across the continent:

- Trade in counterfeit goods
- Cannabis trade
- Synthetic drug trade
- Financial crimes

Highest-scoring criminal market in the region:

- Financial crimes

Most increased criminal market since 2021:

- Synthetic drug trade

Among the newly added criminal market indicators, cyber-dependent crimes and extortion and protection racketeering were comparably limited in the region compared to other illicit economies, with regional averages of 3.25 and 4.17 respectively. Cyber-dependent crimes are currently underdeveloped within North African countries but there are concerns about their possible spread in the coming years, particularly due to a lack of specific legislation focused on cybersecurity and limited awareness around the risks linked to this type of offence. Extortion and protection racketeering (4.17) were also limited in the region, with the exception of

Libya (9.0) where kidnapping for ransom, hold-ups, carjackings and other extortion practices targeting smuggled individuals are major sources of income for armed groups.⁶² According to experts, criminal groups in Libya also frequently demand protection money from local markets or companies.⁶³

In 2023, human smuggling (7.33) and human trafficking (5.92) were widespread in the region, where the exploitation of migrants and other vulnerable groups is common. Between 2021 and 2023, human trafficking declined slightly (-0.17), likely as a consequence of the lifting of the pandemic-related restrictive measures, which in some cases aggravated exploitative and slavery-like situations. In contrast, human smuggling increased significantly (+0.75), driven by Libya (9.50, +1.50) and Tunisia (8.0, +1.0). In 2022, more migrants left the Libyan coast for Europe than in any year since 2017, driven by 'the global economic downturn, a return to normal levels of mobility', and a general weakening in law enforcement's crime suppression capacities, which created opportunities for human smugglers.⁶⁴ Similarly, in Tunisia, the protracted political and economic crisis, which in recent years affected the delivery of key services such as water and health, led to an increase in migration, with human smugglers remaining the main option for Tunisian and foreign migrants seeking to reach Europe.

After increasing between 2019 and 2021, arms trafficking in the region decreased slightly in the following two years, from 5.58 in 2021 to 4.83 in 2023. This is likely to reflect a sort of political stabilisation in Libya and the decline in violent extremists' attacks and the illegal circulation of weapons, coinciding with increased territorial surveillance.


With regard to environmental crimes, flora crimes were assessed to be negligible in the region (at 1.75), while fauna crimes were found to be comparatively more prevalent (with a regional average of 4.67). By contrast, non-renewable resource crimes were assessed to be far more pervasive, with a regional average of 5.17. In Libya (9.50), oil and gas continued to be at the centre of the smuggling industry, while the illegal trafficking of gold extracted from artisanal mines in remote areas, such as the tri-border area with Niger (7.50) and Chad (8.0), increased. In oil-rich Algeria (7.0), the smuggling of fuel and gold was a significant source of profit for criminal groups.

Criminal actors

Between 2021 and 2023, all criminal actors increased their influence in North Africa. State-embedded actors continued to dominate in the region (7.67, +0.50), especially in Libya (9.50) but also in the other countries (which all scored above 6.50). Criminal networks (5.67, +0.17 since 2021) were also pervasive, engaging in the illicit trading of a range of commodities, from drugs to counterfeit products, as well as people.

FIGURE 3.14


Criminal actors in North Africa, 2023



Since 2021, foreign actors have gained traction. After a decline of 0.42 points between 2019 and 2021, due to COVID-19 related border closures, foreign actors returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, increasing to 4.67 (+0.42). They are involved in different criminal economies. For example, foreign mercenaries and armed groups are known to operate in Libya (5.50), including Chadian and Sudanese fighters.⁶⁵ Mauritania (6.0) had a particularly high level of foreign actors due to its location, at the centre of western, central and northern African routes. Groups from Morocco, Algeria, Mali and Senegal are reportedly involved in Mauritania's drug and human smuggling markets.

Although identified as the least pervasive actor regionally, mafia-style groups were influential in Libya (9.0) but less so in Egypt (3.0) and Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia (all at 1.50). Private sector actors had very little influence in North Africa (3.83), with Libya (5.0), Tunisia (4.50) and Algeria (4.0) experiencing slightly higher levels than their neighbours. Most private sector actors are engaged in corruption or money laundering activities often in collaboration with state actors.


Central Africa



OVERVIEW

- Since 2021, criminality levels in Central Africa have decreased slightly, mainly due to the expansion of indicators in the Index, while criminality is seen to have increased slightly when only the original criminal markets are included.
- Central Africa was the highest scoring region in Africa for non-renewable resource crimes, which was the most pervasive market, alongside arms trafficking.
- Since 2021, arms trafficking has continued to expand, which was further fuelled by renewed hostilities across the region's conflict areas, political instabilities and coups d'état, among other factors.
- The illicit trade in counterfeit goods was the most prevalent new criminal market in Central Africa, where trade in pharmaceutical products and branded labels is growing.
- Since 2021, the influence of foreign actors in the region has increased markedly, with a notable involvement in environmental crimes, specifically illegal logging and trafficking of natural resources.

FIGURE 3.15
Criminality trends by country, Central Africa (2019–2023)



Between 2019 and 2021, the criminality average in Central Africa increased by 0.26 points, from 4.85 to 5.11. This increase reflects the impact of the global health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on organised crime in the region. Renewed hostilities across the region’s conflict areas, with clashes between armed groups and regular forces, the deterioration of the overall protection and humanitarian situation, the spillover effects of political instabilities and coups d’état in the region and beyond, have all played a part in defining the current criminality landscape of Central Africa. Since 2021, criminality levels have improved slightly (-0.05), which is because the Index has included new criminality indicators with relatively low scores, thereby reducing the regional average. Based on only the original indicators, criminality in the region has increased by 0.12 points since 2021.

The most prevalent criminal markets in Central Africa were human trafficking, environmental crimes and arms trafficking. Meanwhile, most of the new indicators scored lower than the other indicators because they are still underdeveloped markets. Among criminal actors, state-embedded actors continue to represent the biggest threat in the region among all the other criminal actor types.

When delving into the countries that make up Central Africa, the region features the highest scoring country for criminality on the continent, the DRC, with a score of 7.35, followed by the CAR at 6.75. Other countries exhibited high levels of penetration of organised crime, such as Cameroon (6.27), Angola (5.58) and Chad (5.50). In contrast, São Tomé and Príncipe, was assessed as having very low levels of criminality, with a criminality average of 1.70 out of 10.



Criminal markets

In Central Africa, the two most pervasive criminal markets were non-renewable resource crimes and arms trafficking (both scored 6.32 in 2023). The region had the highest score in Africa for non-renewable resource crimes, led by the CAR (10.0) and the DRC (9.50) where illicit gold and diamond mining and smuggling are extremely widespread. With a one-point jump since 2021, non-renewable resource crimes in the CAR had the highest possible score for an Index indicator in 2023. Experts have identified a variety of criminal actors, ranging from foreign groups

to private sector and state-embedded actors, who are involved in the trafficking of diamonds and gold from the CAR, most of which are smuggled abroad. The market is also reported to facilitate foreign money-laundering operations, in connection with Sudan and Cameroon, where illegally exploited diamonds are laundered by intermediaries, then transported to Europe, Asia and Dubai or Rwanda. A similar market exists in the DRC, which, due to the abundance of

natural resources, mainly serves as a source country, especially for gold. More than 90% of the DRC's gold is smuggled to regional states, including Uganda and Rwanda, where it is then refined and exported to international markets (particularly the UAE). Both pro-government and rebel militias profit from these activities, which perpetuate well-documented forms of human exploitation, such as child labour.

FIGURE 3.16
Criminal markets in Central Africa, 2023



Highest-scoring criminal markets across the continent:

- Flora crimes
- Non-renewable resource crimes

Highest-scoring criminal markets in the region:

- Arms trafficking
- Non-renewable resource crimes

Most increased criminal market since 2021:

- Human smuggling

The pervasiveness of the other two environmental crimes markets, flora crimes (5.82) and fauna crimes (5.59), was more stable but is still worrying. For flora crimes, the DRC (9.0), Gabon (8.50), Equatorial Guinea (8.0) and the Republic of the Congo (8.0) continue to be important sources of illegal logging of timber and other protected species, for both export and domestic consumption. Although many countries have strengthened their regulations related to forest resources and tightened forest governance, most timber exports are still reported to be illegal. Timber is usually trafficked to China, with the complicity of both state and private sector actors. Corruption in the sector is widespread at each stage of the timber supply chain, and companies, usually foreign, continue to systematically cut down prohibited species. Moreover, illegal logging and trade are often linked to money laundering and corruption, reaching the top echelons of state power in many countries.⁶⁶

Despite a minimal decrease since 2021 (-0.05), which brought the score back to its 2019 levels, fauna crimes remained a major concern. This almost imperceptible decline was driven by Rwanda, which shifted from 5.0 to 4.0 in 2023, mainly due to the tightening of measures aimed at reducing illegal poaching cases. However, fauna crimes continue unabated in most Central African countries, with the CAR and the DRC holding once again the top spots in the region (8.0). Criminal groups and poachers engage in the transnational trafficking of elephant tusks, pangolin scales and rhino horns, as well as other illegal wildlife products, destined for Asia. The DRC plays a huge role in the illicit ivory global supply chain and, as such, poaching has caused a dramatic reduction in elephant populations across the region. Pangolins and big cats are also the prime targets of poachers. In addition, certain species of great apes and monkeys are threatened by illegal bushmeat hunting, while armed groups engage in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, often resulting in high levels of violence.

Central Africa continued to be marred by ongoing conflict and instability, and highly vulnerable to arms trafficking (6.32). The pervasiveness of arms trafficking has steadily grown over time, showing a rise of 0.23 points between 2019 and 2021, followed by an additional increase of 0.18 points between 2021 and 2023. The demand for illicit arms and

ammunition was sparked by the coup d'état in Chad and the subsequent protests, increasing criminality in Cameroon's north-west and south-west regions, and attacks by violent extremist groups in the DRC and neighbouring countries. Armed conflict and porous borders contribute to the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, which are often smuggled through the borders between Chad, the CAR and Cameroon. The diversion of weapons from government stocks and corruption in security sectors are also key factors that sustain armed groups and drive instability, thus feeding the arms trafficking market.

The increasing number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has led to a rise in victims of human trafficking and human smuggling in the region.⁶⁷ Human trafficking (6.05) remained one of the highest scoring illicit economies in Central Africa, affecting large segments of societies. The market, which was exacerbated during the pandemic by border closures and movement restrictions (increasing by 0.54 between 2019 and 2021), was also later affected by worsening political and security dynamics in the wider Great Lakes region, weak and ineffective governance, and the lack of human and financial resources to combat these crimes (increasing by 0.10 between 2021 and 2023). Countries with the highest levels of human trafficking include Burundi (8.50), the CAR and DRC (both at 7.50) and Chad (7.0). Labour and sexual exploitation are widespread in these countries, with people trafficked internally and abroad, usually to Gulf countries, while child recruitment into armed groups and child labour in mines are also pervasive.

The prevalence of conflict, violence and displacement has had an impact on human smuggling, which was most pervasive in Chad (7.50) and Burundi (6.50), compared with the other countries in the region, which tended to score in the moderate to significant range (4.0 to 5.50). Chad is the most common transit country for migrants coming from Sudan (especially Darfur) and South Sudan, heading north towards Libya. It is also home to large numbers of internally displaced persons, who risk falling victim to smugglers in the country, because of recurrent attacks by non-state armed groups, notably Boko Haram from Nigeria, in the Lake Chad region, as well as the rapidly degrading climatic and environmental conditions.

The drug markets in Central Africa were less pervasive, led by the cannabis trade (4.50), followed by the synthetic drug trade (3.73), the cocaine trade (3.45) and the heroin trade (2.68). Cannabis (which has a relatively low price) is widely consumed throughout Central African countries, with some also serving as production hubs. Since 2021, the synthetic drug trade has shown minimal changes, although tramadol consumption is reportedly a persistent problem, especially in Chad, the CAR and Cameroon, mainly due to its high availability and affordability. It is generally transported via West Africa (particularly Nigeria) and distributed within Central African countries. Despite government efforts to curb the problem, the sale of synthetic drugs is an ongoing issue and may become problematic in the years to come. By comparison, the heroin trade is scarce and has limited impact in most countries. The illicit cocaine trade is slightly more present but the drug is less consumed and trafficked, with the exception of in Angola (6.50). This is because of its location as a trans-shipment point for South American cocaine, mostly originating from Brazil and destined for Southern and West African countries, as well as European and the Middle Eastern countries, both by sea and air.

Human trafficking (6.05) remained one of the highest scoring illicit economies in Central Africa.

Among the newly added criminal markets indicators, the illicit trade in counterfeit goods (5.23) and financial crimes (5.18) were the most pervasive. The sale of counterfeit items, including pharmaceutical products and branded labels, constitutes a threat to the economy of many Central African countries, including Cameroon (7.50), the CAR (7.0) and Gabon (7.0). Factors that contribute to the prevalence of counterfeit products include porous borders, corrupt law enforcement agents, lack of quality control and inadequacy of actions taken against perpetrators. Experts have identified embezzlement and misuse of public funds, tax evasion and fraud as the most common financial crimes in the region. The high levels of financial crime in the DRC (7.0) are the result of structural shortcomings in economic frameworks that create favourable conditions for corruption and the abuse of power to flourish, causing serious harm to the business environment.


The illicit trade in excisable goods (3.95) in Central Africa primarily involved cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. Extortion and protection racketeering (3.59) was common in the region, especially in the CAR (6.50) and the DRC (7.50), where armed groups extort civilians and traders, and impose taxes and levies on controlled key roads and access points. In contrast, cyber-dependent crimes (2.86) were very rare in most Central African countries.

Criminal actors

Corruption is a problem across the region, with criminals able to infiltrate the state apparatus of many Central African countries and play an essential role in conflict dynamics. State-embedded actors were identified as the highest scoring criminal actor type in Central Africa (7.68) with extensive influence, especially in the DRC, the CAR, Equatorial Guinea and Burundi (all at 9.0) but less so in Rwanda (5.0) and São Tomé and Príncipe (3.0).

