

## CONFERENCE REPORT

ENACT Regional Organised Crime Observatories: Foundation Workshop  
3-6 July 2017, Cape Town, South Africa

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Since 2000, Africa has witnessed unprecedented economic growth and extraordinary advancements in technology and infrastructure. While such prosperity has increasingly solidified the continent's role within the wider global economy, it has also arguably facilitated the growth of organised crime at exponential rates on the continent.

The growth of criminal networks has been accentuated by continued patterns of conflict and instability, weak state institutions and the prevalence of corruption. As criminal activities and illicit flows move beyond borders, taking advantage of an increasingly inter-connected world, the impact of such activities becomes compounded. This results in a permeation of organised crime into all areas of society: from governance and security to culture and economy.

Despite indications of the scale of the challenge, much of what is known (or assumed) in relation to organised criminal activities in Africa remains conjecture. It is critical to develop a methodical and informed system of continent-wide data collection and analysis to measure and respond to the challenge, while acknowledging that this process will be complicated by the covert nature of organised crime and the reality that state institutions and other actors may be involved in, or hide, criminal activities.

By way of its geopolitical location, diverse natural resources and varied geographies, Africa hosts a wide range of organised criminal markets, encompassing an array of commodities and products.

The growth of these illicit markets over the span of the last decade has changed Africa's position in the global criminal economy. This shift can be attributed to many reasons; indeed, organised crime markets in Africa are influenced by three interconnected drivers:

- The oversupply of illicit products elsewhere, most notably increases in drug production in Central Asia and the Andean region, with the result that increasing volumes of drugs are reaching African shores
- The growing scarcity of illicit environmental products, which raises the prices of these commodities and provides strong incentives for criminal networks to move into to new products and areas
- The demand from ordinary Africans for consumer goods, which drives an array of illicit or grey markets, most notably for counterfeit goods

The development of a combination of illicit markets in Africa, shaped by violence and corruption, has affected people on the continent in ways that are multidimensional, longitudinal and complex. Criminal organisations use legitimate state structures to circulate illicit goods and reduce the risks of successful prosecution. Organised crime impedes poverty reduction, distorts local economies, hinders trade and redirects resources that could be dedicated to improving basic services. In addition, links have been identified between forms of organised crime, conflict and violent extremism in Africa.

In response, there has been a broad disparity in the capacities of African countries and sub-regions to address organised crime. Responses have traditionally been framed within a criminal justice or security context, with little consideration for tackling the phenomenon from a socio-economic perspective. In order to effectively address organised crime in Africa, strategies that include a broad range of sectors and a diverse group of stakeholders are essential. As organised crime continues to grow, responses necessitate a holistic understanding of the phenomenon and its impact on different areas of society, within Africa and beyond.

*'We favour an approach that goes beyond recognising this phenomenon as merely and purely a criminal enterprise. Rather, we favour an approach that recognises the complexity of the various symbiotic relationships that exist to make this a political enterprise, one that constitutes a political-criminal nexus.'*

- Ambassador Olawale Maiyegun, Director of Social Affairs of the African Union

The ENACT project (Enhancing Africa's response to transnational organised crime), funded by the European Union (EU) and implemented by a consortium comprised of INTERPOL and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI), aims to redirect the focus of the international and regional communities away from a singularly criminal justice response to organised crime, towards a complex array of policies that mitigate impact, build local resilience and change incentives for market participants.

Through the project's flagship activities, namely the creation of five Regional Organised Crime Observatories (ROCOs) and the development of an Organised Crime Vulnerability Assessment Tool (Index tool), ENACT endeavours to shed light on the multidimensional impact of illicit markets by monitoring, analysing, reporting and measuring illicit markets and building networks throughout the continent to combat organised crime in a unified way.

This report draws upon a foundational expert group meeting entitled, '*Enhancing Africa's response to transnational organised crime, Regional Organised Crime Observatories: Foundation workshop*', hosted by the ENACT consortium in Cape Town, South Africa from 3-6 July 2017. The workshop brought together 65 multi-disciplinary experts in the areas of metrics, crime observation and illicit markets within the African context, to exchange experiences and allow the ENACT consortium to draw from their expertise to develop the ROCOs and the Index.

It is intended that these flagship products serve as useful tools to monitor, measure and analyse how the different organised criminal markets in Africa reinforce one another and have an impact on the lives of Africans, in order to foster effective and informed responses. While the following sections discuss the value of such tools, particularly within the African context, the subsequent Recommendations and Annex sections provide brief summaries of the thematic sessions that were held throughout the workshop.

### *The value of observatories*

As platforms for collaboration, observatories serve as important instruments in measuring, analysing and disseminating information in order to effectuate evidence-based decision-making processes.

