Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast

Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw

Summary

In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and Southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. An integrated regional criminal market has developed, shaping and shaped by political developments. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide, and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and Southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. New policy approaches are urgently needed.

Key points

• Responses should address the challenge as a cross-border criminal system.
• Progressive action should be targeted in major drug hubs along the southern route, focusing on vulnerable areas and potential sources of regional instability, such as northern Mozambique.
• The relationship between politics, business and organised crime must be adequately researched and addressed.
• Vetted private sector actors should be engaged to prevent or reverse the criminalisation of key ports.
• Support must be increased for community-based initiatives that mitigate the effects of drug use.
• Programming interventions to reduce violence in the most vulnerable communities affected by the heroin trade in Southern and East Africa should be considered.
Since 2010, several large seizures of heroin by the Combined Maritime Force – a 32-member-state naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations aimed at countering terrorism and narcotics smuggling – have confirmed that the East African coast is now a significant geographical link in the global heroin trade.¹

Heroin is being shipped from Afghanistan to the east coast of Africa along a maritime route known as the ‘southern route’. This is in reality a network of routes stretching along East and Southern Africa, with drug consignments eventually making their onward way to countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and, to a limited extent, North America. The southern route has gained popularity in recent years because the land-based drug-trafficking route to western Europe via the Balkans has become increasingly difficult for traffickers to navigate owing to conflict and increased law enforcement.² This has diverted some illegal drug flows to the Indian Ocean and onwards to the east coast of Africa.

Although traffickers using the southern route have their own challenges to contend with, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia and the anti-drug operations of the Combined Maritime Force, the volume of trade along this route appears to be increasing. Previous estimates have suggested that 22 to 40 tonnes of heroin a year were being trafficked through East Africa.³ However, although the actual volumes cannot be estimated with certainty, our research indicates that the figure may now be higher.

Multilateral institutions and northern donors have tended to focus is on how heroin that transits the southern route enters markets in Europe⁴. This perspective, however, tends to downplay or even ignore the impact of the heroin trade on the transit countries in Africa. Our research has, instead, focused on the political economy of the southern route. It looks more closely at the characteristics of the heroin flows in the region and how the narcotics trade has become embedded in Kenyan, Tanzanian, Mozambican and South African society.

This research is the culmination of four months of qualitative research based on over 240 interviews conducted in seven countries, the full findings of which appear in an ENACT research paper.⁵ This brief summarises this analysis and highlights several concerning conclusions, below.

The southern route and criminal governance along the east coast of Africa

In countries all along the eastern seaboard of Africa, from Somalia to South Africa, the heroin trade has become embedded in local communities and linked to political elites. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy based on the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to the West, and with a spin-off trade for local consumption.

The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy

Along this trafficking route, much of the heroin is first shipped to Africa on motorised, wooden seagoing dhows built in the United Arab Emirates designed for fishing. The vessels are loaded with between 100 kg and 1 000 kg consignments of contraband off the Makran coast of southern Pakistan. The dhows anchor off the coast of Africa in international waters, and flotillas of small boats collect the heroin and ferry it to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload it into small commercial harbours. Dozens of such sites are used for landing the consignments along the entire eastern coastline – from north of Kismayo, Somalia, to Angoche, Mozambique. This route is used all year round apart from during the three-month monsoon period.

While this dhow-based heroin trade has been identified for several years, significantly, the present research suggests that transit traffickers have also made use of containers at various deep-water container ports along the coast. Several ports have fallen under substantial criminal influence and are used to transship a number of other illicit goods, such as elephant ivory and timber.

Most of the heroin that passes through East and southern African is destined for markets in the West, which are far more profitable than the African markets.⁶ The transit heroin trade is a bulk trade: though shipments are sometimes broken down into smaller consignments in an effort to avoid detection, much heroin transported this way is moved in units of
tens or even hundreds of kilograms at a time. As such, the transit economy relies on international ports and highways, and, to a lesser extent, air links. The trade also relies on high-level political protection, so that those involved can benefit from ready access to infrastructure, such as ports along the route, which are ostensibly important to national security and so should be well guarded and controlled by governments.