FIGURE 3.17


Criminal actors in Central Africa, 2023



State-embedded actors are followed by foreign actors (5.59), which recorded the largest score increase of all actors in this region (+0.32 since 2021). Ranging from traffickers to private businesses, foreign actors are involved in the illegal logging and non-renewable resource crime markets in several countries. They originate from other parts of Africa and from different continents, especially Asia. Over the last few years, the Wagner Group's presence in many Central African countries, especially in the CAR, has had a strong impact on this indicator, especially due to the group's involvement in several criminal markets, including the extraction and trafficking of natural resources.⁶⁸

Since 2021, criminal networks (5.41) recorded no change in their influence, while the influence of mafia-style groups (3.55) was negligible, reflecting the continental trend. However, although many countries do not have any domestic mafia-style groups, there are some exceptions, such as the DRC (9.0) and the CAR (8.0). Here, mafia-style groups generally take the form of armed rebel groups that extend their control to rural areas and engage in a myriad of crimes, including extortion, illicit taxation, environmental crime and human trafficking. Lastly, private sector actors (5.05) had a moderate presence in the region, with their involvement in organised crime generally relying on collusion with state-embedded actors.


Southern Africa



OVERVIEW

- Although Southern Africa overall had the lowest regional levels of crime, certain countries exhibited relatively high levels of criminal activity.
- Fauna crimes were the most pervasive criminal market, with the region serving as one of the world's largest hubs for live animals and animal parts.
- Financial crimes were the second most pervasive criminal market in the region, with widespread incidents of embezzlement, fraud and tax evasion.
- Unlike the rest of the continent, the heroin market is widespread in Southern Africa, with some countries involved in the transnational trade and experiencing rising consumption rates.
- The least prevalent criminal market in the region was extortion and protection racketeering, with the exception of South Africa, where kidnap for ransom and mass shootings linked to protection rackets were widespread.
- State-embedded actors were the most dominant type of criminal actor in the region and have increased their influence, but criminal networks and foreign actors also exerted significant influence over various criminal markets in the region, such as financial crimes and the drug trade.

FIGURE 3.18
Criminality trends by country, Southern Africa (2019–2023)



Since 2019, Southern Africa has had the lowest regional criminality levels on the continent, but the impact of organised crime has steadily increased, from 4.44 in 2019 to 4.67 in 2021 and 4.83 in 2023.

Of the 13 countries in Southern Africa, four had high levels of criminality: South Africa (7.18), Mozambique (6.20), Madagascar (5.58) and Zimbabwe (5.47). In most countries in the region, environmental crimes and drug markets, especially heroin and cocaine, are a threat and increasing. In some cases, the same transporters, dealers and brokers are involved in multiple criminal markets. For example, there are instances in the region of wildlife trafficking overlapping with drug trafficking or extortion practices at various stages of the supply chain. These networks are supported by corrupt public officials who protect organised criminal groups from law enforcement and facilitate the movement of illicit goods across borders.⁶⁹ This implies that state-embedded actors, at all levels, are essential for these criminal activities to thrive and remain an obstacle to implementing an effective anti-organised crime strategy in many countries in the region.

Criminal markets

Fauna crimes were the most prevalent criminal market in Southern Africa, which is one of the largest sources of live animals and animal parts in the world and an extremely profitable market. The region is home to large populations of animal species, from rhinos and lions to elephants and pangolins, which are at risk due to the persistent threat of wildlife trafficking. Organised crime syndicates, mainly from countries in South-eastern Asia, often work with their local counterparts and corrupt officials to establish highly organised routes for trafficking wildlife products to South-eastern Asia. After a temporary halt during the COVID-19 pandemic, between 2021 and 2023, fauna crimes grew by +0.30 points, to 5.65, driven mainly by South Africa (8.0) and Mozambique (8.0), followed by Madagascar (7.50) and Botswana (7.50). All countries in Southern Africa, except for Eswatini (2.0), Lesotho and Mauritius (both at 3.0), had high levels of fauna crimes. Despite conservation efforts and the arrests of major kingpins in some countries, the poaching of wildlife, especially elephants, rhino and pangolins (in Zambia, Malawi and South Africa), continued unabated. The consequences for local ecosystems and communities

are serious: deterioration of natural capital, social stability and cohesion; extinction of animal species; erosion of sustainable economic development.

Over the past few years, non-renewable resource crimes (5.12) have been on the rise, initially increasing by 0.35 points between 2019 and 2021 (to 4.81), and then by 0.31 points between 2021 and 2023. This criminal market is linked predominantly to the mining and trading of gold. However, the illegal extraction of diamonds and precious gems was also pervasive in the region, with detrimental effects on both the environment and human safety. In countries, such as Madagascar (8.0) and Zimbabwe (8.50), increasing poverty levels forced people to find alternative profit-making activities, resulting in the depletion of forests and exploitation of locals in the illegal mining of gemstones. Although less widespread than other environmental crimes, flora crimes (4.69) were also an acute problem in much of the region, especially in Madagascar (8.0), Mozambique (8.0) and Zambia (7.50), but less so in Lesotho (1.0), Botswana (2.50) and Eswatini (2.50). After a slight increase between 2019 and 2021 (+0.19), this market experienced a more sustained growth in the region between 2021 and 2023, rising by 0.31 points. Flora crimes include illegal logging and trafficking of precious woods, particularly rosewood, with a large share of timber exported to Asian markets without valid licences.

Financial crimes (5.54) represented the second highest scoring criminal market in Southern Africa. Embezzlement, fraud and tax evasion are ubiquitous, with no country scoring less than 4.50. In some cases, massive illicit financial flows scandals involving high-profile individuals have hindered economic development, which has contributed to widespread poverty and inequality.

Among the drug markets, the heroin trade (at 5.27, +0.27 since 2019 and +0.12 since 2021) was rife in Southern Africa, particularly in the major transshipment and destination states of Mozambique (8.0) and South Africa (7.50), where Afghan-produced heroin is imported in huge quantities and traded throughout the rest of Africa, Europe and Australia. Heroin was also predominant in countries such as Mauritius (8.0) and the Seychelles (8.0), where consumption of the drug is rising at an

alarming rate. Traffickers who move heroin along the 'southern route' actively target these countries whose comparative wealth makes them attractive and lucrative destinations. In comparison, the cannabis trade (4.96) and the synthetic drug trade (4.65) were more stable, with a moderate but solid presence in almost all Southern African countries. However, in recent years, synthetic drugs have grown in prevalence in the region, recording an overall increase of 1.11 points since 2019. These drugs are widespread in countries such as South Africa (8.50), Mauritius (8.0) and Mozambique (7.0), which not only serve as production sites and consumer markets for synthetic drugs but also as transit points, especially for methamphetamine sourced from Afghanistan or other African countries.⁷⁰


Although predominantly a cannabis-consuming region, with some demand for opiates (particularly heroin) and a geographically limited demand for synthetics (particularly methamphetamine), Southern Africa is also a well-established transit and destination hub for cocaine, which has increased by +1.54 points since 2019 and +0.58 since 2021, to a score of 4.04 in 2023. This demonstrates that the regional supply chains for cocaine have proven to be remarkably resilient, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when movements and transport were restricted. The expanding networks in Southern Africa are starting to play an important role in the transnational flow of cocaine, which is mainly transported through maritime routes, including the Mozambican channel and harbours in South Africa, such as the Port of Durban.⁷¹ As these countries become more prominent transit points, the use of cocaine in local markets increases. A recurrent feature across the region is polydrug use, where (for example) heroin and methamphetamine users also consume crack cocaine.⁷²

Compared to other regions in Africa, Southern Africa scored relatively low for human trafficking (4.62) and human smuggling (4.0), although both these markets have been increasing in pervasiveness since 2019. In countries such as Madagascar, Mozambique and Comoros, worsening economic conditions have left more people in vulnerable situations, making them susceptible to human trafficking and smuggling networks. There are some Southern African countries that play distinct roles in the human

smuggling market. For instance, South Africa (5.0), Namibia (2.5) and the Seychelles (3.5) are destination countries for irregular migration, while Zambia (3.0), Mozambique (5.5) and Malawi (4.5) are transit hubs for migrants coming from other African countries (such as Ethiopia and Somalia) and South Asian countries, who are then smuggled into South Africa. Malawi and Mozambique are also located along the active southern migration route, which starts in East Africa and extends all the way to South Africa.⁷³

Arms trafficking (4.42) was also less pervasive in the region, with the exceptions of South Africa (8.0) and Mozambique (6.50). South Africa, in particular, is grappling with the widespread availability of illegal firearms, most of them stolen from licensed civilian owners or police evidence stores and armouries, which has given more power to organised criminal groups and networks. Moreover, the use of firearms in targeted killings has increased, reflecting the increasing professionalisation of criminal services.⁷⁴

FIGURE 3.19
Criminal markets in Southern Africa, 2023




Although the trade in counterfeit goods (4.27) and the illicit trade in excisable goods (4.46) were not serious issues in the region, they remained problematic in areas that have weak enforcement and border controls. Detecting small consignments of counterfeit goods or barring entry to untaxed and illegally traded products is still challenging in some Southern African jurisdictions. Moreover, in many cases, the distinction between trade in counterfeit goods and illicit trade in excisable goods is blurred as these markets tend to often be interlinked on the ground. Cyber-dependent crimes (3.62) and extortion and protection racketeering (3.31) were not particularly pervasive in the region, with (again) the exception of South Africa, which has seen increased instances of kidnap for ransom and extortion that has halted billion-dollar construction projects. Moreover, in 2022, South Africa experienced a record number of mass shootings, all attributed to protection rackets in the liquor and nightlife industries.

Criminal actors

Similar to the rest of the continent, state-embedded actors were the most influential criminal actors in Southern Africa and have increased by 0.42 points since 2021. Their influence is greatest in Mozambique (9.0), South Africa (8.0), Madagascar (8.0) and Zimbabwe (8.0). In Mozambique, authorities have been accused of facilitating or being complicit in a number of illicit activities, providing protection to criminal enterprises in exchange for bribes,⁷⁵ while in South Africa, grand corruption is pervasive at senior levels across different state departments.⁷⁶ These include the prosecution and prison services, which hinders public trust in the state. Moreover, despite the recommendations of a commission of inquiry into state capture, no significant prosecutions of implicated individuals have resulted in South Africa, leading to a slight increase in the state-embedded actors score (+0.50 since 2021).

FIGURE 3.20

Criminal actors in Southern Africa, 2023



Between 2021 and 2023, the other criminal actor types also increased their influence in the region. After a temporary setback (-0.35 between 2019 and 2021) due to COVID-19 lockdowns and border closures, by 2023, the influence of foreign actors had returned to pre-pandemic levels (5.88). Criminal networks (5.85) continued to exert moderate to significant influence across the region, relying on increasing

transnational connections using online tools, and engaging in various criminal activities, such as drugs, fraud, stock theft and armed robberies. In most Southern African countries, private sector actors (4.31) are involved in illicit activities that include money laundering, bribery and misappropriation of state funds, and generally benefit from corrupt relationships with politicians and the criminal justice system.

In Southern Africa, mafia-style groups (3.0) did not exist or held very little influence in most countries, with the exception of South Africa (7.5), where heavily armed and violent gangs are particularly active in the drug trade and involved in extortion. The 'construction mafia', for instance, violently disrupts construction sites and extorts protection fees from businesses in almost all parts of the country, including the more rural provinces.⁷⁷

THE CONSTRUCTION MAFIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa, the 'construction mafia' bears the hallmarks of a mafia-style group. Often parading as business forums or economic transformation groups (sometimes with trademarked names), they have known leaders, identifiable membership and control the territories in which they operate. The construction mafia is involved in large-scale systemic extortion. Its modus operandi is to invade construction sites across the country, demanding a percentage (usually 30%) of the project contract value and the employment of its members on these projects.

The phenomenon began in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province, in the townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu in 2014/15, when two distinct 'business forums' emerged: Delangokubona Business Forum and KwaMashu Youth in Action Movement. They were founded on the principles of a form of economic transformation to address growing unemployment and inequality. In 2016, the two groups merged, and began operating alongside other heavily armed local business forums that had mushroomed and were disrupting almost all construction sites within the KZN province. From 2018, the construction mafia's influence began to spread across the country. Groups in other provinces began emulating the KZN local business forums, halting and disrupting multi-billion dollar construction projects. In 2019, these disruptions

affected at least 183 infrastructure and construction projects worth more than R63 billion across the country.

These groups are characterised by a willingness and ability to use violence when invading construction sites to ensure their demands are met. Within the construction sector, many businesses have opted to engage with these groups, while others have turned to the courts to seek interdicts against the business forums, but to little effect. The damage caused by the business forums has not only delayed the delivery of a number of important infrastructure projects, but also contributed to the demise of several businesses.

Small enterprises within the sector have been the most affected, losing opportunities for subcontracts because they lack the resources of larger companies to deal with the construction mafia. Moreover, the influence of the construction mafia has also spread beyond construction to other sectors, with groups demanding stakes in soft-drink manufacturer Coca-Cola Beverages and business tenders from the KZN treasury. Of concern is that the construction mafia is known to have links to certain 'taxi-mafia' elements of the minibus taxi industry and to some influential politicians.⁷⁸



SECTION 4

Resilience





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4 Resilience

4.1 Continental overview


The gap between criminality and resilience is widening in Africa, where despite some improvement since 2021, resilience levels are not keeping pace with growing levels of criminality. Between 2019 and 2021, Africa's resilience levels dropped slightly (-0.06), from 3.86 to 3.80, likely because countries were focused on mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic rather than maintaining and strengthening mechanisms against organised crime. Since 2021, the continent's resilience grew marginally, returning to almost pre-pandemic levels in 2023 (3.85), as three of the five regions saw a boost in their resilience. This positive development was due to greater international cooperation on the continent to counter the growth of illicit markets, such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, and improved scores for 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention'. Nevertheless, although some regions and individual countries have increased their resilience, the continent as a whole needs to further bolster its capacities urgently, to keep up with and potentially disrupt rising criminality levels.

Since 2021, the continent has seen an increase in eight of the 12 resilience indicators. In 2023, 'international cooperation' was the highest scoring indicator, increasing by 0.54 points since 2019, as countries on the continent enacted and ratified regional and international collaborative agreements to respond to organised crime. Between 2019 and 2023, two other indicators also saw notable developments: 'victim and witness support' (+0.40) and 'prevention' (+0.57), reflecting investments in support to victims of organised crime and commitments to address organised crime.