While observatories are useful in a number of contexts, they can be particularly valuable as front-line tools in gathering information on the prevalence and nature of organised crime, analysing local trends and evaluating impact in communities within their purview.

*'Although organised crime is a transnational phenomenon, its consequences are local.'*

- Ariane De Palacio, International Centre for the Prevention of Crime

Policymakers and practitioners must understand local conditions related to illicit flows and their effects in order to develop tailor-made prevention and response strategies, to minimise criminal markets and their impact on citizens.

Regional organised crime observatories can thus provide specialised analysis, through a reliance on local partnerships and cross-agency communication, to provide the evidence base through which policies and initiatives are developed and implemented.

Moreover, in line with the need to tackle organised crime through a multi-dimensional lens, observatories can be established by various stakeholders (including government agencies and civil society and non-governmental organisations). They can be tasked with a number of priorities and capacities and carry out their activities at any

jurisdictional level. Observatories can therefore serve as a flexible tool for key actors to hone in on prioritised issues and thematic areas and gather relevant data and other information to effectively shape responses.

In Africa and elsewhere, establishing observatories becomes particularly significant in the context of organised crime. Collusion between corrupt government and law enforcement officials and criminals is widespread, and undermines legitimate efforts to combat illicit activities. Independent local actors, including civil society organisations, business groups, foundations and universities, are gradually, informally and independently engaging in monitoring criminal activity.

When corruption has permeated state structures, independent observatories become crucial sources of credible information on organised crime and help with balancing conflicting priorities among stakeholders.

Finally, as information dissemination hubs, observatories can foster networks of communication and information exchange among observatories and relevant networks, allowing stakeholders to coordinate and strengthen measures to combat organised crime.

For example, the collection and dissemination of data related to specific illicit markets can feed into tools like the Index, providing policymakers with another means on which to base response strategies.

#### Observatories can:

- ❖ *Serve as front-line tools in monitoring, analysing and evaluating organised crime and its impact locally*

- ❖ *Build partnerships with local actors and coordinate among relevant stakeholders*

- ❖ *Serve as flexible tools, adaptable to jurisdiction, stakeholder priorities and thematic areas*

- ❖ *Offer an independent and transparent method for gathering credible data*

- ❖ *Disseminate information to a wide range of stakeholders*

#### *The value of an index*

While tools to capture organised crime exist, they are typically either created at the national level, or serve as estimates of criminal threats. As such, they do not fully meet the needs of policymakers who increasingly seek integrated responses. Moreover, information on organised crime rests disproportionately on qualitative research.

A better evidence base is urgently required for states and key actors to effectively monitor, analyse, prioritise and address the threats presented by organised crime in systematic and sustainable ways.

Indices are quantitative tools that allow for comparative analysis of complex subjects such as organised crime. By using indices, practitioners and policymakers are able to compare information on criminal markets with other areas of society (e.g. governance, social cohesion and political will) and develop responses based on empirical data.

***'Numbers are not the solution, but simply provide a basis for building the solution.'***

- Alfredo Peña López, Mexico United Against Crime

An index that captures organised crime on a continental level can foster awareness and cooperation on a grander scale by catalysing attention to the growing threats presented by transnational crime in Africa. It can also raise this issue to the top of the priority list for African governments, regional commissions and the African Union.

The model of the vulnerability tool that is being developed is multi-layered and nuanced around the scope and scale of specific illicit flows, on inherent risk and on the level and nature of state responses. The tool will therefore provide policymakers and regional bodies with guidance on how to prioritise their interventions, based on a multi-dimensional assessment of where the greatest harms are being felt.

## ENACT Vulnerability Assessment Tool

In the assessment of a state’s overall vulnerability to organised crime (OC), the Organised Crime Index, comprised of three composite sub-indices, will be designed to measure three categories of information: 1) risk to organised crime, 2) its presence and 3) state capacity and political will to respond to OC threats.



The relationships among the three metrics will also be considered in order to develop a cumulative vulnerability score for each African State. While the Index component offers a holistic framework of a state’s overall vulnerability to OC threats, a Data Dashboard will allow users to disaggregate such information and determine correlations to various impact areas in any given country or region.

### Components:

#### **Sub-Index I: Presence**

- Considers the presence of organised crime (in both form and depth)
- Classifies manifestations of crime within relevant illicit markets, ranging from human trafficking to maritime security, in the African context
- Serves as longitudinal study, aiming to show how OC has evolved, its current state and its predicted course of evolution
- Contributes to the core substance of the Data Dashboard
- Considers (among other things) hard criminal data, sharp changes in crime trends, etc.