Initially, the political protection secured for this trade seems to have emerged out of simple transactions between drug traffickers and political figures who exert control over ports, customs and law enforcement. Heroin traders using this transit route need to arrange for these ports to be permeable, and ensure their illicit goods are neither seized nor linked to criminal cases against them. Over time, these transactions have evolved in different ways along the coast. In Kenya, drug traffickers have decided to campaign directly for political office. In Mozambique, drug traffickers have consolidated their hold over the market in a remarkably resilient and long-standing quid pro quo with the political elite. In these countries, heroin profits play a discrete and identifiable role in providing campaign and patronage finance to political figures. Tanzania, meanwhile, is currently going through a series of reforms under President Magufuli that are substantially disrupting criminal-political relationships in the country, with signs that this is having the effect of displacing criminal figures to other parts of the region. In South Africa heroin has not been directly linked to political figures, although prominent figures in the broader drug trade have.

Along this route, not all heroin is in transit, however. East and southern Africa have a much larger consumer market than is commonly acknowledged. This local market gets some of its supply from ‘leakage’ from the transit trade – through in-kind payments to drivers, fishermen, the police, etc. – and through small-scale theft from bulk consignments. But there is also some indication that bigger players arrange their own supplies directly from Pakistan or from the kingpins of the transit trade. In South Africa, in particular, the consumer market for heroin is large and growing, and this phenomenon is being driven by more organised local and international networks, which have spawned a secondary heroin trade.

The 2017 World Drug Report noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally. Cities with the biggest consumer markets – like Mombasa, Cape Town and the Johannesburg–Pretoria metropolitan area – are also beset with violence associated with the drug trade. For example, residents in Mombasa say that local gangs have mushroomed over the last few years to give protection to heroin barons. Drug traffickers hire indiscriminately from among the unemployed in Mombasa’s slums. When job opportunities fall – such as after election periods, or when drug barons are imprisoned – these ‘violent entrepreneurs’, to use a term that seems apt, become predatory and turn to extortion and robbery in the local community. At the same time, and in the midst of widespread impunity for the people who organise and profit from the drug trade, lynching of drug users by anti-crime vigilante groups has also become commonplace.

Despite a heartening trend that is seeing drug users’ rights and their access to health services being placed at the centre of drug treatment approaches in several locations, there are nevertheless gaps in such interventions. Coverage rates of harm-reduction services in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, are still low, according to World Health Organization indicators, and neither South Africa nor Mozambique offers evidence-based treatment options, such as opioid-substitution therapy, through the public-health system. Regionally, there are also gaps in the collection of key data, while legal frameworks are punitive for drug users, with law-enforcement responses that are harsh on users and small dealers, but ineffective against major traffickers.

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In South Africa, nyaope and unga use has also led to an increase in crime, with addicts financing their habit by resorting to mugging, theft of electrical copper cables and other criminal activities. More significantly, however, in gang-controlled areas levels of violence have seen huge increases, related both to an influx of guns and dramatic gang wars over drug turf. The Cape Town murder rate spiralled upwards from around 2011 and has only recently stabilised – although at extremely high levels – making the city one of the most violent cities in the world, on a par with several Latin American capitals.

The heroin trade is therefore linked, both directly and indirectly, to a number of serious developments in the East and southern African region. These include sustaining undemocratic political figures and parties, the role of the trade in making key ports porous, the empty hotels and undeveloped land that serve as fronts for laundering drug money, the spread of HIV and hepatitis C, and violence in the communities caught up in heroin consumer markets.

This policy brief puts forward a number of recommendations, cautions and ideas on how best to respond to the heroin trade in southern and East Africa. The regional integration of the heroin trade raises several critical challenges for both civil-society and law-enforcement responses. There are also, however, important opportunities for action that must be grasped now.

Policy recommendations

Conventional wisdom would hold that the immediate response to the heroin trade should come in the form of decisive action from national political leaders and a crackdown by law enforcement. However, one needs to be aware of the inherent difficulty of working with government institutions that are heavily implicated in organised-crime activities, unless there is an internal faction motivating for change.

Likewise, building capacity among law-enforcement agencies where there is deeply systemic corruption is often futile – and sometimes very counterproductive. Such engagements often rely for their success on timing related to political openings. Such openings may exist in South Africa in the medium term. Tanzanian law-enforcement officials have also expressed, at least informally, a desire for regional cooperation, but it is not clear what the position of their political leaders is. Even in these cases, caveats about engaging with security forces that are deemed to flout human rights must apply. The lack of success of militarised ‘war on drugs’ type strategies that have been applied in other contexts must also be taken into account. Lastly, given the integration of the coastal economy, the disruption and inevitable displacement of criminal networks in one country will only have the effect of shifting them to places that are unprepared to respond.

Although these may seem like gloomy prospects, there is an argument that a better starting point to address the challenges would be to gain a sound understanding of where effort is likely to have the most impact, and then to design programmes that build powerful alliances between not just key elites and law-enforcement agencies, but also civil-society figures.