Since 2019, the indicator assessed by experts to have declined the most (by 0.41 points) is 'non-state actors', which measures the impact of civil society and the media on anti-organised crime efforts, crucial stakeholders who are often on the front line, as well as the environment in which they are allowed to operate. This decrease has implications for the continent's overall resilience and is indicative of crackdowns on opposition forces in countries such as Zimbabwe ahead of its 2023 elections,⁷⁹ the stifling of free speech in countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda,⁸⁰ and shrinking government transparency. At the same time, 'law enforcement' also declined, by 0.36 points, indicative of dwindling investigative, intelligence and law enforcement capacities in general, which are essential to a country's defence against organised crime.

FIGURE 4.1

Resilience in Africa, 2023




Although the continent's resilience improved marginally between 2021 and 2023, resilience levels varied across regions since the inception of the Index. Resilience went up in both West Africa (+0.22) and Central Africa (+0.28), despite some countries in these regions being mired in conflict, and with threats of extremist violence and criminality persisting. In contrast, Southern Africa went from being the continent's most resilient region in both 2019 and 2021 to being the second most resilient region in 2023, with an overall decrease of 0.05 points between 2019 and 2023, largely because of a decline in economic and anti-money laundering regulatory capabilities. Resilience declined the most in North Africa (-0.52 since 2019), as countries such as Libya continued to face an onslaught of conflict and criminality.

The way countries and regions respond to organised crime and boost their resilience is influenced by geographical, political and economic factors. Some countries have taken public stances against organised crime, with national strategies that prioritise the combating of organised crime, widespread arrests and prosecution of corrupt individuals, and collaboration with other governments to tackle transnational organised crime. To better understand the growth or decline in resilience across the continent, the individual resilience building blocks are evaluated (Section 4.2) and the regional dynamics analysed (Section 4.3).

4.2 Indicator trends

FIGURE 4.2
Continental resilience trends (2019–2023)



Between 2019 and 2023, the continent experienced a decline in ‘political leadership and governance’ (–0.29) and ‘government transparency and accountability’ (–0.12). The decline coincided with increasing levels of conflict, political violence and political contestation on the continent, especially in Libya, the DRC, the CAR and Somalia. It was compounded by the growing influence of state-embedded actors, with accusations of criminal influence in leadership and governance structures rife across the continent. This trend is of concern, as governments tainted by corruption are highly susceptible to criminality, and reliable and transparent governance is crucial in

combating organised crime and building resilience. Between 2019 and 2021 ‘national policies and laws’ has declined by 0.20 points but it improved slightly between 2021 and 2023 (+0.11), suggesting that some states are working towards building up their legal framework in response to organised crime.

As mentioned earlier, since 2021, the highest scoring resilience indicator has been ‘international cooperation’ (5.03 in 2023), which takes the form of structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level aimed at reducing illicit markets. By 2023, a record 52 out of 54 countries on the continent had ratified the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its accompanying protocols. In addition, countries in regional economic blocs, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), often collaborated in their efforts to respond to transnational organised crime. One area that needs more attention is the implementation of international strategies and agreements.

Since 2021, the highest scoring resilience indicator has been ‘international cooperation’.

combating organised crime and building resilience. Between 2019 and 2021 ‘national policies and laws’ has declined by 0.20 points but it improved slightly

MEASURING UNTOC'S EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS OF ORGANISED CRIME

Adopted in 2000, the UNTOC is a legally binding treaty and the main international instrument for fighting organised crime. Its aim is to foster international cooperation for preventing and combating transnational organised crime, through establishing and promoting regional and international bodies and mechanisms, and sharing information. Within the first five years, 36 out of 54 African states had ratified the UNTOC, furthering the development of national responses that comply with UNTOC standards.⁸¹

After almost two decades of having mechanisms in place for combating organised crime, early ratifying countries would be expected to have higher resilience levels. However, no correlation was found between being an early ratifier and having improved criminality and resilience scores.⁸² For instance, the CAR, which ratified the UNTOC in 2004, and Somalia, a non-ratifying African state, shared the lowest resilience score of 1.79 in 2023. This indicates that early adoption of the UNTOC does not confer an advantage for establishing robust resilience frameworks and mechanisms

that combat transnational organised crime and mitigate the effects of criminal markets. Although most early ratifying countries had low resilience levels, three countries had high resilience levels, but these did not translate into reduced criminality. In 2023, resilience was high in Senegal (5.79), Nigeria (5.79) and South Africa (5.63), with all three countries having high scores for 'international cooperation' (7.0, 7.50 and 6.0, respectively) and 'national policies and laws' (6.50, 7.50 and 7.0, respectively). Yet criminality levels were also high in Senegal (5.52), Nigeria (7.28) and South Africa (7.18), with Nigeria ranked among the top two countries in Africa for criminality in the three iterations of the Index.

Between 2021 and 2023, 'international cooperation' (5.03), which is a central theme of the UNTOC, increased by 0.24 points in Africa. However, as illustrated above, the ratification of international instruments, such as the UNTOC, is not sufficient to ensure effective responses to organised crime, especially given the generally low levels of resilience on the continent.

Although governments increased their cooperative efforts to address organised crime, levels of criminality also went up across the continent. This is because international cooperative mechanisms may be in place but are not being implemented due to structural vulnerabilities and fractures within national governments, and challenges of violent extremism. For example, Mozambique has been collaborating with regional and international allies (including SADC's Mission in Mozambique, which was still operational in 2022) to address the insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region,⁸³ and yet criminality has continued to rise in this region and the country. It

demonstrates that 'international cooperation' is just one of the many factors needed to build a resilience framework that effectively combats organised crime.

Since 2019, criminal justice and security measures have declined, reflecting the waning power of judicial systems, the corrosion of law enforcement institutions and the infiltration of country territories by organised crime syndicates – and, ultimately, the failure of traditional structures to respond to organised crime. The 'judicial system and detention' indicator refers to a country's judicial power in prosecuting organised crime cases, and its decline (by

0.14 points since 2019) suggests that criminal actors may be operating with growing impunity on the continent. 'Territorial integrity' also decreased (-0.16), as a result of porous borders, rapid globalisation and the rebound in international travel after the COVID-19 travel restrictions were lifted. 'Territorial integrity' was also undermined by armed groups and de facto independent governments in certain regions within the country, such as in Somalia (1.50).


After declining between 2019 and 2021, as a result of the global economy shrinking during the pandemic, in 2023, the continent's economic and financial indicators improved: 'anti-money laundering' (3.99) and 'economic regulatory capacity' (3.76). Ethiopia's score of 7.0 for 'anti-money laundering' reflected the country's efforts to track and control criminal actors involved in money laundering and terrorist financing. Curbing the laundering of illicit proceeds is a fundamental step in discouraging illicit economies. Sound economic regulations are more likely to create a positive environment for overall resilience because they facilitate investments in independent judiciaries that will not be swayed by financial collusion and corruption, and bolster investigative technologies

and capabilities. At an individual level, economic opportunities disincentivise informal and illegitimate businesses practices.


In 2023, the social protection indicators were the lowest performing indicators: 'victim and witness support' (2.84), 'prevention' (3.25) and 'non-state actors' (3.88). However, the improvement in 'victim and witness support' (+0.40) and 'prevention' (+0.57) since 2019 was encouraging because civic and social responses to organised crime reflect the will at community level to build resilience. In contrast, 'non-state actors' has declined by 0.41 points since 2019, mirroring the global trend. This is of concern, as it shows that the space for civil society is shrinking across Africa.⁸⁴ In most countries, non-state actors, such as civil society organisations, are at the forefront of responding to and building resilience against organised crime, by supplementing state action and holding governments to account.⁸⁵ In West Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Cabo Verde and Senegal all scored 7.0 for 'non-state actors', compared to a regional score of 4.90, signalling the need for a more nuanced analysis of each of these indicators and their dynamics at the regional level.

4.3 Regional breakdown

FIGURE 4.3
Resilience averages by region, 2023



West Africa




OVERVIEW

- In 2023, West Africa had the highest resilience levels on the continent, after having had the second highest levels in 2019 and 2021.
- The region had high scores for indicators related to leadership and governance and criminal justice and security, highlighting a preference for more traditional and legislative measures to build resilience.
- The lowest scoring indicators were 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention'.
- In West Africa, 'non-state actors' were influential regionally and especially in Ghana, Cabo Verde, Nigeria and Senegal, indicating an active civil society.
- Countries in the region have demonstrated commitment in enhancing anti-money laundering measures and increased their efforts against terrorism financing in the wake of growing terrorism in the region.

FIGURE 4.4

Resilience, West Africa (2023)



In 2023, West Africa’s resilience levels rebounded to their pre-pandemic average (4.28, compared to 4.26 in 2019), having declined significantly (-0.20) between 2019 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, in line with global trends. The rebound, although very marginal, was noted as a positive development in the region’s efforts and commitment to building resilience amid the challenges posed by the COVID-related health crisis. The most resilient country in West Africa was Cabo Verde (6.58), which, also due to its small size and population, has become a beacon of stability and democracy in the region, followed by Nigeria and Senegal (both at 5.79).

West Africa had the second highest score for ‘international cooperation’ on the continent (5.43).

In Mali (2.38), most of the resilience indicators maintained the same scores between 2021 and 2023, but ‘government transparency and accountability’ declined from 3.0 to 2.50. This was due to the current military leadership’s increasing authoritarianism, which has reduced the room for accountability and transparency. ‘Political leadership and governance’ improved from 2.0 to 2.50, as the military


leadership in Mali took a strong anti-crime and anti-corruption posture, making some high-profile arrests of former political leaders accused of embezzlement and corruption. However, these arrests were often carried out without a transparent trial, which has hindered progress in the country's 'judicial system and detention' indicator, which scored 2.50. In Guinea-Bissau, widespread corruption and collusion between state-embedded actors and criminal networks have led to low resilience levels, according to expert evaluations. But the country has taken steps to improve 'territorial integrity' by exerting more military oversight,⁸⁶ and 'prevention' by beginning to investigate and identifying more victims of the forced begging that plagues the country.⁸⁷

The region's higher scores for 'political leadership and governance' (4.23) and 'government transparency and accountability' (4.10) show an affinity to more traditional and legislative stances against organised crime, such as the enactment of criminal justice legislation and governance policies to root out corruption and boost accountability. In Senegal, the fight against organised crime is part of its national security agenda, while Ghana and Nigeria have implemented e-Government portals aimed at streamlining all state services and thereby increasing transparency and access to information.⁸⁸

West Africa had the second highest score for 'international cooperation' (5.43) on the continent, reflecting combined efforts by countries to tackle organised crime. For instance, Senegal cooperates with its immediate neighbours (Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) to disrupt drug trafficking in the region. Gambia has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Seaport Cooperation Project (SEACOP), a European Union-funded project working with countries to disrupt and prevent illicit maritime trafficking.⁸⁹ These efforts complemented the criminal justice and security measures in the region, which have also improved since 2021.

Between 2021 and 2023, West Africa improved its 'judicial system and detention' indicator (+0.14), despite most countries having limited or compromised judicial systems (i.e. Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Guinea Bissau). Similarly, although regional 'law enforcement' improved slightly (+0.10), individual countries continued to have under-resourced

FIGURE 4.5
Resilience trends by country, West Africa (2019–2023)




and ill-equipped law enforcement agencies. For example, in Guinea, some law enforcement officials have reportedly been implicated in corruption, while in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, most of them were found to be under-trained and under-funded.⁹⁰ Countries that improved their law enforcement structures included Togo (5.0), which has strengthened its capabilities to investigate cybersecurity cases,⁹¹ and Senegal (6.0), which built police capacity through training and education, and by providing infrastructure and equipment.

Between 2021 and 2023, the region as a whole saw an improvement in the average for 'anti-money laundering' (from 3.87 to 4.23). In light of growing terrorism in the region, countries are directing more efforts to tackle terrorist financing and money laundering. After implementing robust anti-money laundering frameworks, Ghana (6.0) is no longer on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. Nigeria (5.0) has introduced a training and education project aimed at understanding and improving anti-money laundering initiatives, while Gambia (5.50) has set up a financial intelligence unit to investigate money laundering and financial crimes, as part of its efforts to strengthen capabilities in line with FATF regulations and reviews. However, even with their efforts, the economic powerhouses of Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria remain at risk from money laundering and terrorism financing, which has been compounded by the use of digital technologies to enable illicit financial flows. For example, the FAFT has grey-listed Senegal for not meeting international standards in money laundering, despite the country making strides in combating terrorism financing and money laundering.

'Economic regulatory capacity' in the region has improved, from 4.07 in 2021 to 4.20 in 2023. The countries that pulled down the regional score for 'economic regulatory capacity' were Niger (3.50), Mali (2.0) and Liberia (3.0), where criminality hindered legitimate businesses and opportunities. In contrast, despite shrinkages in economic output during the COVID-19 pandemic, 'economic regulatory capacity' increased in Cote d'Ivoire (5.0), Niger (3.50) and Sierra Leone (3.50), in part due to the conclusion of international aid agreements.

The lowest scoring resilience indicators in the region were 'soft' resilience indicators, such as 'victim and witness support' (3.17) and 'prevention' (3.60). Although West African countries have improved their mainstream efforts for fighting organised crime, through enacting laws and policies and concluding international agreements, they have not prioritised assisting victims of organised crime and allocating resources and support to organised crime-prevention initiatives in affected communities. Among 'soft' resilience measures, the regional outlier was 'non-state actors' (4.90), which had the second highest score after 'international cooperation'. Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have strong civil society despite growing trends in harassment and intimidation tactics. Civil society in the region is responsible for reporting and raising awareness on organised crime, calling for increased government transparency, and spearheading initiatives to reduce organised crime at the community level.