#### **Sub-Index II: Risk**

- Considers areas under which a state’s susceptibility to OC may be present, e.g. its economy, physical geography, natural resources, social cohesion, conflict, socio-demographics, global engagement and trade

- Is intended to serve as a lens to clarify some of the complexity involved in the rise of OC within a state context, with a view of identifying potential vulnerability patterns across the continent
- Aims to measure risk to OC specifically and not of broader social, political, economic and environmental conditions

#### Sub-Index III: Response

- Considers a state's ability to respond to OC, namely its capacity and political will
- Serves as an assessment of any OC strategies in place and other state actions that may be used to combat OC
- Acknowledges that capacity and will are precursors to actual strategic policy implementation
- Considers various indicators such as the presence of a specialised OC unit, budget data dedicated to security and justice and ratifications of relevant treaties

#### Data Dashboard

- Provides analytic insight on the presence of OC and its impact
- Provides crime-sensitive indicators to assess the correlations in five impact areas: 1) *security and violence*, 2) *economic*, 3) *social development*, 4) *environment* and 5) *governance and democracy*
- Allows users to choose a crime type and see its impact in a selected area, for example, *human smuggling* may be viewed as it correlates to *gender based violence* or *terrorism* components of *security and violence*

While indices serve as useful tools, their development does not come without challenges. Measuring organised crime is inherently linked to its complex and clandestine nature, which creates difficulties in its analysis. For example, two of the biggest challenges posed by organised crime, particularly within the African context, are the absence of data and the collection of reliable data. Indeed, the collection of data may vary across countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. Moreover, limitations in accurately quantifying levels of organised crime throughout the continent, as well as considerations given to the rate at which data is collected and the timeliness of the data, may hinder the ability to produce accurate information.

***'We must strike a balance between statistical robustness and conversation starters.'***

-Jonathan Moyer, Pardee Centre, University of Denver

Nevertheless, indices can endeavour to overcome such challenges by cross-checking and triangulating data sources where available and by identifying proxy indicators as needed. While useful in providing a comparative analysis of organised crime, it is important for stakeholders to accept indices for what they are and the information they provide. Indices are best used as supplements to other means of gathering information, including through organised crime observatories.

#### *The foundation workshop*

The foundation workshop was formatted into a series of plenary sessions and various thematic breakout sessions, each of which focused on either a particular challenge, illicit market or group of crime types. This was done to coincide with and reinforce the framework of the ENACT Regional Organised Crime Observatories (ROCOs) and the Index tool.

While experts with specific backgrounds were asked to speak on panels to offer their experience, advice and expertise, all participants were encouraged to attend and engage in discussions throughout the workshop. The following key recommendations below highlight the major points that were made to the ENACT consortium in the development of the ROCOs and the Index tool. The subsequent Annex provides detailed yet concise summaries of each substantive session.

### *Key recommendations*

#### **Regional Organised Crime Observatories (ROCOs)**

- Take a proactive approach in data gathering by building relationships (both formal and informal) with local partners and other observatories.
- Develop multi-sector partnerships provide the groundwork for establishing reliability in data gathering.
- Maintain awareness of the impact of activities through regular self-evaluation.
- Find a timely balance between gathering reliable data and adapting to fast changing criminal markets.
- Understand the security implications of monitoring organised crime to personnel, sources and structure and establish the necessary safeguards.
- Reconcile conflicting priorities by mandating the overall objective to raise awareness of organised crime rather than advocating a specific solution.

#### **Index Tool**

- Ensure conceptual planning outlines the objectives, assumptions and value of the tool.
- Seizure data can be triangulated with proxy variables (i.e. from administrative sources, surveys and media reports) to provide a more accurate measure of the state of organised crime.
- The collection of statistics must be in line with international standards and principles, despite potential challenges such as data gaps and discrepancies in reporting.
- Choose a succinct and limited measurement method to avoid issues such as *multi-collinearity*, in which many different approaches and measures are used to explain the same concept.
- Refrain from extracting more from data collected than realistically exists, to ensure data outputs coincide with metric inputs.
- To increase the likelihood that the results are seen as a positive contribution and policymaking tool rather than a criticism, the framing of the Index is important. Advocate the Index as an international tool, by offering global comparisons to mitigate the risk of incriminating a particular country or continent and bolster international support.

### ***Plenary 1: ENACT Regional Organised Crime Observatories (ROCOs): objectives and principles***

The first plenary session focused on introducing the ENACT ROCOs. The session served to highlight the pivotal role of the ROCOs in the ENACT project as the central hubs for data gathering, knowledge dissemination, network building, policy influence and capacity building.