Some recommendations for how to go about this are discussed in this brief; these are categorised into three areas:

- Taking a regional approach
- Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics
- Building coalitions for change around local effects

Taking a regional approach

Address the challenge as a regional criminal system

A key objective of this brief is to highlight the cross-border nature of this coastal criminal economy and to emphasise the need to think holistically about responses. From a development perspective, this means thinking about cross-border illicit flows as part of an integrated regional system – one with jointly shared knock-on effects and impacts. One of the findings of this study is that the countries enmeshed in this system do not think about the challenge in this way.

It should be a key aim, however, of development funding and partnership programmes to encourage such a regional approach. There are multiple ways to support such a conceptual shift: funding a single regional think tank or regional pressure groups, supporting the establishment of a coastal commission (similar to an initiative currently operating in West Africa) and drawing on the inputs of all the countries affected by the challenge. The point is to fashion a
Indicative overview of sea- and land-based heroin routes across the eastern African coastal states

Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, based on interviews across the region, September 2017
response that draws on these linkages and uses the language of solidarity between affected parties and countries. In this sense, political developments in Tanzania (and potentially in the medium term in South Africa too) may provide new openings for such a wider regional anti-trafficking response.

Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial

Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial. At least two of the governments in this region, Mozambique and Tanzania, are highly resistant to Western intervention, especially in issues that cut so closely to politics and security. And, given that regional cooperation is in any case necessary to address these regional flows, attempts should be made to encourage cooperative efforts among the countries in the region. For example, South Africa wields hefty political and economic clout in southern Africa, and to a lesser extent in East Africa, and is also particularly hard hit by the downwind effects of the heroin trade. Exposing these effects in South Africa, and facilitating regional dialogue, might therefore encourage the South African government to apply pressure on other regional states to address the situation. But, to achieve this, networks that include both government and civil-society actors from the countries across the region must be built.

Build regional (coastal) enforcement networks

Interviews conducted with law-enforcement representatives at different points along the East African coast suggest that official forms of regional cooperation are extremely weak. South African officials, for example, suggested that they struggle to engage with their Mozambican counterparts. Despite these difficulties – and the fact that political protection often prevents effective law-enforcement responses to organised crime – it remains crucial to build networks of professional practice and solidarity across the region. Although these may lie dormant in some cases until political change allows effective action, they are an important investment for the future.

Building regional solidarity among honest officials also provides a source of protection for their actions. At the same time, it is also crucial to ensure that bridges are built between civil-society and key members within the regional law-enforcement community. This is not to compromise actors on either side of the divide, but to recognise that civil society and the media are increasingly a spur to law-enforcement action. This is a trend that is likely to continue.

Focus on the areas most vulnerable to instability

One of the conclusions emerging clearly from this work is the vulnerability of northern Mozambique. Here, and largely off the radar, a significant local drug-trafficking economy has developed, facilitated by government corruption and indifference. In this context, there is much to gain by seeking ways to build better relations and networks, and to gather more information on the local political economy, including its connections to illicit markets.

Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime, but, in fact, the opposite is true

Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime. But, in fact, the opposite is true. Infrastructure, such as roads and ports, provides the physical means for moving and handling illicit commodities (in the absence of effective regulation and enforcement, that is). In that respect, northern Mozambique – with its potential for economic growth derived from its oil and gas reserves – is particularly vulnerable. With a shift in trafficking southward from Tanzania, this part of the region is increasingly becoming a major hub of illicit activity. Preventive action is required now if the area is not to become a wider source of instability and a regional platform for criminal activity. The problem is still manageable but early action is needed. At the most basic level, the first step would be to increase engagement with local communities and build stronger networks of civil society in the region.
Identify hubs and lever change within them

At a macro-level a region-wide programme should identify geographic points, or key hubs, on which to focus. Hubs are choke points where multiple illicit flows merge to either leave or enter a political territory, to be processed (whether that involves physical adulteration or the transformation of hard cash into electronic transfers) or transferred from one transport mode to another (e.g. from sea to land, or truckloads being broken down into smaller packages for onward transport).

Crucial hubs in this regional criminal economy are Mombasa (Kenya), Nacala and Nampula (northern Mozambique), City Deep (an area of Johannesburg) and the Port of Cape Town.