Southern Africa




OVERVIEW

- In 2023, Southern Africa was the second most resilient region on the continent, having been the most resilient region in 2019 and 2021.
- Since 2019, indicators relating to leadership and governance have declined marginally, while 'international cooperation' has increased, in line with continental trends.
- Criminal justice and security measures have also declined since 2019, due to limited resources and capacity to respond to organised crime, and the politicisation of criminal justice and security institutions.
- Although anti-money laundering structures and policies improved slightly across the region, the results at country level were mixed. 'Anti-money laundering' declined in some countries, resulting in grey-listing by the FATF, but improved in others.
- The region's lowest scoring indicators included social protection indicators, with 'non-state actors' scoring higher than the other indicators, suggesting that there have been some successful civic efforts to boost resilience in the region.

In 2023, for the first time since 2019, Southern Africa was not the most resilient region on the continent, slipping to second position. Between 2019 and 2021, the region's resilience declined by 0.08 points, from 4.27 to 4.18, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although resilience levels have recovered slightly since 2021 (+0.04), they still fell short of 2019 levels in 2023 (4.22).

FIGURE 4.6
Resilience, Southern Africa (2023)



South Africa continued to be the most resilient country in the region.


Looking at individual countries, despite a decrease of 0.17 points since 2021, South Africa continued to be the most resilient country in the region, scoring 5.63, which is well above the regional average. The country displayed robust 'national policies and laws', strong 'economic regulatory capacity' and a diverse range of 'non-state actors'. And yet, paradoxically, it had the highest levels of criminality in the region. On the other end of the spectrum, the least resilient country in Southern Africa was Comoros (2.38), whose challenges include restrictions on political and civil liberties, pervasive corruption, and an under-resourced and overburdened judiciary.

Between 2021 and 2023, all of the region's indicators linked to leadership and governance decreased slightly, with the exception of 'international cooperation'. 'Political leadership and governance' declined to 4.15 (-0.08) due to insufficient prioritisation of anti-organised crime responses and high levels of state capture in certain countries, particularly South Africa, while 'government transparency and accountability' (3.85) and 'national policies and laws' (5.12) both declined by 0.03 points. In contrast, since 2019, 'international cooperation' in the region has steadily improved (+0.77 between 2019 and 2021 and +0.31 since 2021), to reach 5.58 in 2023. It was Southern Africa's highest scoring resilience indicator, highlighting the region's commitment to international treaties and collaboration with regional and international law enforcement counterparts and organisations in the ongoing fight against organised crime.

Between 2019 and 2021, 'judicial system and detention' and 'law enforcement' deteriorated, decreasing by 0.19 and 0.62 points respectively. Then, from 2021 to 2023, both indicators declined by another 0.04 points, to reach 4.04 and 3.69, respectively. Challenges facing both judiciary and law enforcement authorities in the region included insufficient human and financial resources, resulting in limited capacity; state influence over these authorities; and pervasive corruption, resulting in low public trust. These challenges hindered the region's ability to combat organised crime effectively. Nevertheless, since 2021, the region's 'territorial integrity' has improved slightly (+0.07), to 4.19 in 2023.

In 2023, 'anti-money laundering' scored 4.54, (+0.12 since 2021), reflecting the region's improved legal frameworks and mechanisms aimed at combating money laundering, although results across the region were mixed. For instance, between 2021 and 2023, 'anti-money laundering' decreased by between 0.50 and 1.0 points in South Africa (5.50), Madagascar (4.50) and Lesotho (4.0), countries that were found to be at high risk for money-laundering activities. In particular, developments in 2022 led to South Africa's FATF grey-listing in February 2023, mainly due to ineffective prosecutions for money-laundering cases and an overall lack of institutional capacity to combat this crime.⁹² In contrast,

FIGURE 4.7
Resilience trends by country, Southern Africa (2019–2023)






Zambia (5.50), the Seychelles (4.50) and Mauritius (4.0) strengthened their legal frameworks and policies related to money laundering. With regards to 'economic regulatory capacity', in 2023, the region's average score for this indicator was 4.23 (+0.19 since 2021), reflecting the presence of countries, such as Mauritius (7.0), South Africa (6.0) and Botswana (6.0), with relatively well-regulated and free formal economies, supported by an investment-friendly economic climate.

Since 2019, 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention' have been among the lowest-ranked resilience indicators. In 2023, 'victim and witness support' scored just 3.19, a decrease of 0.04 points since 2021, reflecting a further deterioration in the already limited mechanisms and practices to support victims and witnesses affected by organised crime. Conversely, 'prevention' measures improved considerably (+0.69 points between 2019 and 2021 and +0.15 points since 2021), reaching 3.73 in 2023. However, despite this upward trend, the low score is indicative of the continuing ineffectiveness or lack of preventative measures related to organised crime in the region.

In 2023, one of the stronger indicators was 'non-state actors' (4.31), despite declining by 0.65 points between 2019 and 2021 and by 0.15 points since 2021. Although, despite this downward trend, the regional score suggests an active civil society engaged in combating organised crime and a relatively free media landscape, it is driven by a select group of countries that include South Africa (7.0), Namibia (6.0), the Seychelles (5.50), Malawi (5.50) and Mauritius (5.50). In other countries, such as Comoros (2.0), Eswatini (2.50) and Madagascar (2.50), bureaucratic obstacles and restrictive legal frameworks hinder the activities of non-government organisations (NGOs), civil society and media.

North Africa




OVERVIEW

- North Africa remained the third most resilient region on the continent, but its resilience levels have declined significantly since 2019.
- Capabilities and capacities for building resilience were mixed within the region, ranging from Libya, where fragmentation hinders resilience, to Morocco and Tunisia, which have higher resilience to organised crime.
- Between 2021 and 2023, 'political leadership and governance' and 'national policies and laws' remained unchanged, following a decline between 2019 and 2021, whereas 'government transparency and accountability' has deteriorated since 2019. 'International cooperation' was the only indicator to increase, in line with continental trends.
- Since 2019, criminal justice and security indicators have declined slightly, with largely degrading prison conditions reported across North Africa.
- Social protection indicators continued to be the lowest scoring indicators in the region. Since 2019, 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention' have slightly declined, while the 'non-state actors' indicator has substantially deteriorated.

Since the first iteration of the Index in 2019, North Africa's resilience levels have been progressively declining, from 4.19 in 2019 to 3.67 in 2023 (-0.40 between 2019 and 2021 and -0.12 since 2021). Challenges facing the region included military coups, political unrest and the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This continuing decline is of concern given the pervasiveness of certain criminal markets in North Africa, such as human trafficking, smuggling and financial crimes, that have further hampered the region's ability to combat illicit activities effectively.

FIGURE 4.8

Resilience, North Africa (2023)



In 2023, Libya (1.54) had the lowest resilience levels in the region and on the continent, despite no change in its resilience indicators since 2021. However, this followed a notable decrease of 0.59 points between 2019 and 2021. These low resilience levels, combined with the fifth highest criminality levels in Africa, illustrated the insufficient prioritisation of organised crime countermeasures, stemming from limited state authority since the 2011 uprising. At the other end were Morocco (4.63) and Tunisia (4.50), which had strong national legal

frameworks for addressing organised crime, exerted significant control over their territories, and maintained well-established collaborations with international and regional partners in the fight against organised crime. However, these countries still faced challenges that included ineffective mechanisms to combat systemic corruption, state influence and politicisation of the judiciary, and an oppressive approach towards the media.


Between 2021 and 2023, 'political leadership and governance' (3.75) and 'national policies and laws' (4.75) remained at the same levels, whereas 'government transparency and accountability' (3.0) deteriorated by 0.42 points, following a decrease of 0.33 points between 2019 and 2021. This decline was due to various factors, including the closure of the competent anti-corruption authority in Tunisia (4.0), the political use of anti-corruption regulations in Algeria (3.0) and ongoing budgetary transparency issues in Egypt (2.50). In 2023, 'international cooperation' scored 4.50, an increase of 0.17 points since 2021, reflecting both the continental and global trends of a growing reliance on international cooperation efforts to combat organised crime.

In 2023, 'judicial system and detention' (2.92) was one of the lowest performing resilience indicators in North Africa, having decreased by 0.84 points between 2019 and 2021 and by 0.41 points since 2021. Country scores for this indicator ranged from 1.50 (Libya) to 4.0 (Morocco), indicating the troublesome state of the judiciary and detention facilities across the region. In most countries, the judicial system is increasingly influenced by the state and faces practical challenges, such as a lack of human and financial resources. Furthermore, the region's penitentiary systems are largely characterised by degrading conditions, including hygiene deficiencies and severe overcrowding.

'Law enforcement' in the North Africa region has also declined over the years, resulting in an average of 4.17 in 2023 (-0.92 from 2019 to 2021, followed by a decrease of 0.08 points between 2021 and 2023). The region's highest scoring indicator was 'territorial integrity' (5.0), which was unchanged from 2021, suggesting that most North African countries had sound measures in place to safeguard their borders from the infiltration of organised crime groups and

FIGURE 4.9

Resilience trends by country, North Africa (2019–2023)



other threats. The exception was Libya (1.50), where internal fragmentation and weakened governance has resulted in the loss of formal border control to local networks and non-government forces. This situation has led to a disjointed and weak system of border and maritime control, which has made it easier for criminal elements and armed groups to infiltrate Libya's territory.


Since 2021, 'anti-money laundering' (4.08) has also remained unchanged, signalling no significant shifts in anti-money laundering efforts in the region. Most North African countries continued to face a moderate risk of money laundering while featuring relatively adequate legal frameworks and mechanisms to combat it. In 2023, 'economic regulatory capacity' declined to 3.58 (-0.67 points between 2019 and 2021 and -0.17 points since 2021), as a result of the financial

crisis in North Africa stemming from both global and national factors, fiscal constraints and ever-expanding informal economies.

Social protection indicators continued to have the lowest scores in the region and have declined since 2019. In 2023, 'prevention' decreased to 2.67 (-0.25) and 'victim and witness support' to 2.83 (-0.17). 'Non-state actors' (2.75) experienced one of the most substantial deteriorations among all 12 resilience indicators in the region, initially decreasing by 0.83 points between 2019 and 2021 and then by another 0.42 points between 2021 and 2023. Although North African countries had a vibrant civil society that actively addressed issues related to organised crime, the media environment has become increasingly precarious, with journalists facing constant pressure, threats of detention and arbitrary arrest.



East Africa




OVERVIEW

- In 2019, 2021 and 2023, East Africa was ranked fourth out of five regions for resilience, with minimal changes over the years. The region includes Somalia, the second least resilient country in Africa after Libya.
- Since 2019, the lowest scoring indicator in the region has been 'victim and witness support'.
- Between 2021 and 2023, 'government transparency and accountability', 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws' all improved their scores slightly, whereas 'political leadership and governance' continued its downward trend from 2019.
- Despite marginal improvement since 2021, 'government transparency and accountability' was one of the lowest scoring indicators, whereas 'international cooperation' was the highest scoring indicator in the region in 2023, in line with continental trends.
- Since 2021, all criminal justice and security indicators have declined, with 'law enforcement' continuing its decrease from 2019.
- Social protection indicators had some of the lowest scores, reflecting inefficient social protection measures in East Africa. However, following a major setback during the COVID-19 pandemic, non-state actors have regained some presence in East Africa, despite continuous challenges.

In 2023, East Africa (3.46) was the second least resilient region in Africa. Despite challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, between 2019 and 2021, the region's resilience improved slightly from 3.50 to 3.54, but then fell by 0.08 points from 2021 to 2023, largely due to ongoing instability that resulted in heightened fragility. In all three iterations of the Index, indicators related to civil society and social protection have been the most underdeveloped across the region, indicating the inadequacy of victim support mechanisms and the limited space for action granted to NGOs and the media in East Africa.

FIGURE 4.10
Resilience, East Africa (2023)



Individual countries in the region had some of the lowest resilience scores on the continent: Somalia (1.79), South Sudan (1.88) and Eritrea (2.33), which all also scored only 1.0 for 'victim and witness support', indicating a complete absence of adequate support mechanisms for victims and witnesses. On the other hand, after slight improvements recorded since 2019, Kenya had the region's highest


resilience levels (5.33) in 2023 due to its willingness to cooperate with regional and international partners in information sharing and crime investigation. Kenya's legal framework against organised crime is also one of the most advanced in the region, although there are implementation shortcomings.

Since 2021, only one of the indicators measuring leadership and governance has declined in East Africa: 'political leadership and governance' (3.28), which decreased by 0.11 points between 2019 and 2021 and by a further 0.28 points since 2021. The score was pulled down by the 1.0 point drop in Sudan (2.0) and Ethiopia (4.0), where continuing political turmoil (in Sudan) and ethnic tensions (in Ethiopia) posed a severe threat to the governability of these countries, undermining their capacity to implement effective anti-organised crime strategies and providing an ideal environment for criminal actors to thrive.

Conversely, between 2021 and 2023, 'government transparency and accountability' (2.50), 'international cooperation' (4.61) and 'national policies and laws' (4.50) all improved. 'Government transparency and accountability' increased by 0.11 points after declining by 0.22 points between 2019 and 2021. This shows that corruption remains an issue across East Africa, with only two of the nine countries having a moderately effective institutional framework: Ethiopia (4.50) and Kenya (5.0). The region is also home to Somalia (1.0) and Eritrea (1.0), two states evaluated by experts to have some of the highest levels of corruption in the world, characterised by dysfunctional institutions and a lack of transparency and accountability, which facilitate corruption and hinder the effectiveness of anti-organised crime measures.

East Africa's highest regional average was for 'international cooperation', which has steadily grown since 2019. This is largely due to countries in the region having repeatedly sought the help of international partners and signed strategic agreements with their neighbours to fight cross-border crimes and secure their borders against the infiltration of organised crime and violent extremist groups. Moreover, most countries in the region have signed international treaties and conventions relating to organised crime as well as bilateral extradition agreements. Lastly, with regard

FIGURE 4.11
Resilience trends by country, East Africa (2019–2023)



to 'national policies and laws', although legal frameworks guiding anti-organised crime efforts are usually in place across East African countries, implementation is often inadequate or absent.

Between 2021 and 2023, all criminal justice and security-related indicators declined. 'Law enforcement' (3.17), which has steadily decreased since 2019, was limited in all East African countries, even Kenya (4.50), which had generally higher levels of resilience than its neighbours. In Kenya, security forces are considered untrustworthy because of allegations of corruption among police, customs and immigration officers, and reports of arbitrary violence and lack of investigative skills.⁹³ Confidence in law enforcement officials was even lower in Somalia (1.50) and South Sudan (2.0), where police presence in certain areas is limited or completely absent.