Panel members discussed the concept of observatories, the steps in their establishment and challenges in their development and activities. A marked distinction was made for crime observatories and those that focus on transnational organised crime (TOC), noting that TOC poses specific obstacles to observation, data collection and analysis. Moreover, observatories with an international or continental purview have the added complexity in ensuring participation of their constituents, managing data sources and delegating tasks among other observatories. A representative from the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) urged the use of a standardised common information and data exchange protocol. Additionally, the group highlighted the need for observatories to regularly self-evaluate by remaining cognisant of the impact of their activities.

The group stressed the need for observatories to be interactive, to develop multi-sector partnerships as groundwork for establishing reliability in their data gathering and to be supported by public institutions to stand as credible sources. Credibility was emphasised as a function of ethics; observatories should thus remain neutral in funding, operations and managing conflicting priorities. The potential benefits of partnering with observatories in other regions, specifically in Latin America, were also explored, drawing on organised crime links between the two regions.

While the development of organised-crime observatories holds its own set of challenges and considerations, once established, their missions and activities face specific concerns and obstacles. Two topics relating to the operations of observatories were underscored – namely, the timely fashion in which data is gathered, analysed and distributed, as well as the issue of security.

Criminal markets and networks are constantly changing and becoming increasingly sophisticated while remaining as invisible as possible. Observatories must therefore remain agile in their regular monitoring and assessment of criminal patterns, while taking into account the time-consuming efforts of gathering reliable data. Moreover, the tracking, analysis of and reporting on organised crime brings with it inherent risks given the nature of criminal activities. A representative from InSight Crime noted that while criminals' prime asset is their anonymity, observatories work to bring such illicit activities into the public sphere. Thus, in the planning, creation and implementation of observatories, it is crucial to understand the security implications to personnel, sources and structure, and to establish necessary safeguards.

### ***Plenary 2: Using an index: measuring crime and measuring impact***

While the first plenary session focused on the ROCOs, the second plenary session shifted attention to the Index, as the second of ENACT's flagship activities, forming a basis for subsequent thematic sessions. The session served as an overview of the framework and planned structure of the Organised Crime Vulnerability Assessment Tool in Africa, with a view of expanding to the global context. Participants were introduced to the rationale for the Index methodology, which drew from global best practices and the principle that multi-dimensional metrics – beyond seizure data – were crucial.

Presentations highlighted indices as lobbying tools, quantifying ideas and giving comparative dimensions to the organised-crime phenomenon. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that the development of an index may face challenges in adequately capturing the true complexity of organised crime by relegating its essence into numerical form. It was further highlighted that indices must strike a balance between building national data and maintaining regional and cross-regional perspectives.

The group acknowledged that in measuring the prevalence of organised crime, there was a tendency to rely on seizures made by law enforcement, given the clandestine nature of illicit markets. While at times useful, panellists warned that data collected on seizures often provide inaccurate information, with one panellist recommending the adjustment of data to better reflect this inherent challenge.

This is particularly important for the development of an index, which offers a window of data comparison both among countries and over time. Although data may appear to be comparable, countries may differ in their ability to make and report on seizures, (thus giving a biased or skewed view in a particular context). Despite this, seizure data can be triangulated with proxy variables to provide a more accurate view. Panellists explained different types of data sources, including administrative sources, surveys and media reports. They also highlighted the need for statistic collection to be in line with international standards and principles despite potential challenges, such as gaps in data and discrepancies in reporting.

Finally, drawing from past global experiences and best practices, it was emphasised that for the Index to remain relevant and accurate, it was necessary to choose a measurement approach that was succinct and limited. This should be done to avoid issues such as *multi-collinearity*, in which many different things are used to explain the same concept. Participants went on to offer lessons learnt regarding metrics, weighting and comparison, while ensuring longitudinal validity. Overall, in the development of the Index tool, the session emphasised the need to avoid extracting more information than actually exists from collected data. The participants agreed on placing limits on various aspects (such as variable selection and scope). They also agreed that making reasonable conceptualizations and expectations during the establishment and implementation of the Index tool was essential in minimising criticisms and ensuring data outputs coincided with metric inputs.

### **Breakout 1: Illicit financial flows**

The first breakout session focused on illicit financial flows (IFFs) and their role in perpetuating obstacles to development. As the overall objective of criminal groups is profit or material gain, participants debated whether the scale of illicit flows can arguably offer concrete and quantifiable indicators for the overall rate of organised crime and of its likely impact on state capacity to deliver development outcomes. The session served as base for the Index's crime type category involving illicit trade and counterfeiting.