Targeted investments to make these places less permeable to criminal elements may bear fruit in several areas, diminishing not only heroin flows, but also illegal trafficking of wildlife or other natural-resource commodities. However, these interventions should not necessarily take the form of improving state control or increasing state efficiency, as prominent state actors are often key players in illegal trade, and greater control and better technology may well only serve to facilitate their business. Instead, they should entail creative ways of empowering licit actors with an interest in ‘clean’ and functioning ports. Forming alliances with vetted private-sector agents is one possibility.

Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics

Grasp the nettle of party-political funding

The growth of the illicit economy in Africa, and particularly along its east coast, coincided with the establishment of a series of fragile democracies. Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding in the various countries that are involved in the coastal criminal economy. Such funding is used not only for inter-party election campaigns, but also for positioning within political movements (intra-party). Illicit funds or grey funds have been a source of ‘easy money’ in several places. One direct result has been the alignment of political interests (and the interests of the political elite) and the illicit economy, including drug trafficking.

One cannot overemphasise the impact of this hidden economy: interview after interview raised the issue directly or indirectly. Although much more needs to be understood about the relationships between party politics and illicit trade, the outlines of the challenge are clear.

Grasping the nettle of party-political funding may be very difficult, but it is of crucial importance in separating licit political activities from underworld influence. A response would need to encourage and sustain a debate on the subject, and build more effective civil-society coalitions in each country, and perhaps even across the region.

Understand the nexus between politics, business and crime

Linked to the issue of political party funding, current development approaches have amassed a large body of research pointing to the value of market-driven interventions – including entrepreneurialism, innovation and the role of the private sector – in creating employment and alleviating poverty. Yet there is poor understanding of how the drive to create a business elite and to privatise state-owned enterprises has facilitated the growth of organised crime in Africa.

In East Africa, figures who move between the spheres of business, politics and crime stand out as key to helping us understand which institutions facilitate illicit flows. Understanding how they sustain themselves may provide useful clues on how to better insulate government from the forces that promote corruption within it. Action here must include an engagement with legitimate business actors, provide support to financial journalism (where the market fails to do so) and exposing such ‘crossover’ actors to external scrutiny.
Building coalitions for change around local effects

Understand the impact of heroin at local level in coastal cities

Across the region under analysis here there are significant gaps in the strategic information collected about drug use. Comprehensive surveys of drug users, drug prices and methods of drug use are not only necessary for mounting a proper public-health response, but also provide a powerful platform for national discussions of the role of the heroin trade in society. Therefore encouraging and supporting drug-use surveys among these coastal communities would be crucial in raising awareness and acting as a lever to government action.

The current momentum towards harm-reduction approaches in the region could be a starting point for building a broader civil-society response. Health activists and public-health professionals can use their networks to generate debate, and to develop a response that also includes the input and support of people who use drugs themselves.

Community leaders as potential allies

This study has uncovered the degree to which, in many places, the illicit economy has co-opted elected leaders, partly because of their need to raise money to finance their political parties, yet, across the region, the authors engaged with religious and community leaders who expressed their deep concern about the impact of drug use on, in particular, young people. The human face of heroin addiction is often visible in many places, with dirty and emaciated users conspicuous in several coastal cities. Addiction is seen to drive local crime and is disruptive of family and social life. Communities are taking their own initiatives with little external support, including setting up so-called ‘sober houses’ and running anti-drug campaigns. Support (including financial support) for such initiatives, which would build messages of solidarity across coastal communities and focus community leaders on best practice from elsewhere, would be a unique and timely regional response.

It is important to instil the philosophy and practices of harm reduction into community drug efforts at an early stage. This is particularly the case in those initiatives run by local religious groups, which, while sometimes remarkably enlightened, have the potential for abuse without effective regulation or guidance.

Reduce violence associated with illicit markets

The levels of violence associated with these coastal markets vary considerably. Either way, focusing on violence directly linked to illicit economies will provide a way in which the immediate impacts, particularly for poor and excluded people, can be mitigated.

Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions

As indicated, perhaps the most extreme levels of violence linked to this coastal criminal economy now occur at its most southern point – in Cape Town. Violence here is linked to developments much further north and this will be increasingly the case if the current influx of Tanzanian traffickers becomes a more established feature of the local drug economy. Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions. There are numerous programming options available, one of which would be to build solidarity between community leaders in cities like Mombasa dealing with similar issues along the coast. A focus on the Cape gangs is also essential to cut off their connections to the wider regional economy and protect the poorest and most marginalised residents of the city.