Similarly, since 2021, 'judicial system and detention' (3.56) have declined by 0.11 points in East Africa, due to the lack of independence, weak institutional capacity, poor access to justice and harsh prison conditions, which in some cases do not adhere to fundamental human rights principles. Between 2021 and 2023, 'territorial integrity' (4.22) also decreased (-0.28), mainly because Ethiopia's 'territorial integrity' score dropped from 6.0 to 4.0, as a result of the various armed conflicts (especially the civil war in Tigray) that threaten the country's borders and internal security.

The efficacy of 'anti-money laundering' responses (4.0) and the overall tenure of the economic regulatory environment (3.67) declined, by 0.17 and 0.11 points respectively. No country improved their 'anti-money laundering' score, while three of nine countries saw a 0.50 point decline: Somalia (2.0), Sudan (3.50) and Tanzania (5.0), putting them at greater risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, with considerable capacity barriers hindering their policies' effectiveness. Across the region, the informal economy was also pervasive, and authorities have had little success in ensuring legitimate business can operate free from criminal interference. Moreover, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have severely affected priority sectors in some countries, such as health, education and social protection.

In 2023, as in other regions, social protection indicators had the lowest scores in East Africa, with 'victim and witness support' (2.0) decreasing by 0.17 points since 2021, driven by Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan (all 1.0 in 2023). This demonstrates that procedures for proactively identifying trafficking victims and referring them to care are either not in place or not being implemented effectively. Similarly, 'prevention' (2.89) indicates that many East African countries do not have sufficient public awareness campaigns and preventative strategies aimed at curbing the expansion of organised crime. Lastly, 'non-state actors' (3.17) are in danger in many countries, with most existing civil society organisations and independent activists struggling to survive in the face of governments attempting to restrict their space and limit their power.

In 2023, social protection indicators had the lowest scores in East Africa.

Central Africa




OVERVIEW

- Despite gradual improvements in resilience levels over the years, Central Africa continued to have the lowest resilience levels in Africa and the world.
- 'International cooperation' and 'national policies and laws' were the region's highest scoring indicators and have improved gradually since 2019.
- The region scored lowest for 'political leadership and governance' and 'government transparency and accountability', due an observed lack of political willingness to combat organised crime, which is closely tied to widespread corruption and ongoing instability.
- Since 2019, 'territorial integrity' in Central Africa has deteriorated, and this decline is linked to the increasing porosity of borders that facilitates cross-border criminal activities.
- 'Victim and witness support' and 'non-state actors', which were weak in 2019, have continued to deteriorate, suggesting a worsening situation for victims of organised crime and a shrinking civic space due to limitations and hostilities in certain Central African countries.

Central Africa was the least resilient region in Africa and the world, despite notable improvements. From 2019 to 2021, the region's resilience levels jumped from 2.95 to 3.21 (+0.26) but after 2021 improved by just 0.02 points, to 3.23 in 2023. This indicates that progress remains marginal, despite some stabilisation in certain areas. The region continued to lag behind the rest of the continent in 'government transparency and accountability' (2.45), which was the lowest scoring indicator and has not changed since 2021. Central Africa is plagued by widespread fragility and corruption, with often no oversight mechanisms to protect against state collusion in illicit activities, and with authorities reportedly involved in organised crime, either directly or indirectly.

FIGURE 4.12
Resilience, Central Africa (2023)




Rwanda (5.54) was the most resilient country in Central Africa, mainly because of its efforts to enhance prevention against organised crime and provide support to victims and witnesses, and its solid law enforcement capacities and anti-trafficking measures. Rwanda was followed by São Tomé and Príncipe (4.92) and Angola (4.50). The least resilient country in the region was the CAR (1.79), followed by Burundi (2.17) and Equatorial Guinea (2.21).

Since 2021, ‘political leadership and governance’ (3.05) and ‘government transparency and accountability’ (2.45) have been stable in Central Africa but remained very low in 2023, especially in Cameroon, the CAR, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, which all scored between 1.0 and 2.0. Many countries lack the political will to fight organised crime, partly because of endemic corruption and persistent instability.

In contrast, ‘international cooperation’ and ‘national policies and laws’ have been gradually improving, in line with continental trends. In 2023, ‘international cooperation’ (4.45) increased by 0.50 between 2019 and 2021 and by 0.14 points since 2021, while ‘national policies and laws’ (4.36) increased by 0.14 points since 2019 and 0.04 points since 2021. However, although most countries showed a stronger commitment to multilateral initiatives to combat organised crime and to improving their legislative frameworks, implementation and enforcement of such measures remained problematic, mainly due to lack of capacity and resources. For example, in 2023, Cameroon scored 5.50 and 4.50 for ‘international cooperation’ and ‘national policies and laws’ respectively, despite participating in many bilateral and regional initiatives aimed at addressing all types of trafficking and adopting several domestic laws related to organised crime. This indicates gaps in efforts to improve national and international legislative frameworks that hinder the development of such initiatives and benefit criminal organisations.

Since 2019, criminal justice and security indicators have not progressed significantly in Central Africa, with ‘judicial system and detention’ scoring 3.0 and ‘law enforcement’ 3.50 in 2023. Most countries have structural deficiencies and persistent constraints, which include poor access to justice, lack of resources and limited independence in the justice sector and security apparatus. Moreover, the region’s ‘territorial integrity’ average (3.59) weakened slightly, by 0.09 points between 2019 and 2021 and 0.05 points between 2021 and 2023. Most countries have porous borders, as evidenced by the continuous movement of illicit goods across state lines in the region. In addition, national authorities are often unable to exert full control over their entire territory, such as in the case of the DRC (2.0 for ‘territorial integrity’), where some areas are frequently subject to the violence of armed rebels and organised crime groups.

FIGURE 4.13
Resilience trends by country, Central Africa (2019–2023)



Similarly, Central Africa had low scores for the economic and financial resilience indicators. In 2023, 'anti-money laundering' (2.95) was unchanged from 2021, indicating a high risk of money laundering and inefficient preventative measures. Although some countries have anti-money laundering frameworks in place, implementation is lacking, regional responses are weak, and enforcement is problematic. Reflecting the informal nature of the economy, the region's 'economic regulatory capacity' scored 2.77 in 2023, a slight increase (+0.13) since 2021. Rwanda (6.50) was one of the few countries in the region to make progress in the regulatory environment for private business. However, energy shortages, lack of adequate transportation linkages and instability in neighbouring states remain key obstacles to private sector growth.

Social protection indicators for Central Africa were largely weak and ineffective. Between 2021 and 2023, 'victim and witness support' (2.68) and 'non-state actors' (3.18) both declined by 0.05 points, indicating insufficient support for victims of organised crime and a limited role for civil society organisations across the region. Conflicts and hostile environments in many countries also undermined and constrained the actions of non-state actors. Despite growing gradually since 2019 (+0.73 between 2019 and 2021 and +0.14 points since 2021), 'prevention' (2.82) remained low.





SECTION 5

The crime- resilience nexus



5 The crime-resilience nexus

A common expectation is that the relationship between criminality and resilience is negative, and linear, as lower levels of resilience would leave countries vulnerable to the proliferation of organised crime groups and illicit economies. Similarly, countries where organised crime is prevalent would struggle to develop the necessary tools to combat organised crime, leading to higher levels of criminality. However, the reality is not that simple.

FIGURE 5.1
Vulnerability matrix






FIGURE 5.2
Vulnerability classifications map



Since 2019, over three iterations, the Index has studied the relationship between criminality and resilience. As was the case in prior editions, the 2023 Index found that the majority of countries in Africa do not meet the common expectation that high resilience translates into low criminality and vice versa. Instead, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, half of all African countries are in the low criminality–low resilience quadrant, and only three African countries are in the high criminality–high resilience quadrant. The other 24 countries fall either in the high criminality–low resilience quadrant (21 countries) or the low criminality–high resilience quadrant (three countries).


These apparent discrepancies are due to various factors. For instance, countries with comparatively low levels of resilience and low levels of criminality may have a few pervasive criminal markets, but not enough to bring up the average criminality score. This does not mean that these countries have no issues – on the contrary, given the low resilience levels, political and economic fragility might deepen to the extent that other illicit economies could develop to levels that are difficult to contain. Other factors include geography, as illicit economies make use of the global trade infrastructure. Therefore, a country might not have developed stronger resilience frameworks but be isolated from trade routes used to move illegal goods, making it less attractive to organised crime.

The distribution of the countries on the vulnerability matrix suggests a very weak link between organised crime levels and resilience levels, as measured by the Index. The correlation analysis supports this

suggestion, finding that the relationship between criminality and resilience has weakened since 2021, from a correlation coefficient of -0.29 to -0.21 in 2023.

FIGURE 5.3

Criminality–resilience correlation



However, an important caveat is that, although seven countries changed quadrants in 2023, the weakening of the link between criminality and resilience is probably due to the expansion of the Index’s scope. For instance, the Index found a moderate positive correlation (+0.54) between resilience and cyber-dependent crimes (one of the new markets added in 2023). This correlation was stronger than for any other criminal market, suggesting the cyber-dependent crimes market in Africa may not be particularly pervasive (3.59) but that it develops irrespective of the general anti-organised crime frameworks that countries have in place. Moreover, the 0.54 correlation implies that cyber-dependent crimes tend to proliferate in environments with stronger

anti-organised crime frameworks; in other words, the higher the resilience score, the higher the score for cyber-dependent crimes tends to be.

In line with the 2021 findings, the 2023 Index found that drug markets in Africa do not have a discernible link to levels of resilience. For example, the correlation between resilience and the heroin market (0.40) and the cocaine market (0.38) indicates that these illicit economies flourish even in environments where robust anti-organised crime frameworks have been developed and implemented. This apparent anomaly could be explained by looking at economic development levels. The Index considers countries as playing source, transit and/or destination roles and equally weights each of these roles in the criminality

score. However, well-developed nations, where populations are more likely to engage in recreational drug use or be victims of crime because of their higher economic status, may have high resilience, whereas producer countries may have lower resilience levels.

Furthermore, although there was a strong, negative correlation between resilience and certain criminal markets, such as human trafficking (-0.46) and arms trafficking (-0.46), the reality is that the relationship between resilience and all criminal markets (-0.03) was not statistically significant. What this highlights is the complexity of the organised crime–resilience dynamics and the need for a deeper dive into the specific environments, to analyse the conditions that drive criminality and the measures that could effectively counter and reduce the damage caused by criminality.

Criminal markets are only one aspect of the overall criminality measured by the Index. Criminality also includes the strength and influence of different criminal actor types. As was the case in 2021, in 2023, the relationship between criminal actors and resilience was stronger (-0.34) than between criminal markets and resilience. This dynamic reflects global findings and is driven mainly by the prevalence of state-embedded actors, who had the strongest link

to resilience (-0.65). In other words, state-embedded actors tend to have more influence in countries with less developed resilience frameworks. This finding speaks to the challenges that African countries face in breaking the cycle and curbing the influence of state-embedded actors, thereby improving the foundation on which to build resilience.

Although causality is not implied when discussing the correlation between overall resilience and non-state actors (-0.79), improving the environment in which civil society operates would undoubtedly translate into better implementation of anti-organised crime frameworks. Taken together, these links emphasise the need for a more holistic approach, where state and civil society join forces to combat the growing problem of organised crime.

No other criminal actor type comes close to state-embedded actors in their influence on resilience. In Africa, no statistically significant relationship was found between foreign or private-sector actors and resilience. At the same time, the correlation was very weak (-0.18) between criminal networks and a country's ability to withstand the threat of organised crime, while the link between mafia-style groups and resilience was stronger (-0.30), which was somewhat surprising when compared to global results.



SECTION 6

Conclusion



6 Conclusion

Over five years, the Index has gathered data on criminality and resilience in Africa, with each iteration showing criminality steadily growing as resilience struggles to keep up with the increasing threats posed by organised crime. Nevertheless, as illustrated above, the news is both good and bad for Africa. The good news is that, although still below the global average, resilience has improved in Africa since 2021. This improvement followed a decline in resilience during 2020, which was because countries were focusing on managing the pandemic rather than addressing organised crime. The other good news is that, since 2021, criminality has grown the least in Africa compared to other continents. However, the bad news is that criminality in Africa has grown undeterred since 2019, with illicit markets increasing in pervasiveness and the influence of criminal actors expanding in the continent's regions.

The surge in criminality and the fragmentation of resilience mechanisms are related to the ongoing conflicts, widespread insecurity, and declining democratic order and state accountability on the continent. In addition to wars and political crisis, economic decline and environmental stressors have resulted in fragile states, exacerbating both instability and rising criminality on the continent. Extreme weather events cause food and water shortages, disrupting livelihoods and leading people to move externally and internally in search of sustenance and stability – for example, in 2022, the worst drought in decades affected about 40 million people in East Africa. As a result of this human mobility, many African countries experience high levels of human smuggling.

Given these observations, some interesting questions begin to emerge. First, how can African countries disrupt the transnational expansion of criminality and strengthen their systems to respond to organised crime more effectively? Second, how can they reduce their vulnerability to conflict and insecurity, and enhance state transparency, limiting the role of state-embedded actors and guaranteeing respect for the rule of law? The responses to these questions will allow countries to begin to formulate how to address growing criminality and strengthen resilience to organised crime. However, these policy responses will need to be informed by improved data collection on different illicit markets. The Index was designed for evidence-based research and analysis, as the basis for further research and contribution to the growing body of evidence on the causality and interrelationships between criminality and resilience. It shows that

the continent has a long way to go in tackling growing criminality and bolstering resilience. The Index's findings are intended to guide policymaking and prioritisation, and to start a constructive discussion on responding, and building resilience, to organised crime.

Most responses to organised crime on the continent tend to focus on institutional frameworks, such as enactment of laws, ratification of international instruments, and campaigns against organised crime as part of political rhetoric and national strategies. A more holistic approach is needed that encompasses 'softer' measures, such as prevention, victim and witness support, and non-state-actor initiatives. Countries cannot rely solely on legislation and policy without implementation. Engagement with a robust and active civil society is also needed to bolster resilience at community level. Although the challenge of criminality is increasing, it can be mitigated through a concerted effort that encompasses all resilience building blocks. Countries on the continent need to diversify, intensify and strengthen their collective responses and efforts to build long-lasting resilience structures against organised crime.