Referencing their recent report entitled, *Track It! Stop It! Get It! Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa*, the representative from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) provided a brief overview of the background of measuring IFFs within the African context, as well as different methods of measurement. As the crux behind organised crime, the movement of illicit financial flows relies heavily on a diverse shadow financial system comprised of tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions and fake charitable foundations. IFFs can therefore be measured through equally numerous and diverse means, including discrepancies between imports and exports and trade mis-invoicing.

In so doing, it is important to consider issues such as corruption, reporting errors and timelines across countries. Participants debated the definition and measurement of illicit financial flows (based on value and impact) for the purpose of the Index construction, drawing from methodologies of the International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Integrity and the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa. They specifically looked at how the proceeds from organised crime are (or are not) captured within these methodologies and what proportion of total IFFs criminal proceeds might represent. The group also considered the extent to which existing protocols to monitor and control money laundering in formal financial systems might be used to capture and respond to IFFs.

Finally, the group explored the nuances between the broader illicit trade of physical commodities and counterfeiting of goods and identified various sources of relevant data. The implications of Africa's role as a source, transit point and destination for illicitly traded and counterfeit goods are significant in developing the Index's approach to measuring these types of crimes. For example, a panellist noted that while many illegally traded commodities remain within Africa, the continent holds a significant position as a staging post for illicit goods into Europe, in parallel with other organised crimes such as human trafficking. Informal market dynamics play significant roles in whether these crime types are viewed as parasitical or integral to the local economy.

### **Breakout 2: Mafia groups, extortion and the impact of criminal governance**

The second breakout session explored the nature of 'mafia-style' crimes throughout the continent. In particular, it explored the rise of gangs and social violence, extortion, assassinations and other violent crimes and their impact on governance. While acknowledging that the purchase of violence is not a flow, the group explored the issue as an

integral part of organised crime, noting that the issue of violence goes beyond data and has a profound impact on human security.

Drawing from information produced by Assassination Witness, a group that sets out to measure the scope and scale of criminal assassinations and their impact on society, economy and democracy in South Africa, panellists described assassinations as a symbolic measure of organised crime. Criminals use targeted violence to influence their illicit objectives and often to influence an economic outcome. The group highlighted challenges in identifying, measuring and categorising violence-driven crimes.

Panellists offered varied responses on the issue of violence, namely homicide counts and its use as an accurate indicator of the intensity of violent organised crime. While it was stated that high levels of organised crime do not necessarily result in violence, there was a debate as to the threshold in which it arises. While in some contexts, such as Nigeria, there is little violent organised crime, other countries, such as Mexico, noted a marked link. The discrepancies in different contexts underscore the need for observatories to monitor and analyse local conditions, and their evolution over time, in congruence with changing illicit market trends.

A point of deliberation was whether the nature of a particular commodity or illicit market and geography were factors in determining violence. This was underscored by the drug trade in Latin America, where certain drugs appear to be associated with high levels of violence, while others are not.

### ***Plenary 3: The role of the state and civil society in organised-crime observation and advocacy***

The third plenary session was focused on one of the major challenges in the development and implementation of observatories: the degree of their engagement with state institutions and the role of independent actors such as the media, investigative journalists and civil society in identifying, investigating and reporting on organised crime while managing conflicting priorities among relevant stakeholders.

Throughout the world, organised crime has permeated state institutions through corruption. This poses significant challenges to accurately monitoring illicit markets and developing effective prevention and response strategies. In this regard, the group discussed how observatories can promote the participation of independent actors while dealing with the challenges inherent to investigating and reporting on criminal activities. The panel collectively acknowledged that obtaining relevant and accurate data is one such challenge. By the very nature of organised crime – and in working with government agencies that often lack resources and are muddled with corruption – information is rarely recorded or easily accessible. The representative from Transparency International said that in such processes, secrecy tends to be the norm, while access to information tends to be the exception.

Moreover, the group noted that the difficulties inherent in data gathering are compounded by two major risks often faced by independent actors: 1) safety and security and 2) risks to credibility. Safety concerns in revealing illicit activities borne by both reporters and their subjects can shape public output and have a polarising impact. A representative from the Thomson Reuters Foundation recommended including those reported on (e.g. illicit actors) in the story telling process as a way to instil a sense of ownership in outputs and minimise safety concerns.

Recalling the discussions in the first plenary session, the group highlighted the risks of independent actors being labelled instruments of the state by collaborating with law enforcement agencies and other government institutions in the observation and reporting of criminal incidents. The representative from Afrobarometer noted that while there is a tendency in some African countries for citizens to place more trust in informal institutions, communication with multiple actors is necessary and in line with the multi-dimensional approach advocated when examining organised crime. The discussion underscored the point that reconciliation between conflicting priorities and impartiality rested on raising awareness of organised crime, rather than advocating a specific solution.