Promote public dissemination of information about criminal networks

In conclusion, and most critically, there is a need for much greater understanding among the public of the nature and impact of organised crime in southern and East Africa. Let alone how to identify it. Here, journalists are at the front line – exposing, through their investigations, the operations of organised criminal groups and their connections to politics. The work of the media plays an important role in educating the public about what organised crime looks like in their...
country. This is key, as it is not always easy distinguish between corruption and legal business activities. Unfortunately, investigative journalism is underfunded and its practitioners are often poorly protected from the repercussions of their highly sensitive work.

Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for law-enforcement investigations

Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for law-enforcement investigations, or even, in the most serious cases, a political response. Raising the profile of organised-crime issues – and especially their impact on service delivery, the local environment, instability and levels of violence – elevates them in public discourse, so that they cannot be ignored by political actors.

Conclusion

The growth of the heroin trade along the southern route has been driven, in part, by the growth in opium production in Afghanistan over the last 16 years. The most recent figure for the area under poppy production was estimated at 328 000 hectares in 2017, a 63 per cent increase against the previous year. This staggering rise in production is likely to increase the flow of heroin along all routes even further. It is a reminder, if one was needed, of just how ‘joined-up’ the global criminal economy is.

And Africa is not immune. The heroin that passes through the countries of the southern route is not just in transit. The coastal criminal economy has been developing for about three decades, through some formative processes of economic liberalisation, globalisation, and shifts and transitions towards multi-party democracy. As such, it has both been shaped by, and in turn, shaped politics across the region. The city of Mombasa shows the dangers of neglecting this phenomenon any longer. There, drug traffickers have become so comfortable and free from scrutiny that they have run for political office – and won. Meanwhile, in marginalised slum areas where rates of heroin use are high and residents fear both men providing security for drug dealers and the impact of heroin use on their own families, people who use heroin are murdered by vigilante groups. Other places, most notably in our assessment northern Mozambique, have become particularly vulnerable. Prevention is much better than cure.

If actors with a progressive vision for how to tackle the heroin trade do not lead a response, then actors with a harsher view will. At a recent meeting that the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime hosted, representatives from civil society, government bodies and law enforcement from around the region expressed firm views that approaches that strengthen democracy, the rights of people who use drugs and the needs of affected communities must be placed at the centre of the response. As our recommendations here suggest, it is time to bring together actors along the East African coast to begin to counter the harmful impacts of the heroin trade.
Notes


4 Herion transiting this route is also transported to other countries, including Asian markets and some Indian Ocean island states.

5 Six researchers were commissioned to conduct research locally between July and August 2017. An external expert team then visited several town and cities in the same areas over three weeks in September 2017, verifying and triangulating information with previously consulted sources, as well as conducting further interviews. Several return trips and telephone calls were made by the expert team to assess the work of the local researchers and to follow up with a range of interlocutors. In addition to the interviews in the core countries of analysis – Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa – some were also conducted in the Seychelles and Pakistan in October and November 2017 to gain a better understanding of the routes into Africa, and almost 50 were conducted in Uganda in an attempt to understand internal linkages. See our full report for more details.

6 The economics of this are evident: in Pakistan, a gram of heroin costs approximately US$3 and in Kenya around US$20, whereas in the UK it costs US$61 and in Denmark US$213. See drug prices listed on Havoscope.com. These prices are as of 16 November 2017.


8 Information provided by the countries in question to the UNODC as per reporting requirements for Annual Report Questionaires for the World Drug Report.

9 Several East African countries have shown some progressive leadership in their public-health responses to injecting drug use. Both Kenya and Tanzania (including Zanzibar) have placed harm reduction at the centre of their response.


11 This phenomenon was noted by respondents with direct experience of such attacks at our expert group meeting in Nairobi on 13 November 2017. See also M Schuberth, The impact of drug trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, Africa Spectrum, 49:3, 2014, 55-81.

12 Nyaope is a cocktail of various drugs and other ingredients that has become widespread in South Africa; unga is a highly addictive heroin-based drug.


14 The most recent homicide figures for 2016/17 show 63 deaths per 100 000 citizens – that against 42 per 100 000 in 2009/10. The Cape Town figure is double the national average. This data is from the Institute of Safety Governance and Criminology at the University of Cape Town. It draws on South African Police Service data but because city boundaries don’t match police ones, it has to be recalculated.

15 And, indeed beyond: many other countries along the southern route are also affected by these dynamics.

16 When visiting one religious leader, for example, we found his waiting room full of locals seeking support for family members who had become addicted to cheap heroin.
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ENACT builds knowledge and skills to enhance Africa’s response to transnational organised crime. ENACT analyses how organised crime affects stability, governance, the rule of law and development in Africa, and works to mitigate its impact.

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