Appendix 1

Interpreting the results

As a data-driven tool, the Index aims to standardise the complex concepts of criminality and resilience across 54 African states. While standardisation promotes comparative analysis and easy interpretation, it does not come without challenges. The collection of data may vary across countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. These issues are even more pronounced given the inherently clandestine nature of organised crime. While the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges through expert cross-checks and by triangulating sources, another challenge arises when there is abundant information on a particular country or component. Research and information promote greater understanding of the organised crime landscape in a given country and its resilience, informing better policymaking decisions and responses. Nevertheless, for comparative tools such as the Index, an information bias – where more information is published on some areas than on others – may risk skewing the results and interpretation of findings. In other words, an organised crime problem may appear to be more acute in countries where more information, research and reporting have occurred. One of the main goals of the Index is to highlight areas where information is lacking, in an effort to promote further research. It is important for stakeholders to accept indices for what they are and the information they provide as supplementary to other means of gathering information. Similarly, instances arise where published information and evidence are lacking but experts with in-depth knowledge of a specific context acknowledge that problems exist. In such cases, the Index as an expert-led assessment heavily relies on expert knowledge in evaluating country contexts.

A1.1 Diversity in the Index components

Countries that differ in their criminality and resilience may nevertheless be assigned the same scores, while those that host a particularly acute organised crime problem may appear to score lower than other countries. These results can be explained by the structure of the Index. Because overall criminality and resilience scores are assigned based on a simple average of their respective composite indicators, countries that have a diverse range of criminal markets and criminal actors will score higher than those that have fewer, albeit perhaps more pervasive, criminal characteristics. The same can be said of the resilience indicators. Overall resilience scores will be dependent on a country's ability to tackle the organised crime situation based on a holistic and multifaceted approach, rather than a criminal justice- or economically-driven approach.

A1.2 Limitations

Recognising the difficulties inherent in creating a tool that studies a subject that is highly varied and inherently clandestine, the Index comes with limitations and potential biases. Nevertheless, it can be described as a worthwhile exercise, although with certain limitations, which we hope will become a catalyst for further debate.

On a methodological note, there are considerations that must be taken into account when interpreting the scores. First and foremost, the Index relies heavily on individual expert knowledge and experience, which introduces the possibility of an implicit bias, where experts' personal convictions might affect their judgement. The ramifications in this case are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, experts might have been too critical, given their knowledge of a specific country's deficiencies, and on the other, they might have been tempted to be too lenient. Although the latter was presumed more probable prior to the evaluation rounds, it was observed that experts tended to be more critical and often held countries, especially more developed ones, to a higher standard. Throughout the development of the tool, we have attempted to control for this bias by providing preliminary country profiles as a basis on which experts were able to make their assessments and by specifying scoring thresholds to guide the scoring process, as outlined in the methodology section. In addition, all countries underwent a number of anonymous verification rounds, comparing the scores across indicators and regions in an attempt to account for implicit bias.

Experts in the initial scoring round provided scores that were presented to experts in the following geographic and thematic scoring rounds. This opened the possibility of confirmation bias, where experts would confirm the scores assigned in previous rounds. To address this, an additional score verification round was carried out, where groups of representatives from numerous areas of expertise came together in moderated regional discussions to debate and scrutinise the scores and justifications for each country.

In addition, as one aspect of the Index tool is to help policymakers improve their approach to organised crime, it is fundamental to understand where harms for different markets are coming from. It is undeniable that many of the harms associated with specific markets stem from existing policies. One example of this is the cannabis trade. Policies related to the policing and use of cannabis differ from country to country. Thus, evaluating the impact associated with the cannabis market has been ambiguous. While an increasing number of states are moving to decriminalise or legalise cannabis, there is some room for illegality, like trafficking cannabis to countries with stricter policies, for instance. Thus, to be as consistent as possible, the importance of capturing this aspect of illegality when evaluating the market was emphasised to expert scorers. Nevertheless, consistency in this case has been difficult to achieve.

Another critical issue raised during the scoring process was the debate on the harm and impact of markets, – namely, whether harms are comparable across markets. Herein lies another limitation of the tool – the weighting of different components of the Index. Currently, as has been already specified, indicators are weighted evenly. Nevertheless, four of the 15 markets are drug-related, which puts implicit weight on the impact of drugs, which, depending on the context, may pose issues. Cyber-dependent crimes in Africa, for example, exist but are almost negligible. Yet they are weighted equally with more pervasive markets, such as human trafficking and financial crimes.

Thus, the current weighting of indicators might lead to some curious results. What often occurs is that two countries that perhaps would not be expected to rank on the same level in terms of criminality, turn out to be very similar to one another. This is where we advise caution and recommend readers to look at the disaggregated scores, as we have stressed at the beginning of the report, because countries might have a similar or the same overall ranking but for different reasons.

A1.3 Broader scope: additional Index indicators

To address recognised limitations in the scope of the criminal markets covered by the Index, the current edition has been expanded. An additional five criminal markets (financial crimes, cyber-dependent crimes, illicit trade in excisable goods, trade in counterfeit goods, and extortion and protection racketeering), and a criminal actor type (private sector actors), have been added. Incorporating these new indicators provides for a more thorough assessment of the organised crime landscape.

We recognise the difficulties in measuring organised crime in general, but an accurate assessment of cross-cutting markets, such as financial crimes and cyber-dependent crimes, comes with its own set of challenges. As a result, expert technical groups were set up to assess whether these markets would fit into the existing Index methodology. Expectedly, given the sheer volume of criminal activities that fall under these two crime types, financial crimes and cybercrime were the most difficult to define and measure. Therefore, the definitions of these two criminal markets include a set of specific criminal activities. Narrowing down the types of offences that would fall under the respective markets allows us still to adequately measure a specific market while avoiding double counting (i.e. counting the same criminal activity under two different markets). Needless to say, double counting would artificially increase the average criminality score of a country, skewing the overall results of the Index.

To illustrate, take the example of cybercrime. Our approach has been to distinguish between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime. What are often described as cyber-enabled offences (i.e. activities carried out online to enable traditional 'offline' forms of crime) have already been captured under the previous iterations of the Index. So, using the internet to target and recruit victims of human trafficking would be captured under the human trafficking market, for instance. In that sense, it is necessary for cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes to be separated to avoid such significant overlaps between markets. To avoid issues stemming from such overlaps, a decision was made for the Index to measure cyber-dependent crime as a standalone market.

As a cross-cutting phenomenon, defining and measuring financial crime also comes with some challenges. Again, to avoid overlap when assessing financial crimes and to allow comparability with the prior editions of the Index, any activities that can be attributed to another criminal market under the Index fall under that respective market indicator. Procurement fraud for logging contracts is one such example, which is considered under the flora crimes market, as opposed to financial crimes. Notably, the laundering of illicit proceeds and bribery are not included in the financial crimes category either. Excluding money laundering from this category is justified by the fact that it does not exist in itself but rather occurs as a secondary crime linked to illicit proceeds of a predicate offence. As the predicate crimes are already assessed under the various markets (e.g. drug trafficking), the secondary offence – in this instance laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking – would not fall under the financial crimes market. It is instead classified under the primary market: drug trafficking. The one exception is when money laundering occurs as a result of fraud or another offence that is classified as a financial crime.

Appendix 2

Definitions

A2.1 Defining organised crime

Any index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring organised crime, the parameters that this Index relies on are informed by definitions of organised crime, and related activities and concepts.

Organised crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Although there is an awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by different actors, that fluctuate and adapt to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organised crime, came into force, compelling member states to consider a definition for organised crime. Unable to reach a consensus, however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition, but rather offers clarity on two constants within the broad context of organised crime.

The terms 'organised criminal group' and 'serious offence', outlined in the convention, offer the basic conditions for an activity to be deemed to be organised crime and the flexibility to address the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organised criminal group may refer to a broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely connected networks. Likewise, the convention's focus on the term 'serious offence' ensures a distinction is maintained between low-level criminality and organised criminal activity. Moreover,

the convention specifically speaks to activities that are profit-driven, allowing for policies and responses to distinguish organised crime from solely politically motivated actions, such as terrorism. Today the consensus among the convention's member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional debates surrounding the term 'organised crime' and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in which the label 'organised crime' can be understood and conceptualised.

Nevertheless, for an index to offer true insight and value, some form of definition is essential. While relying (though not exclusively) on international instruments to define various criminal markets, the Index considers both transnational organised crimes as well organised criminal activities occurring within state boundaries.

ORGANISED CRIME

For the purpose of the ENACT Organised Crime Index, 'organised crime' is defined as illegal activities conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

By defining organised crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and perpetrators to be considered and measured. One key point to note in this definition is the issue of legality. Activities that are not designated as illegal or that have been legalised in

a country fall outside of the scope of the assessment of that particular country, even if considered illegal in another. At the same time, activities that are not illegal but that violate international human rights standards are included under the Index.

A2.2 Criminal market definitions

People

Human trafficking

Drawing from a range of sources, the Index covers human trafficking within a modern slavery context and includes the trafficking of human organs. In line with common interpretations of human trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men, women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows (such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the Index, human trafficking includes activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and transfer, to harbouring and receipt of persons. To distinguish this market from that of human smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim's consent. In line with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC, exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Human smuggling

Under the Index, human smuggling is defined as the criminalisation of the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organised criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit activity, including producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents when committed for the purpose of enabling the

smuggling of migrants. Although they are distinct crimes that are defined in different ways, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

Extortion and protection racketeering

Crimes of protection and extortion linked to an organised crime group or groups that exert control over a given territory or market – either legal or illegal – include:

- Activities of organised extortion, where the extortioner asks for money or other utility/benefit in exchange for a purposefully fake, fabricated or real need for protection (with or without an extortion request).
- Cartel racketeering, where an organised crime group acts as intermediary or mediator by handling external competition and solving disputes as gatekeeper by controlling access and exit to and from key markets.

The definition does not include such acts when committed by state officials (in which case, it is included under various markets, including corruption).

Trade

Arms trafficking

The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well as intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. 'Firearms' refers to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive,

excluding antique firearms or their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UNTOC. 'Small arms' and 'light weapons' refer to a range of specific weapons, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often, the trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organised crime activities.

Trade in counterfeit goods

Refers to the production, transport, storage, distribution and sale of counterfeit goods. Counterfeit goods are either deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or source, or are fraudulent imitations of registered brands and involve the theft of a trademark.

Illicit trade in excisable goods

This market involves the illicit transport, distribution and sale of excise consumer goods, with the exception of oil (which is included under non-renewable resource crimes). An illicit market exists where the product is either transported or sold illegally (i.e. despite prohibition) or where the product is distributed outside regulated processes, the regulated trade market or the legal regulatory framework (e.g. for the purposes of tax evasion). This market does not include trade in counterfeit versions of such products (which falls under trade in counterfeit goods).

Environment

Flora crimes

Crimes related to flora involve the illicit trade as well as possession of species covered by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), as well as other species protected under national law.

Fauna crimes

Like flora crimes, crimes involving fauna species entail the poaching and illicit trade in animals and animal products, as well as the possession of species or animal products covered by CITES or protected by national law. The Index also considers protected marine species, and IUU fishing falls under this category.

Non-renewable resource crimes

The Index includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. It also covers any illicit activities related to trade in such products, including price misinvoicing. The Index covers commodities including, but not limited to, oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

Drugs

Heroin trade

The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

Cocaine trade

Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market.

Cannabis trade

The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Recognising the growing legalisation of cannabis production, sale and consumption, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalised and/or where criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

Synthetic drug trade

As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants, methamphetamines and fentanyl are included in this criminal market, as is any other narcotic included in the 1972 Protocol, Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Notably, 'substandard and falsified medical products', as outlined by the World Health Organisation, have been excluded.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Defined as organised crimes that are dependent on the use of a computer, computer network or other forms of information communications technology (ICT). These include the spread of viruses or other malware, hacking, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud. These activities are considered to be conducted for the purpose of obtaining a monetary or material benefit (as opposed to a political or ideological objective).

Financial crimes

Refers to organised crime that results in a financial loss to the state, entity and/or private individuals through one or more of the following activities:

- Financial fraud: this refers to cases where money and/or financial assets are obtained through deception, including, but not limited to, procurement fraud, identity fraud, mass marketing fraud, banking fraud, Ponzi schemes, etc.
- Tax evasion (including activities such as price misinvoicing) and abusive tax avoidance: this refers to the use of illegal means to avoid paying taxes. It occurs when the taxpayer either evades assessment or evades payment. When committing price misinvoicing, the profit-maximising actor will either over- or under-invoice and the misdeclaration depends on the relative tax and tariff rates. Tax avoidance is to be distinguished from tax evasion, where, in the case of the latter, someone acts against the law or abuses the letter of the law. By contrast, abusive tax avoidance complies with the letter of the law, but subverts its purpose.
- Embezzlement: this involves the fraudulent appropriation of property or funds entrusted to an individual for their management and safekeeping, with the intention of using these assets for personal benefit. It differs from regular fraud because the actor who takes the money or property has trusted and legitimate access to the valuables before taking them for their own use.
- Misuse of funds: this refers to the misapplication of funds from state, international or regional bodies for purposes other than those for which they were originally granted.

To be considered financial crimes, the aforementioned activities must be committed by an organised crime group for the purpose of financial gain or professional advantage. Such activities, when attributable to another criminal market under the Index, fall under that respective market indicator. For example, procurement fraud for logging contracts would fall under flora crimes.

The laundering of illicit proceeds and bribery are not included in this category, as explained in Appendix 1.

A2.3 Criminal actor definitions

Mafia-style groups

Refers to clearly defined organised criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining features of a mafia-style group: a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

Criminal networks

Refers to a loose network of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or do not have a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any of the other defining features of mafia-style groups. In essence, criminal networks and entrepreneurs are defined by their failure to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

State-embedded actors

Refers to criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus.