### ***Plenary 4: Measuring states' vulnerability to organised crime and their capacity to respond***

The fourth plenary session centred on the themes of two sub-indices of the ENACT Index tool: 1) measuring state risk and 2) measuring resilience to organised crime. Participants examined, among other things, the challenges involved in the classification of data as they pertain to states' vulnerability and capacity to respond. The discussion attempted to clarify the complexity of criminal networks within states and political parties and highlight policy opportunities.

The session also provided a platform for the exchange of lessons learned in the measurement of fluid concepts, such as state fragility and organised crime.

The group agreed that when developing the Index, conceptual planning must outline the objectives, assumptions and values of the tool. Panel members highlighted the Index as a medium through which conversations centred on organised-crime policies among relevant stakeholders could begin. Understanding the drivers of organised crime and the coping capacities of states often rests on the same data, thus posing challenges to the Index development. In attempting to quantify fluid concepts, discussions pointed to the “kitchen sink approach” whereby a multitude of indicators are included in an index. While this approach was deemed problematic from a quantitative perspective (thus advocating the simplification of the Index design), it was considered useful from a qualitative point of view in circumventing debates on the inclusion or exclusion of indicators.

Likening examples of the measurement of fragility to that of organised crime, which the OECD States of Fragility model had attempted to do in the past, the group outlined the different approaches in the collection of data by looking at risks, pressures, structural factors and specific events. When determining whether to classify data as either risk or response factors, it was stressed that quantitative data should be supplemented with qualitative data. Among the exchange of best practices, the importance of terminology, transparency, multi-dimensional perspectives and the use of empirical expert judgment was emphasised.

In the discussion following the presentations, participants stressed that evaluating states and their performance is always a controversial exercise and one that attracts criticism and complaint. To improve the likelihood that the results are seen as a positive contribution and a policymaking tool, rather than a criticism of countries, the framing of the Index is important. Participants supported the ENACT tool being described as a ‘vulnerability assessment’ rather than an Index. They cautioned against too obviously or confidently ranking states. Participants were emphatic that the product should not target Africa exclusively, thereby making it appear as if Africa is the only continent with organised crime, or that it is uniquely suffering. One recommendation to mitigate this risk was building in means for global comparisons.

### ***Breakout 3: The challenges of observatories in gathering reliable data***

The third breakout session examined traditional and alternative sources for organised-crime data collection and the challenges the ROCOs will face in ensuring data quality. Participants shared their experiences and offered lessons learned on ways observatories can strategically mobilise different sources of data that allow systematic triangulation of sources to mend gaps in information. Panel members attributed data gaps to multiple reasons, including a lack of cooperation in collection, a lack of indicator standardisation (i.e. where data may exist but is incomparable), and an absence of data. It was advised that observatories should take a proactive approach in their data gathering, underscoring the necessity of building relationships (both formal and informal) with local partners and other observatories.

The group explored five components that can ensure the quality of data collection: 1) the frequency of collection, 2) the validity process, 3) the collection protocols, 4) the importance of shared definitions and concepts and 5) the management of data and information sharing. One expert noted that stakeholders’ goals can play a part in the quality of data produced. In other words, resources could be prematurely directed towards developing datasets in the face of low quality or missing information. Additionally, a representative from Africa Check, an organisation that promotes the verification of sources, stated that when data simply does not exist, it was important to offer qualitative explanations rather than supplementing with poor information. Observatories and other actors can therefore learn of areas for further investigation.

The group also examined the necessity of having international norms and standards to ensure comparability of datasets between ROCOs. This could be done by lending expertise on the challenges in building internationally harmonised shared definitions, data collection practices and protocols that ensure smooth data transfers. Participants agreed that while organised crime is transnational in nature, its impact is local.

Thus, when faced with a lack of data on a macro level, observatories should redirect their focus to locally informed sources for information. Finally, recalling the third plenary session, the group stressed the importance of the

diversification of funding as a function of observatory neutrality, which ultimately has effects on the quality of information collected and produced.

#### ***Breakout 4: TOC Incident Monitoring***

The fourth breakout session referred to the pilot phase of ENACT's TOC Incident Monitoring project, which sought to record and translate reported incidents of wildlife crimes in Southern Africa. Following the pilot, the project will expand focus to other crime types throughout the continent. Participants explored issues related to tracking and reporting on global crime syndicates and challenges in the classification of incidents of organised crime.

Taking stock of existing sources on organised crime, namely official statistics, media coverage and academic research, participants examined the difficulties in isolating and coding discrete organised-crime incidents. The discussion suggested the need for the project to make a clear distinction between framing incidents as criminal or legal events and assessments or *interpretations* of assumed criminal events. One panellist advised the need for numerous sources to support media-based data produced in lieu of numerous indicators for measuring and monitoring tools. Best practices were shared by other researchers, with participants offering advice on the usefulness of identifying a basic unit of analysis in extracting incidents from data sources. It was agreed upon that the collection of data on organised-crime incidents, events or activities was more feasible than information gathering on criminal structures and criminal governance.

#### ***Breakout 5: Migration, mobility, protection and security***

The fifth breakout session examined the nature and prevalence of human trafficking and human smuggling as interwoven crimes and resilience strategies throughout the African continent. The group examined the theoretical misunderstandings about the distinction between human trafficking and human smuggling, while acknowledging the difficulty in differentiating the crimes for practitioners on the ground. The division in the two crime types rest primarily on the concepts of purpose and consent. While those who commit acts of migrant smuggling do so to facilitate a person's illegal movement for profit, human traffickers seek to exploit their subjects. Unlike trafficked people, smuggled migrants are voluntarily involved in the process and often pay smugglers to enter a country irregularly. The issue of categorisation poses significant obstacles to data gathering. For example, the group discussed the complications around the point at which human smuggling transitions into trafficking.

Moreover, panellists acknowledged the lack of criminalisation of human smuggling in the context of the African continent and questioned whether its consideration as a crime type within the ENACT Index would be appropriate. Instead, a number of factors were suggested as a measurement of irregular movement rather than crime. These included resilience (i.e. the push and pull factors that cause individuals to choose to be smuggled), number of deaths, profitability and pricing of the movement of people, the types of actors involved and the technologies used in advertising smuggling services.

While the efforts to measure the scope and scale of human trafficking are advanced, there are no comparable or comprehensive efforts to measure criminal markets related to the facilitation of irregular movement. While methodologies could be considered, they would require piloting new methodologies and collecting new data related to pricing and the number of actors engaged in human smuggling. The session concluded by drawing attention to the work of other organisations for potential partnerships and guidance in the development of the Index tool. It was advised that existing data could be expanded by improving country narratives.

#### ***Breakout 6: Environmental crimes and impact on the environment***

During the sixth breakout session, participants examined the nature and prevalence of environmental crimes, namely wildlife poaching and trade and illicit logging, to assess their impact in Africa. Participants explored challenges in data collection and set recommendations for the development of the Index. The group acknowledged that methods used to analyse environmental crime in Africa remained underdeveloped, posing a challenge to the effective use of collected data. Drawing from the second plenary session, one expert cited the data on wildlife killings (as reported by park rangers) as insufficient in building reliable datasets because of the difficulties in determining illegality. It is thus important to consider different drivers and aspects of wildlife trade as a whole in order obtain accurate information.

Certain trends, such as the upsurge in poaching and the rise and fall of trade in certain animal products, implied a link to organised criminal activities. The group stressed that environmental crimes were driven by external demand, raising the question of whether to redirect focus from supply markets in the development of response strategies. The impacts of these crimes are widespread throughout the continent, bearing on poverty, human security, health and climate change. These impacts are compounded by discrepancies in awareness and state capacities to respond.

The group also discussed obstacles in measuring these crimes, addressing corruption of government actors, the discrepancy between arrest and prosecution rates and the lack of prioritisation among states. Moreover, the lack of consensus on measuring the impact of legal and illegal hunting of protected wildlife species was highlighted as a risk to the accuracy of reporting on the scale of the problem, given that products derived from legal hunts can often end up on the black market. Nevertheless, it was recommended that certain factors, such as the value of specific commodities over time, would be useful indicators. Moreover, participants emphasised the importance of seeking a broader range of data to adequately capture the complexity of such crimes, including innovative ways to capture the demand of wildlife derivatives and products.

### ***Breakout 7: Arms trafficking***

During the seventh breakout session, participants focused on the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons as a cross-cutting issue and priority in Africa. Arms are often used in carrying out other forms of crimes, making the identification and mapping of these links an important starting point in developing effective strategies to curtail illicit arms flows. A representative from the Small Arms Survey drew attention to arms proliferation as a combination of two notions: 1) illicit trafficking (which has a transnational dimension) and 2) illicit flows (which refers to the re-allocation of arms between various actors).

The group examined sources and factors contributing to the illicit trade of weapons, including political instability that engenders armed resistance, collusion between government actors and traffickers, public dissatisfaction in the governing of resources and military involvement. Criminals smuggle arms for various reasons, including for protection, to carry out their illicit activities, to gain and maintain power and to generate income.