Foreign actors

Refers to state or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. In addition to foreign nationals, this may also in some instances include individuals forming part of a diaspora group that has established roots in a particular country.

Private sector actors

Refers to profit-seeking individuals or entities that own, manage or control a segment of the legal economy free from state ownership or control, that collaborate or cooperate with criminal actors wilfully, through coercion or neglect. Activities include, but are not limited to, the laundering of illicit proceeds, acting as informants, and legal representation through unethical means.

A2.4 Resilience indicator definitions

Leadership and governance

Political leadership and governance

Refers to the role a state's government plays in responding to organised crime and its effectiveness in doing so. Strong political leadership and governance indicate higher state resilience to organised crime.

Governments orientate citizens towards a state's stance on organised crime, championing its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundations for implementing action. The platform on which anti-organised crime rhetoric is delivered reflects to some degree the level of prioritisation of organised crime on the national agenda.

Governance serves as a function of the relationship between the state and its governed populations. Leaders who are seen as legitimate in their intent and

RESILIENCE

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activity as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries' measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

actions unify society. People's confidence in those who govern them can be directly linked to conflict in a society. The presence of organised crime can tangibly reduce the capacity for governance and the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population.

When there is no or little confidence in the government, society can become unstable, creating (further) opportunities for organised crime to fill the governance void between the state and its populations.

Government transparency and accountability

Refers to the degree to which a state has put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities – in other words, whether or not the state creates opportunities for the reduction of state corruption and to obscure the illegitimate control over power or resources, including resources linked to organised crime.

As representatives of their citizens, governments are entrusted with powers to oversee and maintain the rule and order of societies. When this contract is abused, it both undermines citizens' trust in state institutions (which may lead to vulnerabilities to organised crime) and can imply state collusion in organised crime. Efforts to increase transparency, such as adequately resourcing anti-corruption measures, work to reduce opportunities for organised criminals to exert their influence. Thus, the more transparent governments are, the more resilient a state is to organised crime.

International cooperation

Refers to the structures and processes of interaction, policymaking and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level in order to respond to organised crime. Strong international cooperation indicates high levels of state resilience to organised crime.

As organised crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, with actors and supply chains able to span national and continental boundaries, it is essential that states work together on a global scale to combat the threat.

The ratification (and timeliness of ratification) of relevant international organised crime treaties implies state willingness to effectuate responses to organised crime, in line with international standards. These treaties are:

- The UNTOC and its three protocols
- The UN Convention against Corruption
- The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
- The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
- The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
- The Arms Trade Treaty
- CITES

At the international level, for states parties, these instruments constitute sufficient legal grounds for carrying out response measures to organised crime. Such responses include cooperation in criminal matters, particularly mutual legal assistance, extradition, the transfer of sentenced prisoners and transborder asset confiscation. The presence of such structures and policies, and evidence of their effective use, implies a higher degree of state resilience to organised crime.

National policies and laws

International cooperation is an essential component of combating organised crime because it provides the basis for national responses. Thus, national policies and laws refer to state legal action and structures put in place to respond to organised crime. National organised crime strategies and legislation are adapted to the needs of the state, its legal tradition and social, economic cultural and geographic conditions. As such, the presence of these reflects higher state resilience to organised crime.

Criminal justice and security

Judicial system and detention

Refers to the power of a state's judiciary to effectively try to enforce judgments on organised crime-related cases. The ability of a country's judicial system to do so depends on whether it is adequately resourced and operates independently and effectively at all points along the juridical chain. Although passing judgment on cases is its primary function, the ability to enforce is also an essential component of a judiciary's activities. Factors such as evidence that key organised crime leaders are successfully prosecuted and, in particular, the degree of organised crime influence from within the prison system should be key considerations in assessing a state's judicial capacity. Where the prison system has been captured by organised crime, this should significantly impact the score. Thus, while having more resources and independence to pass judgment on organised crime cases implies higher state resilience, high impunity implies lower state resilience.

Law enforcement

Refers to the state's ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures regarding organised crime. As the front line of a state's criminal justice system, law enforcement and intelligence are often in direct contact with organised criminal activities. In order to bring criminal perpetrators to justice, the capacity of a state's law enforcement to combat organised crime rests on factors such as whether it is adequately resourced and whether the state has invested in law enforcement mechanisms that are specifically organised-crime focused. It follows therefore that

greater law enforcement capacity makes a state more resilient to organised crime.

Territorial integrity

Refers to the degree to which states are able to control their territory and infrastructure against organised criminal activities, including the capacity to carry out effective border control.

A country's physical location and geography may increase the risk of exploitation by organised criminal groups. For example, long borders are less likely to be regulated effectively, and criminals are therefore more likely to take advantage by smuggling illicit commodities and people unnoticed. Moreover, the level of a state's economic engagement internationally, marked by factors such as its port and airport infrastructure, can increase the ease with which goods and people are able to move (both legitimately and illegally) between countries.

As such, the greater the resources and infrastructure put in place by a state to manage its territorial integrity against organised crime, the higher the state's resilience.

Economic and financial

Anti-money laundering

Refers to a state's ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

Profits that criminals make from organised crime are often concealed by being funnelled through legitimate businesses. Through the development of anti-money-laundering mechanisms, states become more resilient to the threat of money laundering, which potentially underlies all forms of organised crime.

The Financial Action Task Force is a policymaking body that has developed a series of recommendations that are recognised as the international standard for combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These form the basis for a coordinated response to these threats to the financial system. States are assessed through mutual country evaluations to determine

their level of compliance with these standards. The higher compliance, the more resilient states are to organised crime.

Economic regulatory capacity

Refers to the ability to control and manage the economy, and to regulate financial and economic transactions (both nationally and internationally) so that trade is able to flourish within the confines of the rule of law. In other words, these determine whether an actor has put into place and can effectively oversee the mechanisms that ensure economic transactions and businesses operate in a predictable, fair way, free from distortion, including criminal activities such as extortion and illicit taxation.

When actors are able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, it allows for options and opportunities for legitimate, regulated business to expand. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for informal, illegal business to arise, or for criminal groups to unduly influence economic forces, through alternative regulation, extortion or criminal practice.

States under protracted sanctions by the international community have been shown to develop illicit means by which to circumvent or mitigate the impact of those sanctions.

The larger the number of sound economic regulations that are in place and the lower the number of (and duration of) sanctions placed on a state, the higher a country's resilience to organised crime.

Civil society and social protection

Victim and witness support

Refers to the existence of assistance provided to victims of various forms of organised crime (for example, human trafficking, drug trafficking, extortion or fraud).

Support mechanisms, treatment programmes for victims, as well as resources allocated to these initiatives create an environment in which citizens are able to recover more quickly from the effects of organised criminal activities.

Moreover, initiatives such as witness protection programmes are essential, and often the only way to successfully prosecute organised criminals. The more effective the support programmes that are put in place, the more resilient states are to organised crime.

Prevention

Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed at inhibiting organised crime. While prevention considers mainly state initiatives, these frameworks often use a holistic approach to preventive measures through community outreach, recognising that citizens who are engaged in preventing organised crime help make the state more resilient.

Through prevention, states can build safeguards to protect against organised crime by effecting behavioural change in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities. Thus, the more robust a state's prevention scheme is, the more resilient it is to organised crime.

Non-state actors

From a resilience perspective, non-state actors play a role in responding to organised crime by supplementing government initiatives and by ensuring 'checks and balances' are applied to governments to guarantee resilience to organised crime. The non-state actors indicator is also a measure of the degree to which civil society organisations are able and allowed to play a role in responding to organised crime across the spectrum, from victim support to crime prevention.

Civil society organisations are engaged in local communities, where ownership of initiatives against organised crime is formed, leading to more sustainable response measures. Similarly, the media is critical in the role it plays in holding governments to account while providing a voice for communities by mobilising civil society against the threat of organised crime. Thus, the more civil society capacity a state has, the more resilient it is to organised crime.



Appendix 3

Ranking tables

A3.1 Criminality scores

COUNTRY	2021-23	
	2023	SCORE CHANGE
1. CONGO, DEM. REP	7.35	-0.40
2. NIGERIA	7.28	+0.13
3. SOUTH AFRICA	7.18	+0.56
4. KENYA	7.02	+0.07
5. LIBYA	6.93	+0.38
6. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	6.75	-0.29
7. UGANDA	6.55	+0.41
8. SUDAN	6.37	-0.10
9. SOUTH SUDAN	6.32	-0.02
10. CAMEROON	6.27	-0.05
11. MOZAMBIQUE	6.20	-0.33
11. TANZANIA	6.20	+0.05
13. SOMALIA	6.13	+0.35
14. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.02	-0.13
15. MALI	5.93	+0.05
16. BURKINA FASO	5.92	+0.43
17. GHANA	5.80	-0.21
18. NIGER	5.70	-0.31
19. ETHIOPIA	5.68	+0.90
20. ANGOLA	5.58	+0.30
20. MADAGASCAR	5.58	0.00
22. SENEGAL	5.52	+0.70
23. CHAD	5.50	-0.36
23. LIBERIA	5.50	+0.45
25. ZIMBABWE	5.47	-0.20
26. BENIN	5.32	+0.07
27. TOGO	5.23	-0.09

COUNTRY	2021-23	
	2023	SCORE CHANGE
28. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.10	-0.35
29. EGYPT	5.05	-0.11
30. SIERRA LEONE	4.95	-0.45
31. ALGERIA	4.88	+0.37
32. BURUNDI	4.87	+0.35
33. GABON	4.85	-0.05
34. MOROCCO	4.80	+0.01
35. CONGO, REP	4.78	-0.24
36. ZAMBIA	4.73	-0.19
37. DJIBOUTI	4.65	+0.66
38. GUINEA	4.58	-0.62
39. GAMBIA	4.53	-0.29
40. MALAWI	4.48	+0.66
41. TUNISIA	4.45	+0.66
42. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.38	+0.27
42. ESWATINI	4.38	+0.76
44. MAURITANIA	4.38	+0.01
45. MAURITIUS	4.37	-0.15
46. BOTSWANA	4.35	+0.64
47. NAMIBIA	4.30	-0.03
48. CABO VERDE	4.28	+0.25
49. ERITREA	3.97	-0.37
50. LESOTHO	3.92	+0.02
51. COMOROS	3.92	+0.05
52. SEYCHELLES	3.90	+0.23
53. RWANDA	3.60	-0.07
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70	-0.08

A3.2 Criminal market scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	4. ARMS TRAFFICKING	5. TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	6. ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS	7. FLORA CRIMES
1. NIGERIA	7.37 +0.32	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a	6.0 0.0
2. KENYA	6.93 +0.28	8.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	6.0 n/a	6.0 0.0
3. SOUTH AFRICA	6.87 +0.87	4.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	8.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a	5.0 +1.5
4. LIBYA	6.57 +0.47	8.5 -1.0	9.5 +1.5	9.0 n/a	9.0 -0.5	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a	1.0 0.0
5. MALI	6.47 +0.32	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	7.0 n/a	5.0 0.0
6. TANZANIA	6.40 -0.15	6.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	6.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a	7.0 -0.5
6. UGANDA	6.40 +0.75	7.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 n/a	7.0 +1.0
8. CAMEROON	6.23 -0.02	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	7.5 n/a	5.0 n/a	7.5 +0.5
9. CONGO, DEM. REP	6.20 -0.30	7.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	9.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a	9.0 +0.5
10. ETHIOPIA	6.07 +1.12	8.0 +2.0	7.5 +1.0	6.0 n/a	8.5 +1.5	8.0 n/a	8.0 n/a	4.5 +1.0
11. GHANA	6.00 -0.15	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	6.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	7.0 +0.5
12. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.93 -0.12	7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	7.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	3.5 n/a	6.0 0.0
13. MOZAMBIQUE	5.90 -0.15	4.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	6.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	8.0 0.0
14. BURKINA FASO	5.83 +0.48	7.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a	5.5 +1.5
15. NIGER	5.70 -0.20	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.0 n/a	2.0 0.0
16. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.60 -0.10	7.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	7.0 +0.5
17. SENEGAL	5.53 +0.53	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	5.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 n/a	7.5 0.0
18. BENIN	5.43 +0.18	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	6.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	5.0 n/a	6.0 0.0
19. LIBERIA	5.40 +0.30	6.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	4.5 n/a	6.0 +0.5
20. MADAGASCAR	5.27 -0.03	6.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 +1.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a	8.0 +0.5
20. SOMALIA	5.27 +0.82	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	9.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a	7.0 +1.0
22. SUDAN	5.23 -0.32	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	2.5 n/a	2.5 +1.0
23. ALGERIA	5.17 +0.52	4.0 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	4.5 -0.5	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a	2.0 0.0
23. ANGOLA	5.17 -0.03	6.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	2.0 n/a	6.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a	7.5 +0.5
25. SOUTH SUDAN	5.13 -0.17	8.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a	7.0 -0.5
26. CHAD	5.10 -0.25	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	1.5 0.0