Participants also explored the state of play in illicit proliferation of weapons in Africa, identifying weak regional cooperation, laxity in regulatory control and standardisation and unenforced borders as vulnerabilities. In consideration of the existing policy framework aimed at mapping, curbing and neutralising these flows, the group noted that while African countries are quick to adopt relevant instruments, there has been a general lack of implementation of these instruments. Finally, in the development of the Index, experts proposed a number of sources to consider, including seizure reports, illicit market prices, surveys, routes and the weapons themselves.

### ***Breakout 8: Maritime crimes and vulnerabilities***

In the eighth breakout session, participants examined the nature and prevalence of maritime crimes and state vulnerability to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy at sea and oil bunkering. Compared to criminal activities on land, maritime crimes garner far less attention and the lack of jurisdiction over the high seas complicates interventions. Even within territorial waters, however, the participants referred to a lack of political will to address these types of crimes. They also highlighted the lack of public awareness on the socio-economic impact of maritime crime and the pervasiveness of corruption as challenges to developing informed and effective policy measures.

The diversity in maritime crimes and their methods necessitates cooperation and coordination among states, the private sector, land-based law enforcement and their maritime counterparts. This sentiment was reinforced by an expert on maritime piracy, who noted that while the illicit activity occurred at sea, solutions are often found on shore. A representative from I.R. Consilium provided an example of oil bunkering as a crime comprised of a number of activities including direct theft, smuggling and fuel laundering. While a number of databases already exist for maritime crime, these are not necessarily structured in a way that allows analysis that would support the Index, although this could be manually addressed. Further recommendations for indicator selection included referencing counter-measures and electronic documentation, as well as a number of measures that would require cooperation with private sector businesses to access their corporate reporting and tracking systems.

Activities in IUU fishing may range from single person subsistence fishing to large scale fishing companies. These activities have major impact on coastal communities, which is characterised by poverty, unemployment and crime. The illegal harvest and trade of maritime products has become almost institutionalised. The participants explored methods in measuring these activities by way of their illegality, as a function of being unreported and unregulated. These methods included looking at impact, number of vessels and perpetrators, as well as the value and volume of catches. Some species have very well-developed and longstanding data tracking systems – abalone poaching was one example presented by TRAFFIC – though it was noted that even in this case, using the data to catalyse effective response requires a broader set of interventions and incentives.

### ***Breakout 9: Drug trafficking and drug policy in Africa***

The ninth breakout session examined the nature and prevalence of drug trafficking throughout the African continent. This included its impact on social health, the environment and the perpetuation of other forms of crime, such as counterfeit goods, human trafficking and sexual exploitation. There was a consensus on the current limitations of data related to the extent and scope of drug trafficking on the African continent. Participants advocated for the collection of better data and to limit reliance on existing sources produced by international organisations and governments. There was a call for higher quality African-focused information, noting that framing and measurement are closely linked to priorities and responses.

The group discussed the limitations of existing data, mentioning several key issues ENACT should consider in their measurement of the crime, including: 1) most data on drugs reflect law enforcement action (seizures) rather than the true size of the problem, 2) research and funding prioritisation of certain drug types skews understanding and incorrectly spotlights some drugs over others, 3) most data are restricted by drug type and location (e.g. national), while important countries of influence and supply are excluded from studies and 4) there are inconsistencies in what constitutes *drugs* across various contexts.

To this extent, further understanding was required of the range of drugs and drug use in Africa, such as substance abuse, local prescription and non-prescription drugs such as Panadol and ketamine, smoking cow dung, aerosols and petrol sniffing and hard drugs such as methamphetamines. In line with the Index's objective in capturing harm, consideration should be given to all drug types on the continent.

Participants made suggestions for potential indicators and proxy indicators for the ENACT Index, including using pricing data (from both the demand and the supply side), links between drugs and other crime types and socio-economic data (e.g. population density and household income). Moreover, it was reiterated that within the African context, very little information exists related to treatments and treatment facilities for drug users. Thus, the group suggested indicators include the number of people seeking treatment.

### ***Breakout 10: Africa's future organised crimes and emerging issues***

The tenth and final breakout session explored how patterns of organised crime relate to governance, regime types, corruption, poverty and economics and how these structural drivers may unfold to 2030 and beyond. Referencing ENACT's building of a futures-focused analysis model, participants considered types of factors at play in forecasting and how they can be measured. Panellists acknowledged the lack of clarity regarding the correlation between organised crime and factors such as governance as a result of poor data. Nevertheless, participants noted that the crux of forecasting and scenario building falls on a multidimensional view of society as a whole (i.e. analysing the relationships between economic systems, health systems and natural environmental systems). Key factors should therefore include exploring trends in the economy (such as long-term drivers of economic growth), labour market imbalances, environmental changes and food security.