COUNTRY	8. FAUNA CRIMES	9. NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	10. HEROIN TRADE	11. COCAINE TRADE	12. CANNABIS TRADE	13. SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	14. CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	15. FINANCIAL CRIMES
1. NIGERIA	7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
2. KENYA	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	8.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
3. SOUTH AFRICA	8.0 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	7.0 +1.5	5.0 +1.5	8.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
4. LIBYA	3.5 0.0	9.5 +1.0	2.5 0.0	5.5 +1.5	7.0 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	9.5 n/a
5. MALI	5.0 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
6. TANZANIA	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
6. UGANDA	7.0 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	4.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
8. CAMEROON	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
9. CONGO, DEM. REP	8.0 0.0	9.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
10. ETHIOPIA	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
11. GHANA	6.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
12. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.5 0.0	6.0 -1.5	4.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
13. MOZAMBIQUE	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 +2.5	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
14. BURKINA FASO	6.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	5.5 -0.5	5.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
15. NIGER	5.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
16. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	8.0 0.0	10.0 +1.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
17. SENEGAL	7.0 0.0	4.5 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
18. BENIN	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
19. LIBERIA	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
20. MADAGASCAR	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
20. SOMALIA	5.5 +1.0	3.0 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
22. SUDAN	5.5 0.0	8.5 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
23. ALGERIA	5.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
23. ANGOLA	5.5 +1.0	8.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
25. SOUTH SUDAN	6.5 -0.5	8.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
26. CHAD	3.5 0.0	8.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	3.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	4. ARMS TRAFFICKING	5. TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	6. ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS	7. FLORA CRIMES
26. EGYPT	5.10 +0.15	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 n/a	7.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	3.5 n/a	1.0 0.0
26. MOROCCO	5.10 +0.15	5.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	2.0 -1.0	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a	2.0 -1.0
29. ZIMBABWE	5.03 -0.17	5.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.5 n/a	4.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	6.5 n/a	4.5 -1.0
30. TUNISIA	5.00 +0.80	4.0 0.0	8.0 +1.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 -2.0	6.0 n/a	5.5 n/a	3.5 0.0
31. GUINEA	4.77 -0.38	7.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	1.0 n/a	5.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	5.0 +0.5
31. MALAWI	4.77 +0.62	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	2.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	6.0 n/a	5.0 +1.0
31. TOGO	4.77 -0.13	5.5 -0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.5 n/a	4.0 -1.0
34. GAMBIA	4.67 -0.48	6.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	2.5 0.0	6.5 n/a	2.5 n/a	7.0 0.0
35. BURUNDI	4.63 +0.23	8.5 0.0	6.5 +1.0	4.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a	2.0 0.0
36. GABON	4.60 -0.20	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	3.0 n/a	8.5 0.0
36. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.60 -0.30	5.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 n/a	8.5 0.0
36. SIERRA LEONE	4.60 -0.45	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a	7.0 +0.5
39. CONGO, REP	4.47 -0.33	6.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	3.0 n/a	8.0 0.0
39. ZAMBIA	4.47 -0.13	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a	7.5 -0.5
41. BOTSWANA	4.40 +0.60	4.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a	2.5 +0.5
42. DJIBOUTI	4.30 +0.70	6.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	7.5 +1.5	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a	2.0 0.0
43. MAURITANIA	4.27 +0.27	7.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	3.5 -0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a	1.0 0.0
44. MAURITIUS	4.13 -0.27	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	2.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	2.0 n/a	3.5 +1.5
45. NAMIBIA	4.10 +0.20	3.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	3.5 n/a	6.5 0.0
46. RWANDA	4.00 -0.10	5.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a	2.5 -0.5
47. CABO VERDE	3.97 +0.27	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	2.0 -0.5
48. ERITREA	3.93 -0.12	9.0 0.0	9.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	3.0 n/a	7.0 n/a	1.5 0.0
49. ESWATINI	3.87 +0.62	4.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5	4.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a	2.5 +0.5
50. COMOROS	3.73 -0.12	5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	1.5 n/a	3.5 0.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a	3.0 0.0
51. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.57 -0.28	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	2.0 n/a	8.0 -0.5
52. SEYCHELLES	3.50 -0.10	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	3.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	2.0 n/a	4.0 0.0
53. LESOTHO	3.43 -0.12	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	4.0 +1.0	1.0 n/a	3.5 n/a	1.0 0.0
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70 -0.10	1.5 0.0	1.0 -0.5	1.0 n/a	1.5 -0.5	1.5 n/a	1.5 n/a	2.5 0.0

COUNTRY	8. FAUNA CRIMES	9. NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	10. HEROIN TRADE	11. COCAINE TRADE	12. CANNABIS TRADE	13. SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	14. CYBER- DEPENDENT CRIMES	15. FINANCIAL CRIMES
26. EGYPT	5.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
26. MOROCCO	4.5 0.0	1.5 -1.5	4.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
29. ZIMBABWE	7.0 -0.5	8.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
30. TUNISIA	5.0 +1.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 +1.5	4.0 +1.0	7.0 +2.0	6.0 +2.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
31. GUINEA	6.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
31. MALAWI	6.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
31. TOGO	5.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
34. GAMBIA	4.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
35. BURUNDI	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
36. GABON	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
36. GUINEA-BISSAU	6.5 +1.0	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	5.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
36. SIERRA LEONE	6.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
39. CONGO, REP	7.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	2.0 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
39. ZAMBIA	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
41. BOTSWANA	7.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
42. DJIBOUTI	5.0 +1.0	3.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
43. MAURITANIA	4.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	1.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
44. MAURITIUS	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
45. NAMIBIA	5.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
46. RWANDA	4.0 -1.0	8.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 -1.5	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
47. CABO VERDE	4.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
48. ERITREA	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
49. ESWATINI	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
50. COMOROS	6.0 +0.5	2.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 -1.5	1.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
51. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
52. SEYCHELLES	4.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
53. LESOTHO	3.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	3.0 n/a

A3.3 Criminal actor scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS	5. PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
1. CONGO, DEM. REP	8.50 -0.50	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.5 n/a
2. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.90 -0.48	8.0 -1.0	8.0 0.0	9.0 +0.5	9.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a
3. SOUTH AFRICA	7.50 +0.25	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	6.5 n/a
3. SOUTH SUDAN	7.50 +0.13	5.0 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 n/a
3. SUDAN	7.50 +0.13	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a
6. LIBYA	7.30 +0.30	9.0 +1.0	7.5 0.0	9.5 +1.0	5.5 +1.5	5.0 n/a
7. NIGERIA	7.20 -0.05	5.5 0.0	8.5 -0.5	7.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
8. KENYA	7.10 -0.15	7.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
9. SOMALIA	7.00 -0.13	9.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.5 n/a
10. UGANDA	6.70 +0.08	5.5 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 n/a
11. MOZAMBIQUE	6.50 -0.50	5.0 +1.5	8.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	3.0 n/a
12. CAMEROON	6.30 -0.08	4.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.0 +1.0	4.5 n/a
13. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.10 -0.15	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a
14. ANGOLA	6.00 +0.63	3.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 n/a
14. BURKINA FASO	6.00 +0.38	4.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
14. TANZANIA	6.00 +0.25	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a
17. CHAD	5.90 -0.48	5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
17. MADAGASCAR	5.90 +0.03	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	5.5 n/a
17. ZIMBABWE	5.90 -0.23	3.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a
20. NIGER	5.70 -0.43	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a
20. TOGO	5.70 -0.05	1.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	6.0 n/a
22. GHANA	5.60 -0.28	3.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 n/a
22. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.60 -0.40	1.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
22. LIBERIA	5.60 +0.60	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
25. SENEGAL	5.50 +0.88	3.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
26. MALI	5.40 -0.23	4.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
27. ETHIOPIA	5.30 +0.68	2.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS	5. PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
27. SIERRA LEONE	5.30 -0.45	2.5 -1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a
29. BENIN	5.20 -0.05	2.0 +1.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
29. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	5.20 +0.83	1.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	8.5 n/a
31. BURUNDI	5.10 +0.48	2.0 +1.0	4.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
31. CONGO, REP	5.10 -0.15	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a
31. GABON	5.10 +0.10	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a
34. DJIBOUTI	5.00 +0.63	1.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
34. EGYPT	5.00 -0.38	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
34. ZAMBIA	5.00 -0.25	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a
37. ESWATINI	4.90 +0.90	2.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
38. ALGERIA	4.60 +0.23	1.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a
38. CABO VERDE	4.60 +0.23	3.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
38. MAURITIUS	4.60 -0.03	2.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
41. MAURITANIA	4.50 -0.25	1.5 -1.0	5.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	3.5 n/a
41. MOROCCO	4.50 -0.13	1.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
41. NAMIBIA	4.50 -0.25	2.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
44. GAMBIA	4.40 -0.10	1.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
44. GUINEA	4.40 -0.85	1.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	7.5 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	1.0 n/a
44. LESOTHO	4.40 +0.15	3.0 +2.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.5 n/a
47. BOTSWANA	4.30 +0.68	1.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a
47. SEYCHELLES	4.30 +0.55	2.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a
49. MALAWI	4.20 +0.70	2.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a
50. COMOROS	4.10 +0.23	1.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a
51. ERITREA	4.00 -0.63	1.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	9.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 n/a
52. TUNISIA	3.90 +0.53	1.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	2.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a
53. RWANDA	3.20 -0.05	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70 -0.05	1.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 n/a

A3.4 Resilience scores

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION
1. CABO VERDE	6.58 +0.25	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5
2. NIGERIA	5.79 +0.29	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5
2. SENEGAL	5.79 +0.21	5.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	7.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
4. SOUTH AFRICA	5.63 -0.17	5.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0
5. MAURITIUS	5.54 -0.13	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0
5. RWANDA	5.54 +0.04	5.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
7. BOTSWANA	5.46 -0.17	5.0 -1.0	4.0 -1.0	8.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	6.0 -0.5
7. GHANA	5.46 +0.08	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
9. KENYA	5.33 +0.13	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	5.0 -0.5
10. SEYCHELLES	5.21 +0.63	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0
11. GAMBIA	5.17 +0.17	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5
12. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.13 +0.71	5.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 -0.5
13. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	4.92 0.00	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
14. ETHIOPIA	4.75 -0.63	4.0 -1.0	4.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
15. MOROCCO	4.63 0.00	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0
16. MALAWI	4.58 +0.29	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0
17. NAMIBIA	4.54 -0.42	4.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	4.0 -0.5
17. ZAMBIA	4.54 +0.21	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
19. ANGOLA	4.50 +0.08	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0
19. TOGO	4.50 +0.50	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5
19. TUNISIA	4.50 -0.33	4.5 0.0	4.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	3.5 -1.0
22. ALGERIA	4.38 -0.25	4.5 0.0	3.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0
22. DJIBOUTI	4.38 -0.13	4.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0	4.0 0.0
24. TANZANIA	4.13 +0.08	5.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
25. SIERRA LEONE	4.04 +0.58	4.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	3.5 +1.0	3.0 +1.0
26. LESOTHO	3.92 +0.25	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0

COUNTRY	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
1. CABO VERDE	6.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0
2. NIGERIA	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5
2. SENEGAL	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
4. SOUTH AFRICA	4.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0
5. MAURITIUS	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 -1.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5
5. RWANDA	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0
7. BOTSWANA	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.5 -1.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 -1.0
7. GHANA	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
9. KENYA	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0
10. SEYCHELLES	5.0 +1.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.5	4.5 +1.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.5
11. GAMBIA	5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0
12. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +1.5	4.5 +1.0	5.5 +2.5	5.0 +0.5
13. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
14. ETHIOPIA	3.5 -0.5	4.0 -2.0	7.0 0.0	5.0 -1.0	3.0 -1.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0
15. MOROCCO	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5
16. MALAWI	3.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0
17. NAMIBIA	3.5 -1.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
17. ZAMBIA	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
19. ANGOLA	4.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0
19. TOGO	5.0 +1.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	4.5 0.0
19. TUNISIA	4.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 -1.5
22. ALGERIA	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.5 -1.0
22. DJIBOUTI	4.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5
24. TANZANIA	3.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 +1.0
25. SIERRA LEONE	4.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
26. LESOTHO	3.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +1.0	3.5 +1.5	3.5 -0.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION
27. UGANDA	3.88 -0.08	4.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
28. EGYPT	3.83 -0.21	3.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5
29. BENIN	3.50 -0.04	3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
30. BURKINA FASO	3.46 -0.17	2.5 -1.0	3.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0
30. NIGER	3.46 +0.25	4.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0
32. MADAGASCAR	3.33 -0.04	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.5 -0.5
33. ESWATINI	3.29 +0.04	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0	3.0 +0.5
33. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29 0.00	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
35. CONGO, REP	3.25 0.00	3.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
35. GABON	3.25 +0.08	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
35. LIBERIA	3.25 +0.08	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +1.0	3.5 0.0
38. CAMEROON	3.17 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
39. GUINEA	3.13 +0.29	2.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.5 -0.5	4.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5
39. MAURITANIA	3.13 +0.04	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
39. ZIMBABWE	3.13 -0.04	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5
42. SUDAN	2.71 -0.25	2.0 -1.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5
43. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.58 +0.17	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
44. CHAD	2.42 -0.04	3.0 -0.5	2.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0
45. COMOROS	2.38 0.00	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
45. CONGO, DEM. REP	2.38 +0.08	1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
45. MALI	2.38 0.00	2.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
48. ERITREA	2.33 0.00	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
49. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.21 +0.04	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5
50. BURUNDI	2.17 +0.08	3.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	2.5 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	2.0 -0.5
51. SOUTH SUDAN	1.88 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
52. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.79 -0.13	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0
52. SOMALIA	1.79 +0.13	1.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0
54. LIBYA	1.54 0.00	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0

COUNTRY	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
27. UGANDA	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
28. EGYPT	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 -1.0	4.0 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
29. BENIN	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	4.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
30. BURKINA FASO	3.0 0.0	2.0 -1.0	4.0 +1.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5
30. NIGER	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0
32. MADAGASCAR	4.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5
33. ESWATINI	3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
33. MOZAMBIQUE	2.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
35. CONGO, REP	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5
35. GABON	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5
35. LIBERIA	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 -1.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
38. CAMEROON	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
39. GUINEA	3.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5
39. MAURITANIA	2.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5
39. ZIMBABWE	3.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 -1.0
42. SUDAN	2.5 -1.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.0 -0.5	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
43. GUINEA-BISSAU	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0
44. CHAD	2.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5
45. COMOROS	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
45. CONGO, DEM. REP	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
45. MALI	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
48. ERITREA	3.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0
49. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	1.5 -0.5
50. BURUNDI	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
51. SOUTH SUDAN	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
52. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	1.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5
52. SOMALIA	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 -0.5	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5
54. LIBYA	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0



Notes

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
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The European Union (EU) has placed security in Africa at the forefront of its international agenda, notably through its Pan-African Programme – the first programme of its kind to centre on development and cooperation, and covering Africa as a whole. One project under the Pan-African Programme is ENACT: Enhancing Africa's capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organised crime. ENACT works to mitigate the impact of transnational organised crime (TOC) in Africa on development, governance, security and the rule of law. It achieves this in two ways: firstly, by building knowledge and offering evidence-based analysis of TOC in Africa, which will inform policy and enhance cooperation at the regional and continental level. Secondly, ENACT builds skills and capacity among key African stakeholders to better respond to transnational organised crime and mitigate its impact.

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